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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
10-1491
Ruling Below: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
10-1491 (132 S.Ct. 472).
In 2002, 12 plaintiffs from the Ogoni area of the Niger Delta brought suit against Royal Dutch
and other corporations pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, which allows suits for violation of
international law. The plaintiffs alleged that Royal Dutch and other corporations engaged in oil
exploration and production that aided and abetted the Nigerian government between 1992 and
1995 in committing human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial executions. In 2006
the United Stated District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed claims against
corporate defendants in part, and certified entire order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross
appealed.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of
the law of nations. (2) Whether the Alien TOli Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than
the United States

Esther KIOBEL, individually and on behalf of her late husband, Dr. Barinem Kiobel,
Bishop Augustine Numene John-Miller, Charles Baridorn Wiwa, Israel Pyakene Nwidor,
Kendricks Dorle Nwikpo, Anthony B. Kote-Witah, Victor B. Wifa, Dumle J. Kunenu,
Benson Magnus Ikari, Legbara Tony Idigima, Pius Nwinee, Kpobari Tusima, individually
and on behalf of his late father, Clement Tusima, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,

v.
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO., Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC,
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants,
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., Defendant.
United States COUli of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Filed September 17, 2010
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents a question that has been
lurking for some time in our A TS
jurisprudence. Since our first case upholding
claims brought under the ATS in 1980, our
Court has never directly addressed whether
our jurisdiction under the ATS extends to

civil actions against corporations. We have,
in the past, decided ATS cases involving
corporations without addressing the issue of
corporate liability. But that fact does not
foreclose consideration of the issue here. As
the Supreme Court has held, "when
questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio," the Court
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"has never considered itself bound when a
brings
the
subsequent case finally
jurisdictional issue before [it]."
In answering the question presented we
proceed in two steps. First, we consider
which body of law governs the questioninternational law or domestic law-and
conclude that international law governs.
Second, we consider what the sources of
international law reveal with respect to
whether corporations can be subject to
liability for violations of customary
international law. We conclude that those
sources lead inescapably to the conclusion
that the customary international law of
human rights has not to date recognized
liability for corporations that violate its
norms.

I. Customary International Law Governs
Our Inquiry
The A TS grants federal district courts
jurisdiction over claims "by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1350.27 In 2004, the Supreme
Court held in Sosa that the A TS is a
jurisdictional statute only; it creates no cause
of action, Justice Souter explained, because
its drafters understood that "the common
law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal
liability at the time."
The Court in Sosa held that federal courts
may recognize claims "based on the presentday law of nations" provided that the claims
rest on "norm[ s] of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms [the Court
had] recognized."

We conclude-based on international law,
Sosa, and our own precedents-that
international law, and not domestic law,
governs the scope of liability for violations
of customary international law under the
ATS.

A. International Law Defines the Scope of
Liability for Violations of Norms
That the subjects of international law are
determined by international law, and not
individual States, is evident from the
decisions of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg ("Tribunal") in the
aftermath of the Second World War. The
significance of the judgment of the
Tribunal-and of the judgments of the
tribunals established by the Allied Control
Council pursuant to Council Control Law
No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945)-was not simply
that it recognized genocide and aggressive
war as violations of international law. The
defining
legal
achievement of the
Nuremberg trials is that they explicitly
recognized individ1lal liability for the
violation of specific, universal, and
obligatory norms of the customary
international law of human rights. In its
judgment the Tribunal noted that the
defendants had argued that "international
law is concerned with the actions of
sovereign
states,
and
provides
no
punishment for individuals." The Tribunal
rejected that view, however, declaring that
"international law imposes duties and
liabilities upon individuals as well as upon
states" and that "individuals can be punished
for violations of international law."
B. Sosa and Our Precedent Require Us to

Look at International Law to Determine
the Scope of Liability
In Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the
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lower federal courts to consider "whether
international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant
is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual." That language requires that we
look to international law to determine our
jurisdiction over ATS claims against a
particular class of defendant, such as
corporations. That conclusion is reinforced
by Justice Breyer's reformulation of the
issue in his concurring opinion: "The norm
[of international law ] must extend liability to
the type 0.1 perpetrator (e.g., a private actor)
the plaintiff seeks to sue."
Our interpretation of Sosa is also consistent
with Judge Katzmann's separate opinion in
Khlllllmani, 504 F.3d at 264, which this
same panel (including Judge Leval) adopted
as the law of the Circuit in Presbyterian
Ch1lrch. In Kh1l11lmani, Judge Katzmann
observed that aiding and abetting liabilitymuch like corporate liability-'" does not
constitute a discrete criminal offense but
only serves as a more particularized way of
identifying the persons involved' in the
underlying offense." Judge Katzmann
further explained that "[w]hile [footnote 20
of Sosa] specifically concerns the liability of
non-state actors, its general principle is
equally applicable to the question of where
to look to determine whether the scope of
liability for a violation of international law
should extend to aiders and abettors He
therefore concluded that "to assure itself that
it has jurisdiction to hear a claim under the
[ATS], [a court] should first determine
whether the alleged tort was in fact
'committed in violation of the law of
nations,' 28 U.S.c. § 1350, and whether this
law w01lld recognize the defendants'
responsibility for that violation."
Significantly, it was only because we looked
to international law that we were able to

recogmze a norm of aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS. In Khlllumani,
Judge Katzmann declined to rely on the
usual presumption against aiding and
abetting liability that applies 111 the
interpretation of domestic statutes. Instead,
Judge Katzmann concluded that Central
Bank had no bearing on aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS because, "[u]nder
the [ATS] the relevant norm is prOVided not
by domestic statute but by the law of
nations, and that law extends responsibility
for violations of its norms to aiders and
abettors." 504 F.3d at 282.
In sum, we have little difficulty holding that,
under international law, Sosa, and our three
decades of precedent, we are required to
look to international law to determine
whether corporate liability for a "violation
of the law of nations," 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a
norm "accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity" sufficient to
provide a basis for jurisdiction under the
ATS, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 2739.
We have looked to international law to
determine whether state officials, private
individuals, and aiders and abettors, can be
held liable under the ATS. There is no
principled basis for treating the question of
corporate liability differently.
II. Corporate Liability is not a Norm of
Customary International Law

To attain the status of a rule of customary
international law, a norm must be "specific,
universal, and obligatory." Defining such
norms "is no simple task," as "[ c]ustomary
international law is discerned from myriad
decisions made in numerous and varied
international and domestic arenas." Flores,
414 F.3d at 247. The sources consulted are
therefore of the utmost importance. As the
Supreme Court re-emphasized in Sosa, we
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look to "those sources we have long, albeit
cautiously, recognized":
'[W]here there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of
labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat. Such works are
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not
for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be,
but for trustwOlthy evidence of what
the law really is.'
542 U.S. at 733-34, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

A. International Tribunals
Insofar as international tribunals are
established for the specific purpose of
imposing liability on those who violate the
law of nations, the history and conduct of
those tribunals is instructive. We find it
particularly significant, therefore, that no
intemational tribunal of which we are aware
has ever held a corporation liable for a
violation of the law of nations.

Justice Jackson explained, the London
Charter "is a basic charter III the
Intemational Law of the future," and the
Nuremberg trials took great strides in
"ma[king] explicit and unambiguous" the
human rights norms that had "theretofore ..
. [been] implicit in Intemational Law."
Jackson, Final Report, ante, at 342. And as
Judge Katzmann noted in Khul1l1nani:
"[C]ourts, intemational bodies, and scholars
have recognized that the principles set out in
the London Charter and applied by the
Intemational
Military
Tribunal
are
significant not only because they have
gamered broad acceptance, but also because
they were viewed as reflecting and
crystallizing
preexisting
customary
intemationallaw." 504 F.3d at 27l.
It is notable, then, that the London Charter,
which established the lntemational Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, granted the Tribunal
jurisdiction over nat1lral persons only.

1. The Nuremberg Tribunals

Echoing the London Chalter's imposition of
liability on natural persons only, the
subsequent United States Military Tribunals,
established under Control Council Law No.
10, prosecuted corporate exec1ltives for their
role in violating customary intemational law
during the Second World War, but not the
corporate entities themselves. This approach
to liability can be seen most clearly in the
tribunal's treatment of the notorious I.G.
Farben chemical company.

The Charter of the Intemational Military
Tribunal, commonly known as the "London
Charter," authorized the punishment of the
major war criminals of the European Axis
following the Second World War. The
London Charter and the trials at Nuremberg
that followed are collectively the single most
important source of modern customary
international law concerning liability for
violations of fundamental human rights. As

The refusal of the military tribunal at
Nuremberg to impose liability on I.G.
Fm'ben is not a matter of happenstance or
oversight. This corporation's production of,
among other things, oil, rubber, nitrates, and
fibers was harnessed to the purposes of the
Nazi state, and it is no exaggeration to assert
that the corporation made possible the war
crimes and crimes against humanity
perpetrated by Nazi Germany, including its
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infamous programs of looting properties of
defeated nations, slave labor, and genocide.
Twenty-four executives of Farben were
charged, inter alia, with "Planning,
Preparation, Initiation, and Waging of Wars
of Aggression and Invasions of Other
Countries"; "Plunder and Spoliation"; and
"Slavery and Mass Murder." But the LG.
Farben corporate entity was not charged, nor
was it named in the indictment as a criminal
organization. In issuing its judgment, the
tribunal pointedly observed that "the
corporate defendant, Farben, is not before
the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be
subjected to criminal penalties in these
proceedings." 8 The F aI'ben Case, ante, at
1153. The Tribunal emphasized:
We have used the term "Farben" as
descriptive of the instrumentality of
cohesion in the name of which the
enumerated acts of spoliation were
committed. But corporations act
through individuals and, under the
conception of personal individual
guilt '" the prosecution, to discharge
the burden imposed upon it in this
case, must establish by competent
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
an individual defendant was either a
participant in the illegal act or that,
being aware thereof, he authorized or
approved it.
In declining to impose corporate liability
under international law in the case of the
most nefarious corporate enterprise known
to the civilized world, while prosecuting the
men who led I.G. Farben, the military
tribunals established under Control Council
Law No.1 0 expressly defined liability under
the law of nations as liability that could not
be divorced from individual moral
responsibility. It is thus clear that, at the
time of the Nuremberg trials, corporate

liability was not recognized as a "specific,
universal, and obligatory" norm of
customary international law.

2.
International
Nuremberg

Tribunals

Since

Since Nuremberg, international tribunals
have
continually declined
to
hold
corporations liable for violations of
customary international law. For example,
chatiers
establishing
both
the
the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
or ("ICTR") expressly confined the
tribunals' jurisdiction to "natural persons."
The commentary contained in the Report of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations
on the ICTY reveals that jurisdiction over
corporations was considered but expressly
rejected: "[T]he ordinary meaning of the
term 'persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law'
would be natural persons to the excl1lsion of
j1lridical persons." Moreover, unlike the
at
International
Military
Tribunal
Nuremberg, the ICTY lacked the authority
to declare organizations "criminal." Jd. ~ 51
Thus, to the extent that the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg possessed
some
limited
authority to
declare
corporations criminal-which, as explained
above, operated merely as an evidentiary
rule for later trials imposing liability on
individ1lals-subsequent tribunals have not
retained that procedure.
More recently, the Rome Statute of the ICC
also limits that tribunal's jurisdiction to
"natural persons." Significantly, a proposal
to grant the ICC jurisdiction over
corporations and other "juridical" persons
was advanced by the French delegation, but
the proposal was rejected. As commentators
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have explained, the French proposal was
rejected in pati because "criminal liability of
corporations is still rejected in many
national legal orders" and thus would pose
challenges for the ICC's principle of
"complementarity." ld. The history of the
Rome Statute therefore confirms the absence
of any generally recognized principle or
States
concerning
consensus
among
corporate liability for violations of
customary international law.

Conclusion
The ATS provides federal district courts
jurisdiction over a tort, brought by an alien
only, alleging a "violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1350. When an ATS suit is brought
under the "law of nations," also known as
"customary international law," jurisdiction
is limited to those cases alleging a violation
of an international norm that is "specific,
universal, and obligatory."
No corporation has ever been subject to any
form of liability (whether civil, criminal, or
otherwise) under the customary international
law of human rights. Rather, sources of
customary international law have, on several
occasions, explicitly rejected the idea of
corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability
has not attained a discernable, much less
universal, acceptance among nations of the
world in their relations inter se, and it
cannot not, as a result, form the basis of a
suit under the ATS.
Accordingly, the September 29, 2006 order
of the District Court is AFFIRMED insofar
as it dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims
against the corporate defendants and
REVERSED insofar as it declined to
dismiss plaintiffs' remaining claims against
the corporate defendants.

LEVAL, Circuit Judge, concurring only
in the judgment.
The majority opinion deals a substantial
blow to international law and its undertaking
to protect fundamental human rights.
According to the IUle my colleagues have
created, one who earns profits by
commercial exploitation of abuse of
fundamental human rights can successfully
shield those profits from victims' claims for
compensation simply by taking the
precaution of conducting the heinous
operation in the corporate form. Without any
support in either the precedents or the
scholarship of international law, the majority
takes the position that corporations, and
other juridical entities, are not subject to
international law, and for that reason such
violators of fundamental human rights are
free to retain any profits so earned without
liability to their victims.
Since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir.1980), was decided in 1980, United
States courts, acting under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), which was passed by the
First Congress in 1789, have been awarding
compensatory damages to victims of human
rights abuses committed in violation of the
law of nations. Many supporters of the cause
of human rights have celebrated the
Filartiga line of cases as an impoliant
advance of civilization. Not all, however,
have viewed those cases with favor. Some
see them as unwarranted meddling by U.S.
judges in events that occurred far away,
applying a body of law that we did not
make, in circumstances carrying a potential,
furthermore, to interfere with the President's
conduct of foreign affairs. In 2004, a
substantial minority of the Supreme COUli,
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
124 S.Ct. 2739, would have essentially
nullified the ATS and overturned the
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Filartiga line, by ruling that the A TS did no
more than give courts jurisdiction, and that,
absent further legislation establishing a legal
claim, courts acting under A TS had no
authority to grant any substantive relief. The
majority of the Supreme Court, however,
rejected that argument. The COUli ruled that
under the A TS, federal courts could award
damages for violations of the law of nations.
For those who believe the Filartiga Sosa
line represents a meaningful advance in the
protection of human rights, the majority's
decision here marks a very bad day.
To understand this controversy, it is
impOliant to understand exactly what is the
majority's IUle, how it functions, and in
what circumstances. To begin, their IUle
relates to the most abhorrent conduct-those
acts that violate norms of the international
law of human rights. The ATS gives U.S.
cOUlis jurisdiction to award tort damages to
aliens who are victims of such atrocities.
According to the majority, in cases where
the norms of the law of nations were
violated by a corporation (or other juridical
entity), compensatory damages may be
awarded ltnder the ATS against the
corporation's employees, natural persons
who acted in the corporation's behalf, b1lt
not against the corporation that commanded
the atrocities and earned profits by
committing
them.
The
corporation,
according to my colleagues, has not violated
international law, and is indeed incapable of
doing so because international law does not
apply to the conduct of corporations.
Accordingly, a corporation which has earned
profits by abuse of fundamental human
rights-as by slave trading-is free to retain
those profits without liability.
While my colleagues see nothing strange or
problematic in this conclusion, their position
is that in any event they have no

responsibility for it. They invoke the rule
simply because, in their contention, it is
commanded by the law of nations.
But there is no basis for this contention. No
precedent of international law endorses this
rule. No court has ever approved it, nor is
any international tribunal structured with a
jurisdiction that reflects it. (Those courts
that have ruled on the question have
explicitly rejected it.) No treaty or
international
convention
adopts
this
principle. And no work of scholarship on
international law endorses the majority's
rule. Until today, their concept had no
existence in international law.
The majority contend, nevertheless, that
"lead[s]
unambiguous
jurisprudence
inescapably" to their conclusion. Maj. Op.
125. However, the reasoning that supports
the majority's argument is, in my view,
illogical, misguided, and based on
misunderstandings of precedent.
The argument depends on its observation
that international criminal tribunals have
been established without jurisdiction to
criminal
punishments
on
impose
corporations for their violations of
international law. From this fact the majority
contend an inescapable inference arises that
international
law
does
not govern
corporations, which are therefore free to
engage in conduct prohibited by the rules of
international law with impunity.
There is no logic to the argument. The
reasons why international tribunals have
been established without jurisdiction to
impose criminal liability on corporations
have to do solely with the theory and the
objectives of criminal p1lnishment, and have
no bearing on civil compensatory liability.
The view is widely held among the nations
of the world that criminal punishments
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(under domestic law, as well as international
law) are inappropriate for corporations.
This view derives from two perceptions:
First, that criminal punishment can be
theoretically justified only where the
defendant has acted with criminal intent-a
condition that cannot exist when the
defendant is a juridical construct which is
incapable of having an intent; and second,
that criminal punishments are pointless and
counterproductive when imposed on a
fictitious juridical entity because they fail to
achieve the punitive objectives of criminal
punishment. For these reasons many nations
in their domestic laws impose criminal
punishments only on natural persons, and
not on juridical ones. In contrast, the
imposition of civil liability on corporations
serves perfectly the objective of civil
liability to compensate victims for the
wrongs inflicted on them and is practiced
everywhere in the world. The fact that
international tribunals do not Impose
criminal p1lnishment on corporations in no
way supports the inference that corporations
are outside the scope of international law
and therefore can
incur no civil
compensatory liability to victims when they
engage in conduct prohibited by the norms
of international law.
The majority next contend that international
law does not distinguish between criminal
and civil liability. This is simply incorrect.
International law distinguishes clearly
between them and provides differently for
the different objectives of criminal
punishment and civil compensatory liability.
The majority then argue that the absence of
a universal practice among nations of
imposing civil damages on corporations for
violations of international law means that
under international law corporations are not
liable for violations of the law of nations.
This argument is as illogical as the first and

is based on a misunderstanding of the
structure of international law. The position
of international law on whether civil liability
should be imposed for violations of its
norms is that international law takes no
position and leaves that question to each
nation to resolve. International law, at least
as it pertains to human rights, consists
primarily of a sparse body of norms,
adopting
widely
agreed
principles
prohibiting conduct universally agreed to be
heinous and inhumane. Having established
these norms of prohibited conduct,
international law says little or nothing about
how those norms should be enforced. It
leaves the manner of enforcement, including
the question of whether there should be
private civil remedies for violations of
international law, almost entirely to
individual nations. While most nations have
not recognized tort liability for violations of
international law, the United States, through
the ATS, has opted to impose civil
compensatory liability on violators and
draws no distinction in its laws between
violators who are natural persons and
corporations. The majority's argument that
national courts are at libe11y to award civil
damages for violations of international law
solely against natural persons and not
against corporations has no basis in
international law and, fm1hermore, nullifies
the intention of international law to leave the
question of civil liability to be decided
separately by each nation.
The majority's asserted rule is, furthermore,
at once internally inconsistent and
incompatible with Supreme COUl1 authority
and with our prior cases that awarded
damages for violations of international law.
The absence of a universally accepted rule
of international law on tort damages is true
as to defendants who are natural persons, as
well
as
to
corporations.
Because
international law generally leaves all aspects
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of the issue of civil liability to individual
nations, there is no rule or custom of
international law to award civil damages in
any form or context, either as to natural
persons or as to juridical ones. lfthe absence
of a universally accepted rule for the award
of civil damages against corporations means
that U.S. cOUlis may not award damages
against a corporation, then the same absence
of a universally accepted rule for the award
of civil damages against natural persons
must mean that U.S. courts may not award
damages against a natural person. But the
majority opinion concedes (as it must) that
U.S. cOUlis may award damages against the
corporation's employees when a corporation
violates the rule of nations. Furthermore, our
circuit and others have for decades awarded
damages, and the Supreme COUli in Sosa
made clear that a damage remedy does lie
under the ATS. The majority opinion is thus
internally inconsistent and is logically
incompatible with both Second Circuit and
Supreme Court authority.

I.
The
improbability
that
the
humanitarian law of nations, which is
based in moral judgments reflected in
legal systems throughout world and seeks
to protect fundamental human rights,
would espouse a rule which undermines
that objective and lacks any logical
justification
A. The opposition of the majority's rule to
the objectives of international law.
Rules of international law are not, like
rocks, mountains, and oceans, unexplained
natural phenomena found on the surface of
the emih. The rules of international law have
been created by a collective human agency
representing the nations of the world with a
pwpose to serve desired objectives. Those
rules express the consensus of nations on

goals that are shared with virtual unanimity
throughout the world. Prior to World War II,
the enforcement of international law focused
primarily on relations among States and
problems relating to the sovereign interests
of States. It involved, for example, the
inviolability of ambassadors in foreign
lands, safe conducts, and the outlawing of
piracy, which threatened the shared interest
of all nations in trade on the high seas.
Worldwide revulsion at the Nazi atrocities in
the period of World War II, however,
focused attention on humanitarian valuesvalues so fundamental that they were seen as
shared by the "civilized nations" of the
world. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. Beginning
with the Nuremberg trials, the focus of
international law thus broadened beyond
practical concerns of sovereign nations
toward universally shared moral objectives.
Acts so repugnant that they violated the
morality shared by the civilized world were
recognized as violations of international law.
The law of nations thus came to focus on
humanitarian, moral concerns, addressing a
small category of particularly "heinous
actions-each of which violates definable,
universal and obligatory norms"-conduct
so heinous that he who commits it is
rendered "hostis hllmani generis, an enemy
of all mankind." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, 124
S.Ct. 2739. These acts are generally
understood to include such extreme,
universally condemned conduct as genocide,
exploitation of slaves, war crimes, and, in
certain circumstances, imprisonment without
cause and torture. The law of nations
undertakes an emphatic stance of opposition
to such acts.
The majority's interpretation of international
law, which accords to corporations a free
pass to act in contravention of international
law's norms, conflicts with the humanitarian
objectives of that body of law.
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II. The majority's mistaken claim that
corporations are not "subjects" of
international law
The majority attempt to bolster their
argument by employing the arcane
terminology of international law. They
asseli that a corporation is not a "subject" of
international law. Maj. Op. 125-26. The
majority explain the significance of this term
to be that only subjects of international law
have "rights, duties, and liabilities" under
international law. Maj. Op. 118. Because,
according to the majority, a corporation is
not a subject of the law of nations, it may
neither bring suit for violations of the law of
nations nor be sued for offenses under the
law of nations.
The majority, however, cites no authority in
support of their asseliion that a corporation
is not a subject of international law and is
therefore incapable of being a plaintiff or a
defendant in an action based on a violation
of the law of nations. And there is strong
authority to the contrary.
The idea that an entity was or was not a
"subject" of international had greatest
prominence when the rules of international
law focused on the sovereign interests of
States in their relations with one another. To
the extent that a particular rule of
international law pertains only to the
relationship among States, it can be correct
to say that only States are subjects.
However, as the law of nations evolved to
recognize that "individuals and private
juridical entities can have any status,
capacity, rights, or duties given them by
agreement,"
international
law
or
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, pt. II,
introductory note, that terminology has
come to mean nothing more than asking
whether the particular norm applies to the

type of individual or entity charged with
violating it, as some norms apply only to
States and others apply to private non-state
actors.
As early as the Nuremberg trials, which
represented the dawn of the modern
enforcement of the humanitarian component
of the law of nations, courts recognized that
corporations
had
obligations
under
international law (and were therefore
subjects of international law). In at least
three of those trials, tribunals found that
corporations violated the law of nations and
imposed judgment on individual criminal
defendants based on their complicity in the
corporations' violations.
Two opinions of the Attorney General of the
United States further refute the majority's
view that corporations have neither rights
nor obligations under international law. In
] 907, the Attorney General rendered an
opinion that an American corporation could
be held liable under the ATS to Mexican
nationals if the defendant's "diversion of the
water [of the Rio Grande] was an injury to
substantial rights of citizens of Mexico
under the principles of international law or
by treaty." 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 252, 253
(1907). And in 1795, shortly after the
enactment of the ATS, the Attorney General
opined that a British corporation could
pursue a civil action under the ATS for
lllJury caused to it III violation of
international law by American citizens who,
in concert with a French fleet, had attacked a
settlement managed by the corporation in
Sierra Leone in violation of international
law.
This court similarly recognized claims on
behalf of juridical entities (a corporation, a
trust, and a partnership) against Cuba,
premised on Cuba's expropriation of their
propelty in violation of international law.
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These decisions cannot be reconciled with
the majority's contention that corporations
are not subjects of under international law .

III. The Complaint must be dismissed
because its factual allegations fail to plead
a violation of the law of nations.
Although I do not share my colleagues'
understanding of international law, I am in
complete agreement that the claims against
Appellants must be dismissed. That is
because the pertinent allegations of the
Complaint fall short of mandatory standards
established by decisions of this court and the
Supreme Couti. We recently held in
Presbyterian Ch1lrch of S1ldan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.2009),
that liability under the A TS for aiding and
abetting in a violation of international
human rights lies only where the aider and
abettor acts with a purpose to bring about
the abuse of human rights. Id. at 259.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _
U.S. _ , 129 S.Ct.

1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), that a
complaint is insufficient as a matter of law
unless it pleads specific facts that "allow[ ]
the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949. When read
together, Talisman and Iqbal establish a
requirement that, for a complaint to properly
allege a defendant's complicity in human
rights abuses perpetrated by officials of a
foreign government, it must plead specific
facts supporting a reasonable inference that
the defendant acted with a purpose of
bringing about the abuses. The allegations
against Appellants in these appeals do not
satisfy this standard. While the Complaint
plausibly alleges that Appellants knew of
human rights abuses committed by officials
of the govemment of Nigeria and took
actions which contributed indirectly to the
commission of those offenses, it does not
contain allegations suppOliing a reasonable
inference that Appellants acted with a
purpose of bringing about the alleged
abuses.
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"Supreme Court to Rule on Corporate Personhood
for Crimes Against Humanity"
The HlIffington Post
October 17,2011
Mike Sacks

The Supreme Court on Monday morning
agreed to hear a case over whether
corporations can be sued in federal courts
for human rights violations occurnng
overseas.
The case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
arises out of a suit by a dozen Nigerian
plaintiffs claiming that Royal Dutch and two
of its Shell Oil subsidiaries worked with the
Nigerian government to t0l1ure and
extrajudicially
execute
individuals
protesting against the companies' oil
exploration.
The plaintiffs filed suit in United States
district court under the Alien Tort Statute,
which empowers the federal courts to hear
cases by "an alien" bringing a civil suit for
wrongs committed "in violation of the law
of nations." The first Congress passed the
ATS into law in 1789.
While the ATS indicates who can sue, it
does not say who or what can be sued. In
Kiobel, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals
held, by a 2-1 vote, that only natural
persons, and not corporations, may be held
liable under the ATS. "Corporate liability is
not discernible" under the ATS, wrote the
majority, because "no corporation has ever
been subject to any form of liability
(whether civil or criminal) under the
customary international law of human
rights."
The D.C. Circuit and 7th Circuit split with
the 2nd Circuit Sh0l1ly after its Kiobel
decision. Judge Richard Posner of the 7th

Circuit, in his opInIOn for a unanimous
panel, found the "factual premise of the
majority opinion in the Kiobel case
incorrect," citing the allied powers'
dissolution of German corporations that had
aided the Nazi government in violation of
customary international law.
Even so, Posner continued, that fact "has
nothing to do with the issue of corporate
liability." Rather, as the D.C. Circuit put it,
courts should look to whether the cause of
action-in Kiobel, a claim such as tortureis "clearly established in the law of nations,"
and then ask whether corporations are
generally held liable in domestic lawsuits.
The Supreme Court will now step in to
resolve the circuit split, but Kiobel's outlier
status does not signal an easy reversal. The
D.C. Circuit's dissenter, Judge Brett
Kavanaugh, agreed with the 2nd Circuit's
approach in Kiobel and found that
"customary international law does not
recognize corporate liability." Kavanaugh's
dissents in the past have served as clarion
calls for the Court's conservatives, so what
he believes may be a good indicator for how
the justices may come out. And Kavanaugh,
a former clerk for Justice Anthony Kennedy,
believed that "it would be quite odd for a
U.S. court to allow a customary international
law-based ATS claim against a corporation
when no international tribunal has allowed a
customary international law claim against a
corporation." Yet for many, it would also be
quite odd for the Court, which found in
Citizens United that the Framers intended
the First Amendment to apply to corporate
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persons, to reject the concept when it comes
to corporate liability for crimes against
humanity under a Founding-era statute.

The Court wi11likely schedule oral argument
in Kiobel for February, with a decision to be
handed down by late June.
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"Supreme Court Seeks Clarification on Jurisdiction
in a Human Rights Case"
The New York Times
March 6, 2012
Adam Liptak
Six days after hearing arguments in a major
human
rights
case
about
whether
corporations may be sued for complicity in
torture abroad, the Supreme Court on
Monday instructed the parties to address an
even broader question.
The court called for additional briefs to be
filed by June and a reargument to be held
during the court's next term, which starts in
October.
The original question in the case, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, No. 101491, was whether corporations might be
sued in United States courts for human
rights violations under a 1789 law.
At the argument last Tuesday, it emerged
that several justices were interested in a
larger question.
They wanted to know whether American
courts might ever hear disputes under the
law for human rights abuses abroad, whether
the defendant was a corporation or not.
The case was brought by 12 Nigerian
plaintiffs who said the defendants, foreign
oil companies, had been complicit in human
rights violations committed against them by
the Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria.
"What business does a case like that have in
the courts of the United States?" Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr. asked at the argument.
"There's no connection to the United States

whatsoever. "
Monday's order instructed the parties to file
briefs on the question of "whether and under
what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute"
allows courts to hear claims based on
"violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than
the United States."
The Alien Tort Statute is not a model of
clarity. It allows federal courts to hear "any
civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."
The law was largely ignored until the 1980s,
when federal courts started to apply it in
international human rights cases. A 2004
Supreme COUli decision, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, left the door open to some claims
under the law, as long as they involved
violations of international norms with
"definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations."
Requests for reargument can foreshadow
major decisions.
In 2009, for instance, the justices asked for a
second set of briefs and arguments in
Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, broadening what had been a
quirky case into one that would give rise to
the 2010 campaign finance blockbuster
allowing unlimited corporate and union
spending in candidate election.
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"Supreme Court Says Torture Victim Law Applies
Only to People, Not Organizations"
The Washington Post
April 18, 2012
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously
Wednesday that a federal law that allows
torture victims to sue their overseas assailants
does not permit suits against corporations or
political groups such as the Palestine
Liberation Organization.
The justices said the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 authorized lawsuits only against
individuals responsible for torture and killing.
"The text of the TVP A convinces us that
Congress did not extend liability to
organizations, sovereign or not," Justice Sonia
Sotomayor wrote for the united court.
"There are no doubt valid arguments for such
an extension. But Congress has seen fit to
proceed in more modest steps in the act, and it
is not the province of this branch to do
otherwise."
The legislation authorizes lawsuits in U.S.
courts against "an individual" who "under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation" tortures a person or takes
part in an "extrajudicial" killing.
The case before the court involves a lawsuit
filed by the family of Palestinian American
Azzam Rahim. Rahim immigrated to the
United States in the 1970s and returned to the
West Bank in 1995. His family alleged that he
was arrested by Palestinian Authority
intelligence officers and imprisoned, tortured
and eventually killed in a Jericho prison.
Rahim's survivors filed suit in 2005 against the
PLO and the Palestinian Authority. A district
judge and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

D.C. Circuit dismissed the case, saying only
people can be sued under the language of the
TVP A. But other lower courts have said that
such suits could proceed against corporations
and other entities.
Human rights organizations had argued that the
law was "toothless" if suits were limited to
individuals rather than entities that might have
controlled the torture or killings.
Sotomayor acknowledged that that might be
true but wrote that "Congress appeared well
aware of the limited nature of the cause of
action it established in the act."
Although the law does not define the word
"individual," she noted, Congress seemed to go
out of its way to make sure that the term
referred only to people.
The legislation's text "evinces a clear intent not
to subject non-sovereign organizations to
liability," she wrote.
The case is part of an effort by human rights
groups to use U.S. courts to avenge torture and
killings overseas. Foreign governments are
largely protected from suits in the United
States because of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. But dozens of suits have been
filed against multinational corporations under
the TVPA and a 1789 act, the Alien Tort
Statute.
The Supreme Court heard an argument this
year about whether the ATS allows
corporations to be held liable for human rights
abuses committed abroad in which they might
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have been complicit. But the justices put off a
decision to look at a broader question next
term: whether anyone can be sued under the

statute for violations of international law that
occur in other countries.
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"u.s. Urges Narrowing Human Rights Claims"
SCOTUSblog
June 13,2012
Lyle Denniston
The Obama Administration urged the
Supreme Court on Thursday to close the
U.S. courts to most lawsuits involving
claims that a foreign corporation helped a
foreign government engage in human rights
abuses in that country. While arguing that
the door to American courts should be left
somewhat ajar to allow some abuse claims,
the options that would remain would appear
to be quite narrow, with a variety of legal
hurdles to overcome. The government's
new reaction to lawsuits under the Alien
Tort Statute, first enacted in 1789, was
expressed in a brief filed in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum (docket 10-1491). That
specific lawsuit, the brief argued, should not
be permitted.
That case, heard by the Justices in February,
is due to be reheard in the new Term starting
October 1. The new issue to be explored
then-a question raised by the Court itself in
March-is whether and under what
circumstances an A TS lawsuit should be
allowed
based
on international
law
violations that had occurred in a foreign
land. Technically, that is the issue of
"extraterritorial application" of the A TS.
Previously, the Kiobel case had focused only
on whether corporations could be sued in
U.S. courts under the ATS for foreign
violations of global law.
The supplemental government brief offered
a complex argument, attempting to move
between a sharply negative view of lawsuits
by private individuals that focus on foreign
conduct, and an unwillingness to say that
no A TS lawsuit should ever be allowed in a

U.S. court for overseas breaches of
international law. The views appeared to
have been strongly influenced by State
Department concerns that opening U.S.
courts for many claims that involved foreign
government actions would disrupt foreign
policy and complicate diplomatic relations,
and perhaps expose the U.S. to reprisals
abroad. The ultimate conclusion was that
the Court need not resolve all issues
surrounding ATS claims in this one lawsuit,
but that the Justices should embrace some
controlling principles that generally would
work against U.S. courts' fashioning new
A TS claims for breaches of international
law.
However, there was no mistaking the clarity
of this statement: American COUltS "should
not create a cause of action that challenges
the actions of a foreign sovereign in its own
territory, where the [sued patty] is a foreign
corporation of a third country that allegedly
aided and abetted the foreign sovereign'S
conduct." Beyond that, the brief added, the
Court should not go, leaving open the
questions of whether an A TS lawsuit could
proceed against a U.S. national or U.S.
corporation, whether such a suit could be
brought where the alleged misconduct of a
foreign government had occurred outside its
own territory, or where the lawsuit targeted
the conduct of others within the U.S. or on
the high seas.
The brief did claim that the Obama
Administration had softened the federal
government's past opposition to ATS
lawsuits. It noted that the government "in
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recent years has advanced a more
categorical rule against extraterritoriality
before this Court and the courts of appeals,"
referring to one brief in 2004 in which the
Justice Department had argued that no
lawsuit should be recognized under the ATS
for the conduct of foreign individuals in
foreign countries, and another brief in
2009 arguing against an ATS lawsuit aimed
at conduct occurring in a foreign country.
The new brief added: "As explained in this
brief, the government urges the Couti not to
adopt such a categorical rule here."
Even so, the opening that the new brief
would leave for ATS claims was tightly
circumscribed. It was focused, as is the
Kiobel case in particular, on when the coutis
should create, on their own initiative, a right
to sue for violations of international
law. Accepting that Congress has wider
power to create a right to sue for foreign
abuses, as the lawmakers did in 1991 in the
Torture Victim Protection Act, the brief
suggested that there should be a "general
assumption" that creating a right to sue for
private individuals under ATS was "better
left to legislative judgment."
The filing did accept (and noted that the
State Depmiment, too, had accepted) that a
right to sue had been properly recognized by
the Second Circuit Court in 1980, in the case
of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. That was the
decision that is generally credited with
launching a wave of new lawsuits under the
ATS after that law had languished for
decades. But note the key features of the
Filartiga ruling that the Justice and State
Departments now endorse as valid claims:
while that case involved a claim by
Paraguayan
individuals
against
a
Paraguayan individual for abuses committed
in that Latin American country, the claim
was for torture, and the sued individual had
actually been found living in the U.S., and

that suggested that maybe the U.S.
government could be accused of harboring
him.
And, the brief added, those
Paraguayan individuals if suing now would
be able to due so under the anti-toliure law,
the TVPA.
Turning to the Kiobel case itself, the new
filing flatly urged that it be rejected. It
involved, the brief noted, Nigerian nationals
suing Dutch and British corporations for
allegedly helping the Nigerian military and
police forces to commit torture, killings,
"crimes against humanity," and arbitrary
arrest and detention-all of which had
occurred inside Nigeria.
In those
circumstances, the brief said, "the United
States cannot be thought responsible in the
eyes of the international community for
affording a remedy for the company's
actions, while the nations directly concerned
could."
Even when circumstances might arise that
would justify bringing an ATS lawsuit in the
U.S. cOutis for abuses that occurred in
foreign lands, the brief said, there should be
strict requirements that those who sued
should first have to have tried to get some
legal relief in the courts or the government
of that country, and, if there is an
international claims agency available, to try
for a remedy there. Such lawsuits, it added,
also should be limited by the notion that a
U.S. court might well be an inconvenient
forum, in which it was more difficult or
costly for a foreign government or foreign
corporation to mount a defense many miles
from its own shores.
Those two limiting requirements should be
imposed "at the outset of the litigation," and
should be applied "with special force," the
brief argued. In particular, when the link to
the U.S. "is slight," the filing contended, "a
U.S. court applying U.S. law should be a
forum of last resOli, if available at all."
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The Kiobel plaintiffs have already filed their
supplemental brief on the overseas reach of
ATS, urging that the Justices allow such an
application of that law in their case. The
two oil companies sued in the case are due
to file their briefs on that issue in August.
After that, the Kiobel parties will have a
chance to file a reply brief.
The Justice Department has been taking part
in the Kiobel case since briefing began. In
an earlier brief filed in December, it

supported the Kiobel plaintiffs and urged the
Court to rule that corporations could be sued
under the A TS for overseas human rights
abuses, saying there was nothing in the
history of that old law that provided a basis
for applying it only to natural persons. Its
new position against the Kiobel claims is
bound to draw criticism of the government
from human rights activists, who had been
hoping that the Justice Department would
not file a brief against the claims in this
case.
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Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
11-1025
Ruling Below: Amnesty International USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 2012 WL 526046 (U.S. 2012).
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978 to remedy abuses of
electronic surveillance conducted for national security. FISA was amended in 2008 and codified
as 50 U.S.C. 1881 a, establishing procedures that allow the Attorney General and Director of
National Intelligence's to target foreign persons for surveillance without individualized
identification in order to acquire "foreign intelligence information." The day this amendment
was enacted, attorneys, journalists, human rights organizations, and others brought a facial
challenge to Section 1881a, seeking a declaration that the provision is unconstitutional (under
Aliicle III and the First and Fourth Amendments) and an injunction permanently enjoining any
foreign-intelligence surveillance from being conducted under the section. The case has not yet
reached its merits as the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary
judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to pursue their
claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the
organizations had standing based upon a reasonable fear of being monitored based on a "realistic
understanding of the world" and the costs incurred to avoid that injury. In a 6-6 split, the Second
Circuit refused to rehear the decision en bane.
Question Presented: Whether respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief
because they proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire their
international communications using 50 U.S.C. 1881 a-authorized surveillance and did not show
that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881 a-authorized surveillance would likely redress their
purported injuries.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, Global Fund for Women, Global Rights, Human
Rights Watch, International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, The Nation
Magazine, PEN American Center, Service Employees International Union, Washington
Office on Latin America, Daniel N. Arshack, David Nevin, Scott McKay, Sylvia Royce,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
James R. CLAPPER, Jr., in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Keith
B. Alexander, in his official capacity as Director of the National Security Agency and Chief
of the Central Security Service, Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney
General of the United States, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided March 21, 2011
[Excerpt; some text, footnotes and citations omitted.]
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge
Attorneys, journalists, and labor, legal,
media, and human rights organizations
brought this action facially challenging the
constitutionality of Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 ("FISA"), which was added to FISA
by Section 101(a)(2) of the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 (the "FAA"), and
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. Section 702
creates new procedures for authorizing
government electronic surveillance targeting
non-United States persons outside the
United States for purposes of collecting
foreign intelligence. The plaintiffs complain
that the procedures violate the Fourth
Amendment, the First Amendment, Atiicle
III of the Constitution, and the principle of
separation of powers because they "allow[]
the executive branch sweeping and virtually
unregulated authority to monitor the
international communications . . . of lawabiding U.S. citizens and residents."
The merits of the plaintiffs' claims are not
before us. The only issue presented by this
appeal is whether the plaintiffs are legally in
a position to assert these claims in a federal
court, not whether the claims are to any
degree valid. Their merit is an issue for
another comi on another day. The district
court (Koeltl, 1.) granted the government
summary judgment because it found that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. On appeal, the
plaintiffs argue that they have standing
because the FAA's new procedures cause
them to fear that their communications will
be monitored, and thus force them to
undertake costly and burdensome measures
to protect the confidentiality of international
communications necessary to carrying out
their jobs. Because standing may be based
on a reasonable fear of future injury and
costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the

plaintiffs have established that they have a
reasonable fear of injury and have incurred
costs to avoid it, we agree that they have
standing. We therefore reverse the district
court's judgment.

BACKGROUND
I. Statutory Scheme at Issue
In 1978, Congress enacted FISA to establish
procedures under which federal officials
could obtain authorization to conduct
electronic
surveillance
for
foreign
intelligence purposes, including surveillance
of communications between persons located
within the United States and surveillance of
communications between persons located
within the United States and persons located
outside the United States. The 2008 FAA
amends FISA. It leaves much of the
preexisting
surveillance
authorization
procedure intact, but it creates new
procedures for the authorization of foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance targeting
non-United States persons located outside
the United States. The plaintiffs complain
that the new procedures unlawfully permit
broader collection of intelligence with less
judicial oversight. ...

B. Surveillance Authorization Procedures
After the FAA
The FAA leaves much of the FISA
framework intact, but the new Section 702
creates new procedures for the authorization
of foreign intelligence surveillance targeting
non-United States persons located outside
the United States.
The FAA, in contrast to the preexisting
FISA scheme, does not require the
government to submit an individualized
application to the FISC identifying the
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particular targets or facilities to be
monitored. Instead, the Attorney General
("AG")
and
Director
of National
Intelligence ("DNI") apply for a mass
surveillance authorization by submitting to
the FISC a written certification and
supporting affidavits attesting generally that
"a significant purpose of the acquisition is to
obtain foreign intelligence information" and
that that information will be obtained "from
or with the assistance of an electronic
communication service provider." The
certification must also attest that adequate
targeting and minimization procedures have
been approved by the FISC, have been
submitted to the FISC for approval, or are
being submitted with the certification.
"Targeting procedures" are procedures
designed to ensure that an authorized
acquisition is "limited to targeting persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States," and is designed to "prevent
the
intentional
acquisition
of any
communication as to which the sender and
all intended recipients are known at the time
of the acquisition to be located in the United
States." "Minimization procedures" for
electronic surveillance under the FAA must
meet the definition of minimization
procedures for electronic surveillance under
FISA, set out in 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (h). The
government's certification must further
attest that the surveillance procedures, which
must be included with the celiification,
comply with the FOUlih Amendment.
In addition, the certification must attest that
the surveillance complies with statutory
limitations providing that it:

(1) may not intentionally target any
person known at the time of
acquisition to be located in the
United States;

(2) may not intentionally target a
person reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States if
the purpose of such acquisition is to
target a particular, known person
reasonably believed to be in the
United States;
(3) may not intentionally target a
United States person reasonably
believed to be located outside the
United States;
(4) may not intentionally acquire any
communication as to which the
sender and all intended recipients are
known at the time of the acquisition
to be located in the United States;
and
(5) shall be conducted in a manner
consistent
with
the
fourth
amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
The FISC must review the government's
certification, and targeting and minimization
procedures, and if it finds that the
certification includes all of the required
elements, it must issue an order authorizing
the government to conduct the requested
surveillance. At that point, the AG and DNI
"may authorize jointly, for a period of up to
1 year . . . , the targeting of persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States to acquire foreign intelligence
information. "
If the FISC rejects an application, the
government may appeal the denial to the
Court of Review. During the pendency of
that appeal, including any subsequent
rehearing en bane, the government may
continue to
conduct the
requested
surveillance.
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Under the FAA, in contrast to the
preexisting FISA scheme, the FISC may not
monitor compliance with the targeting and
minimization procedures on an ongoing
basis. Instead, that duty falls to the AG and
DNI, who must submit their assessments to
the FISC, as well as the congressional
intelligence committees and the Senate and
House Judiciary Committees. In its
summary judgment submissions, the
government asserted that "[ s]hould such
repOliing reveal particular minimization
procedures to be ineffective in any respect,
the FISC has the authority to disapprove
such procedures in future § 1881 a
proceedings." But the government has not
asserted, and the statute does not clearly
state, that the FISC may rely on these
assessments to revoke earlier surveillance
authorizations.
The head of each element of the intelligence
community acquiring communications by
means of authorized surveillance also must
review the ongoing surveillance procedures
by conducting "an annual review to
determine whether there is reason to believe
that foreign intelligence information has
been or will be obtained from the
acquisition." These reviews of authorized
acquisitions must indicate how many United
States persons were overheard or were
referred to in intercepted communications
that were collected under surveillance
designed to target non-United States
persons. The relevant intelligence heads who
conduct such annual reviews must use them
"to evaluate the adequacy of the
minimization procedures," and they must
provide these annual reviews to the FISC,
the AG, the DNI, the congressional
intelligence committees, and the Senate and
House judiciary Committees.

C. Comparison of Pre- and Post-FAA
Surveillance Authorization Procedures

The plaintiffs highlight two differences
between the pre- and post-FAA surveillance
authorization procedures. First, whereas
under the preexisting FISA scheme the
government had to submit an individualized
application for surveillance identifying the
particular target, facility, type of information
sought, and procedures to be used, under the
FAA, the government need not submit a
similarly individualized application-it need
not identify the particular target or facility to
be monitored. Second, whereas under the
preexisting FISA scheme the FISC had to
find probable cause to believe both that the
surveillance target is a "foreign power" or
agent thereof and that the facilities to be
monitored were being used or about to be
used by a foreign power or its agent, under
the FAA the FISC no longer needs to make
any probable cause determination at all.
Instead, the FISC simply verifies that the
government
has
made
the
proper
celiifications.
In practice, these new authorization
procedures mean that surveillance orders
can be significantly broader under the FAA
than they previously could have been. Prior
to the FAA, surveillance orders could only
authorize the government to monitor
specific individuals or facilities. Under the
FAA, by contrast, the plaintiffs allege that
an acquisition order could seek, for example,
"[ a]ll telephone and e-mail communications
to and from countries of foreign policy
interest-for example, Russia, Venezuela, or
Israel-including communications made to
and from U.S. citizens and residents."
Moreover, the specific showing of probable
cause previously required, and the
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requirement of judicial reVieW of that
showing, have been eliminated. The
government has not directly challenged this
characterization.
An additional distinction concerns who
monitors
compliance
with
statutory
limitations on the surveillance procedures.
The preexisting FISA scheme allowed
ongoing judicial review by the FISC. But
under the FAA, the judiciary may not
monitor compliance on an ongoing basis; the
FISC may review the mInImIzation
procedures only prospectively, when the
government seeks its initial surveillance
authorization. Rather, the executivenamely the AG and DNI-bears the
responsibility of monitoring ongoing
compliance, and although the FISC receives
the executive's reports, it cannot rely on
them to alter or revoke its previous
surveillance authorizations.

II. Prior Proceedings
A. Parties
The plaintiffs are attorneys and human
rights, labor, legal, and media organizations
whose
work
requires
international
communications with individuals they
believe the government will likely monitor
under the FAA. The plaintiffs sued the ONI,
the AG, and the Director of the National
Security Agency ("NSA") in their official
capacities (collectively, "the government").

plaintiffs alleged that they feared that under
the FAA the government would intercept
their sensitive international communications
that were necessary to carrying out their
jobs, and that they therefore had to take
costly and burdensome measures to protect
the confidentiality of those communications.
They sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, alleging that the FAA facially violates
the
Fourth
Amendment,
the
First
Amendment, Article III of the Constitution,
and the principle of separation of powers.

C. Summary Judgment Filings
In September and October 2008, the parties
cross-moved for summary judgment. The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the FAA
is unconstitutional.
The government, in
addition
to
defending
the
FAA's
constitutionality on the merits, argued that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
the facial validity of the statute, contending
that the Act could be challenged only by
persons who had been electronically
surveilled in accordance with its terms and
the plaintiffs could not show that they had
been so surveilled. The plaintiffs advanced
what they characterized as two independent
bases for standing to challenge the FAA's
constitutionality: first, that they have an
actual and well-founded fear that their
communications will be monitored in the
future; and, second, that in light of that fear
they have taken costly and burdensome
measures to protect the confidentiality of
certain communications.

B. Complaint

On July 10, 2008, the same day Congress
enacted the FAA, the plaintiffs filed their
complaint alleging that the FAA "allows the
executive branch sweeping and virtually
unregulated authority to monitor the
international communications . . . of lawabiding U. S. citizens and residents." The

In support of their standing arguments, the
plaintiffs filed declat'ations and a Statement
of Undisputed Facts pursuant to Local Rule
56.1 ("56.1 Statement"). The plaintiffs'
evidence tended to show that their work
"requires them to engage in sensitive and
sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail
communications with colleagues, clients,
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journalistic sources, witnesses, experts,
foreign governmental officials, and victims
of human rights abuses located outside the
United States." The individuals with whom
the plaintiffs communicate include "people
the U.S. Government believes or believed to
be associated with terrorist organizations,"
"political and human rights activists who
oppose governments that are suppOlied
economically or militarily by the U.S.
government," and "people located in
geographic areas that are a special focus of
the U.S. government's counterterrorism or
diplomatic efforts."
The plaintiffs asselt that in their electronic
communications with these individuals they
exchange information that "constitutes
'foreign intelligence information' within the
meaning of the FAA." The plaintiffs believe
that, because of the nature of their
communications with these individuals, the
communications will likely be "acquired,
retained, analyzed, and disseminated" under
the FAA.
Their fear of future surveillance, according
to the plaintiffs, inflicts present injuries. For
instance, in order to protect the
confidentiality of sensitive and privileged
communications the plaintiffs have "ceased
engaging in certain conversations on the
telephone and bye-mail," which, in turn,
"compromises [their] ability to locate
witnesses,
cultivate
sources,
gather
information,
communicate
confidential
information to their clients, and to engage in
other
legitimate
and
constitutionally
protected communications." In addition, the
FAA has "force [d] plaintiffs to take costly
and burdensome measures," such as
traveling long distances to meet personally
with individuals.
The attorney plaintiffs asseli that they are
obligated to take these measures in order to

comply with their "ethical obligation to
avoid
communicating
confidential
information about client matters over
telephone, fax, or e-mail if they have reason
to believe that it is likely to be intercepted
by others." In support of this assertion, the
plaintiffs filed a declaration from Professor
Stephen Gillers, an expert in legal ethics,
stating that it is "the duty of a lawyer to
safeguard confidential information."
Gillers attested that "[ d]eterminative of how
the lawyer may proceed is . . . whether the
lawyer has good reason to believe that his or
her communications are reasonably likely to
be intercepted, even if the interception is
lawful." He then opined that the FAA gives
the attorneys sufficient reason to believe
their communications will be intercepted:
My opinion is that the lawyers have
good reason for this belief [that their
communications with clients and
third parties in connection with client
matters will be intercepted] because
of the status of their clients, the
identity and location of witnesses
and sources, and the broad authority
that the FAA grants the government.
The lawyers' decision to avoid
electronic means of communication
is not discretionary. It is obligatory.
The government did not submit any
evidence of its own either in opposition to
the plaintiffs' submissions, or in support of
its own summary judgment motion.
Additionally, at oral argument on the
summary judgment motions, the government
said it accepted the factual submissions of
the plaintiffs as true for purposes of those
motions. We therefore must accept the
as
undisputed
plaintiffs'
evidence
explanations of how the FAA has affected
them.
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D. District Court's Summary Judgment
Opinion
The district court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the FAA, and
therefore granted summary judgment for
defendants without reaching the merits of
the plaintiffs' claims. After identifying the
three
constitutional requirements for
standing-an injury in fact, a causal
connection between the injury and the
challenged statute, and redressability-the
court stated that "[t ]his case turns on
whether the plaintiffs have met the
irreducible constitutional minimum of
personal, particularized, concrete injury in
fact." The court denied standing because it
found that neither of the plaintiffs' asserted
injuries-their actual and well-founded fear
of being monitored, and the resulting
professional and economic costs they have
incurred to protect the confidentiality of
their
communications-constituted
the
requisite injury in fact.

1. Fear of Future Surveillance
The district court found the plaintiffs' fear
of future surveillance too speCUlative to
confer standing. It stated:
The plaintiffs have failed to establish
standing
to
challenge
the
constitutionality of the FAA on the
basis of their fear of surveillance ....
Indeed, the FAA neither authorizes
surveillance nor identifies on its face
a class of persons that includes the
plaintiffs. Rather the FAA authorizes
specified federal officials to seek a
surveillance order from the FISC.
That order cannot target the plaintiffs
and whether an order will be sought
that affects the plaintiffs' rights, and
whether such an order would be

granted by the FISC,
speculative.

IS

completely

To arrive at this conclusion, the district court
relied on three lines of cases. First, the court
looked to cases where plaintiffs have sought
standing to challenge electronic surveillance
schemes, namely United Presbyterian
Church in the US.A. v. Reagan and ACLU
v. NSA. Both of these cases rejected the
plaintiffs' standing arguments, which were
based on their fear of future injuries,
because the plaintiffs' respective fears were
too speCUlative. The district court found
those cases apposite and persuasive.
Second, the court examined "'physical
surveillance cases' where the Supreme
Court reached the merits of challenges to
laws or policies authorizing drug or alcohol
testing for specific classes of persons,
without requiring that the plaintiffs had
actually submitted to such testing before
bringing such challenges." The district court
held that those cases have "no application to
this case, where the plaintiffs are not
required to do anything or to submit to
anything, and where there is no showing that
the Government has authorized any action
against [a class of persons including] the
plaintiffs. "
Finally, the district court examined standing
cases outside the surveillance context, and
said those cases: "stand for the proposition
that a plaintiff may challenge a specific law
or regulation before it is enforced against the
plaintiff if the plaintiff is subject to that law
or regulation and has a well-founded fear
that it will be so enforced .... Moreover, the
FAA does not authorize surveillance of the
plaintiffs' communications and the plaintiffs
have made no showing that the Government
has sought any such surveillance pursuant to
the general framework set forth in the statute
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or that such
authorized. "

survei llance

has

been

2. Economic and Professional Costs
Incurred to Protect Communications
As for the plaintiffs' economic and
professional costs, the court found that those
injuries are "not truly independent of the
[plaintiffs'] first basis" for standing, because
those costs "flow directly from the
plaintiffs' fear of surveillance." The court
said that "[t]o allow the plaintiffs to bring
this action on the basis of such costs would
essentially be to accept a repackaged version
of the first failed basis for standing."
Moreover, the court held that "because the
plaintiffs have failed to show that they are
subject to the FAA and that they face a
threat of harm from its enforcement, the
chilling of their speech that they attribute to
the statute is actually the result of their
purely subjective fear of surveillance." The
court went on to state that the Supreme
COUli has held in Laird v. Tatum, that such a
subjective chill "is insufficient to support
standing."

empowers federal courts to hear only
"cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art.
Ill, § 2. Standing doctrine determines
"whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case
or controversy' between himself and the
defendant within the meaning of Art. Ill,"
and is therefore "entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues." A citizen who dislikes a
particular law may not require a court to
address its constitutionality simply by
stating in a complaint his belief, however
deeply held, that the law is inconsistent with
some provision of the Constitution. "[T]he
[Supreme] Court has rejected all attempts to
substitute abstract concern with a subject ...
for the concrete injury required by Art. III."
The plaintiff must be affected by the law in
some concrete way. "Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that
indispensable element of a dispute which
serves in part to cast it in a form
traditionally capable of judicial resolution."
The critical question is whether "the plaintiff
has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to warrant his
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction."

DISCUSSION
This opinion addresses only the question of
whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge
the FAA. It does not address the FAA's
constitutionality. The district court did not
reach that issue, and the parties did not brief
it. The question before this Court is only
whether the plaintiffs may maintain this
lawsuit, a question that "in no way depends
on the merits of the plaintiffs contention that
particular conduct is illegal" "We reVIew
questions of standing de novo. "
I. Elements and Principles of Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution

The Supreme Court has said that "the
irreducible constitutional mInImUm of
standing contains three elements":
First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury in fact-an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical. Second, there must
be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained
of-the injury has to be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant, and not the result of
the independent action of some third
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party not before the court. Third, it must
be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.
"The party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing these
elements." These requirements "assure[] that
there is a real need to exercise the power of
judicial review in order to protect the
interests of the complaining party."
Standing doctrine serves a number of
purposes. The Supreme Court has said
standing is "built on a single basic idea-the
idea of separation of powers." "[T]he
judicial power of the United States defined
by Alt. III is not an unconditioned authority
to determine the constitutionality of
legislative or executive acts." By limiting
the exercise of judicial review of other
branches of government to cases where it is
necessary to protect a complaining party's
interests, standing doctrine is "founded in
concern about the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society." If we had no standing doctrine and
instead simply allowed the comts to
"oversee legislative or executive action,"
that would "significantly alter the allocation
of power away from a democratic form of
government."
Standing doctrine also serves to improve
judicial decision making by ensuring that a
concrete case informs the court of the
consequences of its decisions, and by
ensuring that the party bringing the case has
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."

II. Plaintiffs'
Standing

Asserted

Grounds

for

On appeal, the plaintiffs reaSSeIt that they
have suffered two types of injuries. First,
they claim that they fear that the government
will intercept their sensitive international
communications, because the FAA "plainly
authorizes the acquisition of [their]
international communications," and their
communications are "likely to be monitored
under it." Second, they claim that
anticipation of this future injury also inflicts
a present injury "by compelling them to take
costly and burdensome measures to protect
the confidentiality of their international
communications" and by compromising
their "ability to locate witnesses, cultivate
sources, gather information, communicate
confidential information to their clients, and
to engage in other legitimate and
constitutionally protected communications."
The district comt and the parties have
focused on whether the plaintiffs' asserted
injuries satisfy the injury-in-fact component
of the standing inquiry. Although they are
correct that the plaintiffs' first asselted
injury-the possibility of being monitored in
the future-raises a question of injury in
fact, because probabilistic injuries constitute
injuries in fact only when they reach a
certain threshold oflikelihood, the plaintiffs'
second asselted injury alleges the most
mundane of injuries in fact: the expenditure
of funds. The plaintiffs' declarations, which,
as discussed above, we must accept as true,
establish that they have already incurred
professional and economic costs to avoid
interception.
Having
accepted
the
truthfulness of the plaintiffs' declarations for
purposes of the summary judgment motion,
the government cannot now dispute whether
the plaintiffs genuinely fear being
intercepted, or whether the plaintiffs have
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actually incurred the costs they claim to
have incurred. Thus, we have little doubt
that the plaintiffs have satisfied the injuryin-fact requirement.
As to the second asserted injury-their
present-injury theory-that the plaintiffs
have demonstrated injuries in fact is not
sufficient in itself to establish standing. The
plaintiffs must also prove that the injuries
are caused by the challenged statute and that
a favorable judgment would redress them.
The government's challenge to the
plaintiffs' standing based on their incurred
professional and economic costs focuses on
whether there is a "causal connection
between [the plaintiffs'] injury and the
[legislation] complained of." The causal
chain can be broken where a plaintiffs selfinflicted
mJury
results
from
his
"unreasonable decision ... to bring about a
harm that he knew to be avoidable."
However, "[s]tanding is not defeated merely
because the plaintiff has in some sense
contributed to his own injury.... Standing
is defeated only if it is concluded that the
injury is so completely due to the plaintiffs
own fault as to break the causal chain."
If the plaintiffs can show that it was not
unreasonable for them to incur costs out of
fear that the government will intercept their
communications under the FAA, then the
measures they took to avoid interception can
support standing. If the possibility of
interception is remote or fanciful, however,
their present-injury theory fails because the
plaintiffs would have no reasonable basis for
fearing interception under the FAA, and
they cannot bootstrap their way into
standing by unreasonably incurring costs to
avoid a merely speculative or highly
unlikely potential harm. Any such costs
would be gratuitous, and any ethical
concerns about not taking those measures
would be unfounded. In other words, for the

purpose of standing, although the plaintiffs'
economic and professional injuries are
injuries in fact, they cannot be said to be
"fairly traceable" to the FAA-and cannot
support standing-if they are caused by a
fanciful,
paranoid,
or
otherwise
unreasonable fear of the FAA. "If causation
is to be required at all, it should demand a
meaningful level of probability," but "[a]s
with other elements of standing, the showing
required might be tailored to the other facts
that make it more or less appropriate to
decide the case."
Here, the plaintiffs' actions were "fairly
traceable" to the FAA. Because, as we shall
explain, the plaintiffs' fears were reasonable
even under the stringent reasonableness
standards found in jilt1tre-injllry cases, and
because the plaintiffs incurred these
professional and economic costs as a direct
result of that reasonable fear, their present
InJunes in fact clearly satisfy the
requirements for standing. We therefore
need not and do not decide whether the
degree of likelihood necessary to establish a
causal relationship between an actual
present
mJury
and the
challenged
governmental action is as stringent as that
necessary for a potential harm in itself to
confer standing. However, the line of futureinjury standing cases provides a helpful
framework for analyzing the plaintiffs'
present-injury arguments. Those cases
bolster our conclusion that the professional
and economic harms the plaintiffs suffered
here were fairly traceable to the FAA, and
were not the result of an "unreasonable
decision" on their patt "to bring about a
harm that [they] knew to be avoidable."
In addition to their present-injury theory, the
plaintiffs advance a future-injury theory of
standing. A future injury or threat of injury
does not confer standing if it is "conjectural
or hypothetical" and not "real and
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immediate." To determine whether the
plaintiffs have standing under their futureinjury theory, we would need to determine
whether the FAA creates an objectively
reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs'
communications are being or will be
monitored under the FAA. As noted above,
we conclude that the future injuries alleged
by the plaintiffs are indeed sufficiently
likely to confer standing under the test
established in the case law for basing
standing on the risk of future harm.
The government's first argument against the
plaintiffs' standing-on both theories-is
that the FAA does not create a sufficiently
high likelihood that those communications
will be monitored. In our judgment,
however, for the reasons set fOith in Part III,
below, the plaintiffs have established that
they reasonably fear being monitored under
the allegedly unconstitutional FAA, and that
they have undertaken costly measures to
avoid it. Those present injuries-fairly
traceable to the FAA and likely to be
redressable by a favorable judgmentsupport the plaintiffs' standing to challenge
the statute.
The government next argues that the
plaintiffs lack standing because any injury
they suffer is indirect. That is, the
government contends that because the FAA
does not directly target the plaintiffs, any
injury the plaintiffs suffer is a result of their
reaction to the government's potential
monitoring of third parties. The government
essentially argues that this indirectness
defeats the plaintiffs' standing because it
attenuates the causal chain linking the
plaintiffs' injuries to the FAA. For the
reasons set forth in Part IV, below, we
disagree.

III. Likelihood of Government Action

The government argues that the plaintiffs
can obtain standing only by showing either
that they have been monitored or that it is
"effectively certain" that they will be
monitored. The plaintiffs fall short of this
standard, according to the government,
because they "simply speculate that they
will be subjected to governmental action
taken pursuant to [the FAA]."
But the government overstates the standard
for determining when a present injury linked
to a contingent future injury can support
standing. The plaintiffs have demonstrated
that they suffered present injuries in factconcrete
economic
and
professional
harms-that are fairly traceable to the FAA
and redressable by a favorable judgment.
The plaintiffs need not show that they have
been or certainly will be monitored. Indeed,
even in cases where plaintiffs allege an
mJury based solely on prospective
government action, they need only show a
"realistic danger" of "direct injury;" and
where they allege a prospective injury to
First Amendment rights, they must show
only "'an actual and well-founded fear' "of
injury, an arguably less demanding standard.
A. Standard

When a plaintiff asserts a present mJury
based on conduct taken in anticipation of
jiltllre government action, we evaluate the
likelihood that the future action will in fact
come to pass. To determine whether the
present injury "fairly can be traced to the
challenged [future] action," we must
consider whether a plaintiffs present injury
resulted from some irrational or otherwise
clearly unreasonable fear of future
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government action that is unlikely to take
place. Such a disconnect between the
present lllJury and predicted future
government action would break the causal
chain required for standing.
In this context, cases that discuss whether a
potential ji/t1lre harm is sufficiently likely
such that the chance of that future harm
constitutes an injury in fact can provide
some guidance for determining whether the
plaintiffs have satisfied the causation
requirement for standing where their
asseliions of present and ongoing injuries
stem, in part, from a desire to avoid potential
future injuries.
In Lyons, the seminal case on standing based
on probabilistic or prospective harm, the
plaintiff sued the City of Los Angeles and
certain police officers alleging that officers
stopped him for a traffic violation and,
without provocation, applied a choke-hold,
rendering him unconscious and damaging
his larynx. In addition to seeking damages,
he sought to enjoin police officers' use of
chokeholds.
The Court said, "Lyons' standing to seek the
injunction requested depended on whether
he was likely to suffer future injury from the
use of the chokeholds by police officers,"
emphasizing that "[t]he reasonableness of
[the plaintiffs] fear [of future injury] is
dependent upon the likelihood of a
recurrence of the allegedly unlawful
conduct. It is the reality of the threat of
repeated injury that is relevant to the
standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs subjective
apprehensions. "
The Court held that Lyons lacked standing
to pursue injunctive relief, because he did
not show a sufficient likelihood that he
would be injured. It said, "[ w]e cannot agree
that the odds that Lyons would not only

again be stopped for a traffic violation but
would also be subjected to a chokehold
without any provocation whatsoever are
sufficient to make out a federal case for
equitable relief." Without a "sufficient
likelihood that he will again be wronged in a
similar way," Lyons was "no more entitled
to an injunction than any other citizen of Los
Angeles; and a federal cOUli may not
entertain a claim by any or all citizens who
no more than assert that certain practices of
law
enforcement
officers
are
unconstitutional. "
Although the plaintiff in Lyons lacked
standing, that case clearly aIiiculated the
principle that a plaintiff may obtain standing
by showing a sufficient likelihood of future
injury. Indeed, the Court stated that Lyons
would have established standing if he had
been able to allege facts that would have
made his injury sufficiently likely-such as
another encounter with the police or a city
policy authorizing police officers to engage
in the conduct he feared.
This Court has articulated the principle of
Lyons as requiring an inquiry into the
probability of future harm. In C1Irtis v. City
of New Haven, where plaintiffs sought to
enjoin police officers' use of mace in certain
circumstances because officers stopped
them, maced them, and gave them no
treatment afterward, we denied standing,
holding that "the Court made clear in Lyons
that the critical inquiry is the likelihood that
these plaintiffs will again be illegally
assaulted with mace."
Assessing whether a threatened lllJury, by
itself, is sufficiently probable to support
standing is a "qualitative, not quantitative"
inquiry that is "highly case-specific." "[T]he
question of whether anticipated future injury
suffices to establish standing is approached
as a question of judgment and degrees."
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Indeed, in future-injury cases, we have said
that "the risk of harm necessary to support
standing cannot be defined according to a
universal standard."
One factor that bolsters a plaintiffs argument
that the injury is likely to come to pass,
according to both the Supreme Court and
this Court, is the existence of a policy that
authorizes the potentially harmful conduct.
However, the cases do not establish any
talismanic, dispositive facts a plaintiff must
plead in order to establish a certain threshold
of probability. Some cases suggest that the
risk of that harm need not be particularly
high. The probability required "logically
varies with the severity of the probable
harm." Ultimately, cOUlis consider the
totality of the circumstances, and where a
"plaintiffs interpretation of a statute is
'reasonable enough' and under that
interpretation the plaintiff 'may legitimately
fear that it will face enforcement of the
statute,' then the plaintiff has standing to
challenge the statute."
B. Application

The plaintiffs have established that they
suffered present injuries in fact-economic
and professional harms-stemming from a
reasonable
fear
of jilture
harmful
government conduct. They have asserted
that the FAA permits broad monitoring
through mass surveillance orders that
authorize the government to collect
thousands or millions of communications,
including communications between the
plaintiffs and their overseas contacts. The
FAA is susceptible to such an interpretation,
and the government has not controverted
this interpretation or offered a more
compelling one.
It is significant that the injury that the

plaintiffs fear results from conduct that is

authorized by statute. This case is not like
Lyons, where the plaintiff feared injury from
officers who would have been acting outside
the law, making the injury less likely to
occur. Here, the fact that the government has
authorized the potentially harmful conduct
means that the plaintiffs can reasonably
assume that government officials will
actually engage in that conduct by carrying
out the authorized surveillance. It is fanciful,
moreover, to question whether the
government will ever undertake broad based
surveillance of the type authorized by the
statute. The FAA was passed specifically to
permit surveillance that was not permitted
by FISA but that was believed necessary to
protect the national security. That both the
Executive and the Legislative branches of
government believe that the FAA authorizes
new types of surveillance, and have justified
that new authorization as necessary to
protecting the nation against attack, makes it
extremely likely that such surveillance will
occur.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have good reason
to believe that their communications, in
patiicular, will fall within the scope of the
broad surveillance that they can assume the
government will conduct. The plaintiffs
testify that in order to carry out their jobs
they must regularly communicate by
telephone and e-mail with precisely the sorts
of individuals that the government will most
likely seek to monitor-i.e., individuals "the
U.S. government believes or believed to be
associated with terrorist organizations,"
"political and human rights activists who
oppose governments that are supported
economically or militarily by the U.S.
government," and "people located in
geographic areas that are a special focus of
the U.S. government's counterterrorism or
diplomatic
efforts."
The
plaintiffs'
assessment that these individuals are likely
targets of FAA surveillance is reasonable,
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and the government has not disputed that
assertion.
On these facts, it is reasonably likely that the
plaintiffs'
communications
will
be
monitored under the FAA. The instant
plaintiffs' fears of surveillance are by no
means based on "mere conjecture,"
delusional
fantasy,
or
unfounded
speculation. Their fears are fairly traceable
to the FAA because they are based on a
reasonable interpretation of the challenged
statute and a realistic understanding of the
world. Conferring standing on these
plaintiffs is not tantamount to conferring
standing on "any or all citizens who no more
than assert that certain practices of law
enforcement offices are unconstitutional."
Most law-abiding citizens have no occasion
to communicate with suspected terrorists;
relatively few Americans have occasion to
engage in international communications
relevant to "foreign intelligence." These
plaintiffs however, have successfully
demonstrated
that
their
legitimate
professions make it quite likely that their
communications will be intercepted if the
government-as
seems
inevitableexercises the authority granted by the FAA.
The government argues the plaintiffs have
failed to establish standing because the FAA
does not itself authorize surveillance, but
only authorizes the FISC to authorize
surveillance. As a result, the government
says the plaintiffs must speculate about at
least two intervening steps between the FAA
and any harm they might suffer as a result of
the government conducting surveillance:
first, that the government will apply for
surveillance authorization under the FAA,
and, second, that the FISC will grant
authorization.
But this argument fails. The presence of an
intervening step does not, as a general rule,
by itself preclude standing. Nor do the

particular intervening steps the government
identifies here-the government's seeking
authorization and the FISC's approving itpreclude standing. With respect to the first
step, as discussed above, it is more than
reasonable to expect that the government
will seek surveillance authorization under
the FAA. We therefore cannot say that
uncertainty about this step significantly
attenuates the link between the FAA and the
plaintiffs' harms.
N or does the second intervening step add
significant unceliainty. As discussed above,
under the FAA the FISC must enter an order
authorizing surveillance if the government
submits a certification that conforms to the
statutory requirements. The FAA does not
require or even permit the FISC to make an
independent determination of the necessity
or justification for the surveillance. It verges
on the fanciful to suggest that the
government will more than rarely fail to
comply with the formal requirements of the
FAA once it has decided that the
surveillance is warranted.
Empirical
evidence
supports
this
expectation: in 2008, the government sought
2, 082 surveillance orders, and the FISC
approved 2, 081 of them. We do not know
how many of these applications, if any,
came after the FAA was enacted on July 10,
2008. At the very least, though, the evidence
does not show that the FISC actually rejects
a significant number of applications for
FAA surveillance orders. Without a stronger
showing that the FISC interposes a
significant intervening step, we cannot find
that the mere existence of this intervening
step prevents the plaintiffs from obtaining
standing to challenge the FAA.
Because the plaintiffs' undisputed testimony
clearly establishes that they are suffering
injuries in fact, and because we find those
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injuries are causally connected to
FAA-because
they
are
taken
anticipation of future government action
is reasonably likely to occur-and
redressable by a favorable judgment,
find the plaintiffs have standing.

the
in
that
are
we

IV. Indirectness of Harm
The plaintiffs' asserted economic and
professional costs incurred to protect the
confidentiality of their communications can
be characterized as indirect injuries, because
the FAA does not target the plaintiffs
themselves and the plaintiffs incur injuries
due to their responses, and the responses of
the third-party individuals with whom they
communicate, to the anticipated FAAauthorized surveillance of those individuals.
The government argues that the indirectness
of these injuries defeats the plaintiffs'
standing. We disagree.
A. Standard
The Supreme Court has made clear that
"when the plaintiff is not himself the object
of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded." But a
plaintiff who is indirectly harmed by a
regulation needs to show more than does a
plaintiff who is directly regulated by the
challenged law:
When the suit is one challenging the
legality of government action . . . ,
the nature and extent of facts that
must be averred (at the summary
judgment stage) . . . in order to
establish
standing
depends
considerably upon whether the
plaintiff is himself an object of the
action . . . at issue. If he is, there is
ordinarily little question that the
action or inaction has caused him
mJury, and that a judgment

preventing or requiring the action
will redress it. When, however, ... a
plaintiffs asserted injury arises from
the government's allegedly unlawful
regulation ... of someone else, much
more is needed.
It is therefore "ordinarily substantially more
difficult" to establish standing based on
indirect injuries than on direct injuries.

As a fundamental requisite to establishing
standing, a plaintiff seeking standing on the
basis of indirect injury must satisfy the three
constitutional requirements for standing
discussed above: (l) an injury in fact (2) that
is causally related to the challenged statute
or conduct and (3) is likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision. Despite not
being directly regulated, a plaintiff may
establish a cognizable injury in fact by
showing that he has altered or ceased
conduct as a reasonable response to the
challenged statute. If the plaintiff makes
such an allegation, he must identify the
injury with "specificity," and he "must
proffer some objective evidence to
substantiate his claim that the challenged
conduct has deterred him from engaging in
protected activity,"
The plaintiffs have
satisfied these
requirements through their uncontroverted
testimony that they have altered their
conduct and thereby incurred specific costs
in response to the FAA. As discussed above,
we must accept that undisputed testimony,
so the plaintiffs have established the first
constitutional requirement for standing-an
injury in fact.
The heart of the government's challenge to
the plaintiffs' standing based on the
indirectness of their injury-much like the
government's challenge to the plaintiffs'
standing based on the likelihood of future
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injury-goes to whether the plaintiffs'
InjUrIes are causally connected to the
challenged legislation. The causal chain
linking the plaintiffs' indirect injuries to the
challenged legislation is similar to that
discussed above: it turns on the likelihood
that the plaintiffs' communications with the
regulated third parties will be monitored. If
the FAA does not make it likely that the
plaintiffs' communications with regulated
third patiies will be monitored, then the
costs the plaintiffs have incurred to avoid
being monitored are the product of their own
decisions and are not sufficiently linked to
the FAA; for this reason, they would not be
"fairly traceable to the challenged action."
Conversely,
if
the
plaintiffs'
communications with regulated third parties
will likely be monitored despite the fact that
the FAA does not directly regulate the
plaintiffs, then those costs are sufficiently
tied to the FAA to support standing.
The Supreme Court and this Court have
frequently found standing on the part of
plaintiffs who were not directly subject to a
statute, and asserted only indirect injuries.
Most notably, in Meese v. Keene (1987), the
Supreme COUli found standing in a plaintiff
who, like the instant plaintiffs, was not
directly regulated by the statute, and alleged
only indirect injuries. The plaintiff, a lawyer
and state legislator, challenged a statute that
required certain films to be labeled "political
propaganda." The district court in that case
made clear that "[ a ]ccording to the
authoritative agency interpretation of the
Act and the regulations, plaintiff [wa]s free
to remove the ['political propaganda'] label
before exhibiting the films." Hence, as in the
instant case, the Meese statute did not
directly regulate the plaintiff or require him
to do, or refrain from doing, anything at all.
The Meese plaintiff, however, was injured
indirectly. He wanted to show three labeled
films, but because he did "not want the

Department of Justice and the public to
regard him as the disseminator of foreign
political propaganda," he abstained from
screening the films. He sued to enjoin the
application of the statute to these films.
That the statute did not regulate him directly
was no barrier to standing. The Court found
he had established a cognizable harm by
alleging "the need to take . . . affirmative
steps to avoid the risk of harm to his
reputation." This reaction was reasonable
and was causally linked to the statute,
because the plaintiff averred, with support
from expert affidavits, that if he showed the
"his
personal,
political,
and
films
professional reputation would suffer and his
ability to obtain re-election and to practice
his profession would be impaired." The
Court approved the district court's
conclusion that "the Act puts the plaintiff to
the Hobson's choice of foregoing the use of
the three Canadian films for the exposition
of his own views or suffering an injury to
his reputation." Either way, the statute
affected him in such a way as to give him
standing to challenge it.
More recently, in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw, the Supreme Court recognized
plaintiffs'
standing to
challenge
a
corporation's alleged Clean Water Act
violation. The plaintiffs did not claim that
the defendant took direct actions against
them. Instead, they showed that because
they feared exposure to the defendant's
pollution they had ceased to engage in
celiain recreational activities in the area,
as
swimming,
camping,
and
such
birdwatching. The Court found that the
plaintiffs' decision to cUliail those activities
was "enough for injury in fact," and found
that the plaintiffs' reactions were reasonable
responses to the threat of exposure to
pollution.
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These cases establish that a plaintiff has
standing to challenge a statute that does not
regulate him if he can show that the statute
reasonably caused him to alter or cease
certain conduct. In the instant case, the key
to determining whether the plaintiffs have
standing based on the indirect injuries they
suffer is determining whether someone who
wants to protect the privacy of his
communications would reasonably take the
measures these plaintiffs took not to be
overheard.
B. Application

First, it is reasonable for the plaintiffs to
take measures to avoid being over-heard.
The plaintiffs have established that, because
of their legitimate needs to communicate
with persons who will likely be subject to
government surveillance under the FAA,
they are likely to be monitored. Moreover,
the various groups of plaintiffs-attorneys,
journalists, and human rights, labor, legal,
and media organizations-have established
that they have legitimate interests in not
being monitored. Since the plaintiffs allege
that the FAA is unconstitutional, if the
plaintiffs' legal theory is correct, any search
authorized by the FAA would be an illegal
search that the plaintiffs would reasonably
try to avoid.
Moreover, each of the plaintiffs has alleged
that the risk of being monitored causes
additional injuries beyond the mere fact of
being
subjected
to
a
putatively
unconstitutional invasion of privacy. The
risk of being monitored by the government
threatens the safety of their sources and
clients, impedes their ability to do their jobs,
and implicates the attorneys' ethical
obligations. Journalists Klein and Hedges,
if their
for
example,
assert that
communications with their sources were
overheard, those sources' identities, political

activities, and other senSItIve information
would be disclosed, which would expose
them to violence and retaliation by their own
governments, non-state actors, and the U.S.
government. Likewise, attorney Mariner
asserts that if her communications with
human rights abuse victims on behalf of
Human Rights Watch are monitored, the
victims will draw unwanted attention to
themselves and might risk further abuse.
Attorneys Royce and McKay, who represent
Guantanamo Bay prisoners and others,
assert that they risk disclosing litigation
strategies to the opposing party (the U.S.
government)
and
violating
ethical
obligations if their communications with cocounsel, clients and their family members,
experts, and investigators around the world
are monitored. The plaintiffs act reasonably
in trying to avoid these injuries.
Since it is reasonable for the plaintiffs to
seek to avoid being monitored, we must
consider whether the particular measures
they took were reasonable. They were. In
some instances the plaintiffs did not
communicate certain information they
otherwise would have communicated by email or telephone; and in other instances
they incurred the costly burdens of traveling
to communicate or to obtain that information
in person rather than electronically. These
are not overreactions to the FAA; they are
appropriate measures that a reasonably
prudent person who plausibly anticipates
that his conversations are likely to be
monitored, and who finds it important to
avoid such monitoring, would take to avoid
being overheard. The plaintiffs have
therefore established that those injuries are
linked to the statute they challenge.
In sum, the FAA has put the plaintiffs in a
lose-lose situation: either they can continue
to communicate senSItIve information
electronically and bear a substantial risk of
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being monitored under a statute they
to be unconstitutional, or they can
financial and professional costs to
being monitored. Either way, the
directly affects them.

allege
incur
avoid
FAA

The Supreme Court has said that "the gist of
the question of standing" is whether "the
appellants alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions." The
instant plaintiffs are not merely random
citizens, indistinguishable from any other
members of the public, who want to test in
court the abstract theory that the FAA is
inconsistent with the Constitution; rather,
these plaintiffs have shown that, regardless
of which course of action they elect, the
FAA affects them. We therefore conclude
that they have a sufficient "personal stake"
to challenge the FAA. That does not mean
that their challenge will succeed; it means
only that the plaintiffs are entitled to have a
federal court reach the merits of their
challenge. We need not "decide whether
appellants' allegations ... will, ultimately,
entitle them to any relief, in order to hold
that they have standing to seek it."
V. Laird v. Tatum
The government's principal arguments
against the above analysis rest on a single
case, Laird v. Tatum (1972). Laird is
unquestionably relevant to this case, as it is
the only case in which the Supreme Court
specifically addressed standing to challenge
a
government
surveillance
program.
Because Laird significantly differs from the
present case, however, we disagree with the
government's contention that Laird controls
the instant case, and that Laird created
different and stricter standing requirements

for surveillance cases than for other types of
cases.
In Laird, the plaintiffs challenged a
surveillance program that authorized the
Army to collect, analyze, and disseminate
information about public activities that had
potential to create civil disorder. The Army
collected its data from a number of sources,
but most of it came from "the news media
and publications in general circulation" or
from "agents who attended meetings that
were open to the public and who wrote field
reports describing the meetings." The Court
noted that the court of appeals had
characterized the information gathered as
"nothing more than a good newspaper
reporter would be able to gather by
attendance at public meetings and the
clipping of articles from publications
available on any newsstand." Roughly sixty
government agents around the country
participated in the surveillance program.
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the program.
They claimed that they "disagreed with the
judgments" made by the Executive Branch
about the scope of the surveillance program,
and they argued that "in the future it is
possible that information relating to matters
far beyond the responsibilities of the
military may be misused by the military to
[their] detriment," But the Court stated that
the plaintiffs
[did] not attempt to establish this as a
definitely foreseeable event, or to
base their complaint on this ground.
Rather, [the plaintiffs] contend[ ed]
that the present existence of this
system of gathering and distributing
information, allegedly far beyond the
mission requirements of the Army,
an
impermissible
constitute[ d]
burden on [them] and other persons
similarly situated which exercise[d] a
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present inhibiting effect on their full
expression and utilization of their
First Amendment rights.
The Court noted the court of appeals's
observation that the plaintiffs "have some
difficulty in establishing visible injury....
They freely admit that they complain of no
specific action of the Army against them ...
. There is no evidence of illegal or unlawful
surveillance activities." The Court stated
that any alleged chilling effect arose from
the plaintiffs' "perception of the system as
inappropriate to the Army's role under our
form of government," or the plaintiffs'
"beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for
the military to be concerned with activities
in the civilian sector," or the plaintiffs' "less
generalized
yet
speculative
apprehensiveness that the Army may at
some future date misuse the information in
some way that would cause direct harm to
respondents." Moreover, the Court noted
that the plaintiffs had cast "considerable
doubt" on whether the surveillance program
had actually chilled them, and the plaintiffs
did not identify any concrete harm inflicted
by the program.
The COUli therefore considered:
whether the jurisdiction of a federal
court may be invoked by a
complainant who alleges that the
exercise of his First Amendment
rights is being chilled by the mere
existence, witho1lt more, of a
governmental investigative and datagathering activity that is alleged to
be broader In scope than IS
reasonably
necessary
for
the
accomplishment
of
a
valid
governmental purpose.
The Court denied plaintiffs standing. It held
that the plaintiffs' complaints about "the

very existence of the Army's data-gathering
system" and their "[a]llegations of a
subjective 'chill' are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present
objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm." The Court noted that although
previous cases have found governmental
regulations unconstitutional based on their
"chilling" effect,
[i]n none of these cases, however,
did the chilling effect arise merely
from the individual's knowledge that
a governmental agency was engaged
in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that,
armed with the fruits of those
activities, the agency might in the
future take some other and additional
action detrimental to that individual.
Rather, in each of these eases, the
challenged exercise of governmental
power was regulatory, proscriptive,
or compulsory in nature, and the
complainant was either presently or
to
the
prospectively
subject
regulations,
proscriptions,
or
compulsions that he was challenging.
The government argues that "[t]his case is
directly governed by Laird," because the
only specific present harms the plaintiffs
allege flow from a subjective chill. Laird,
however, differs dramatically from this case.
In Laird, the plaintiffs did not clearly allege
any injuries whatsoever. They did not claim
that the government surveillance they sought
to challenge, which relied principally on
monitoring through publicly available
sources activities conducted entirely in
public, harmed them. They did not claim
that they, or anyone with whom they
regularly interacted, would be subject to any
illegal or unconstitutional intrusion if the
program they challenged was allowed to
continue. Rather, they claimed only that they
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might be injured if the information lawfully
collected by the military were misused in
some unspecified way at some unspecified
point in the future, and they alleged that the
surveillance scheme had a chilling effect,
while essentially admitting that they
themselves had not been chilled, and that the
program not altered their behavior in any
way.

By contrast, the instant plaintiffs clearly
have alleged specific and concrete injuries.
Unlike the Laird plaintiffs, they do not
challenge a program of information
gathering that they concede is lawful, on the
theory that the information gathered may be
misused in the future by government agents
acting illegally and without authorization;
rather, they challenge a specific statute that
expressly authorizes surveillance that they
contend is in itself unconstitutional. They do
not vaguely allege that they might be subject
to surveillance under the program; rather,
they set f011h specific, concrete reasons to
believe they are likely to be overheard,
because their legitimate activities bring them
into contact with the very types of people
who are the professed targets of the
statutorily authorized surveillance. And far
from alleging an undefined "chill" that has
not affected their own behavior in any way,
they detail specific, reasonable actions that
they have taken to their own tangible,
economic cost, in order to carry out their
legitimate professional activities in an
ethical and effective manner, which can be
done only by taking every precaution to
avoid being overheard in the way that the
challenged statute makes reasonably likely.
This case is a far cry from Laird. In this
case, as demonstrated above, the plaintiffs
allege injuries that establish their standing
consistent with the standing jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court and this Court. In Laird,
by contrast, the plaintiffs alleged no such
injuries. Indeed, because the Laird plaintiffs

offered so little by way of concrete injury,
direct or indirect, Laird has little or nothing
to say about the critical issue in this case:
the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fear of
future injury from the FAA, and the causal
relation of the challenged statute to the
tangible costs the plaintiffs claim they have
incurred.
The government next argues, however, that
even if Laird does not directly govern this
case, it created special standing rules for
surveillance cases that are stricter than those
that apply to other types of cases, and that
those special rules preclude standing in this
case. We disagree.
First, the government argues that under
Laird a plaintiff may challenge a
surveillance statute only if he is "subject to"
that statute, meaning that he belongs to a
narrow class of individuals the statute, on its
face, identifies as targets. In support of this
claim, the government relies on Laird's
comment that some previous plaintiffs who
obtained standing to challenge a regulation
that did not explicitly target them were able
to do so because they were or would soon be
"subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or
compUlsions"
they
challenged.
The
government thus argues that the instant
plaintiffs cannot obtain standing to
challenge the FAA, because the FAA "does
not direct intelligence gathering activities
against the plaintiffs. Nor does it authorize
plaintiffs to be targeted."
Second, the government argues that Laird
precludes standing based on chilling-effect
injuries. The government notes that the
Laird plaintiffs alleged that the existence of
the Army's surveillance program produced a
chilling effect upon the exercise of their
First Amendment rights, and the Court
rejected that allegation as a ground for
standing. The government adopts United
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Presbyterian's interpretation of Laird,
which says that in order to obtain standing
plaintiffs must show that they "suffer[] some
concrete harm (past or immediately
threatened) apart from the 'chill' itself,"
such as denial of admission to the bar or
termination of employment. Relying on this
interpretation of Laird, the government
dismisses the economic and professional
costs the plaintiffs have incurred because
they "flow directly from the 'subjective
chill' on plaintiffs' speech caused solely by
the existence of [the FAA]." The
government says those injuries are "nothing
more than a repackaged version of the
'subjective chill' that the Supreme COUli
found insufficient to establish standing in
Laird."
We are not persuaded that Laird created
either of these special standing rules for
surveillance cases. Since Laird is the only
Supreme Court precedent in which a
plaintiff who had not been surveilled
claimed standing to challenge a surveillance
scheme, it is natural to look to it for
guidance. However, the government reads
far more into Laird than either its facts or its
language permit. In doing so, it loses sight
of the general principles of standing.
First, the Laird plaintiffs so obviously
lacked standing that the Court did not need
to create stricter standing rules in the
surveillance context in order to deny
plaintiffs standing. The Laird plaintiffs
identified no injury that they had suffered or
would likely suffer. In the absence of any
clear alleged injury, the COUli could not find
that the plaintiffs had satisfied the normal
standing requirements, and it therefore did
not need to invent new rules to reach that
outcome. As we have demonstrated at length
above, the facts of Laird are simply not
comparable to those presented in the instant
case. That the Laird plaintiffs were held to

lack standing does not imply that the instant
plaintiffs similarly have failed to allege
injury. Any statement in Laird of a general
rule applicable to all surveillance cases
could only be dictum.
Second, Laird in fact contains no such
purported special rules for surveillance
cases. Nothing in Laird supports the
conclusion that the COUli intended to change
the standing rules, nor does it explain any
need to create standing rules for surveillance
cases distinct from the rules applicable in
other contexts. To the contrary, Laird's final
sentence makes clear that the result in that
case was dictated by the well-established
general principles of standing:
[T]here is nothing in our Nation's
history or in this Court's decided
cases, including our holding today,
that can properly be seen as giving
any indication that actual or
threatened injury by reason of
unlawful activities of the military
would go unnoticed or unremedied.
The language quoted by the governmentthat some previous plaintiffs who obtained
standing to challenge a regulation were or
would soon be "subject to the regulations,
compulsions"
they
proscriptions,
or
challenged,-does not purport to establish a
fixed requirement for standing in the
surveillance context or in any other; it
merely contrasts the situation of the Laird
plaintiffs with those of other plaintiffs who
were found to have standing.
Third, while the government relies heavily
on ACLU v. NSA and United Presbyterian to
support its interpretation of Laird, those
cases do not bind us, and they are factually
distinguishable from the instant case.
not find their
Moreover,
we do
interpretations of Laird to be persuasive.
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They read Laird essentially the same way
the government does, without explaining
why we should read Laird to have ratcheted
up the standing requirements in surveillance
cases, sub silentio, where the plaintiffs at
issue clearly lacked standing under the
normal rules. We do not see any reason why
the law of standing should be stricter or
different in the surveillance context, and
those cases do not offer any such reasons.

reasonable steps they have undertaken to
avoid such over-hearing, which would
impair their ability to carry out those
activities. Nothing more is required for
standing under well-established principles.
And nothing in Laird, where the plaintiffs
alleged no comparable injury, purpOlis to
change those principles.

Under the traditional, well-established rules
of standing, the plaintiffs here have alleged
that they reasonably anticipate direct injury
from the enactment of the FAA because,
unlike most Americans, they engage in
legitimate professional activities that make it
reasonably likely that their privacy will be
invaded and their conversations overheardunconstitutionally, or so they argue-as a
result of the surveillance newly authorized
by the FAA, and that they have already
suffered tangible, indirect injury due to the

The plaintiffs' uncontroverted testimony that
they fear their senSItive international
electronic communications being monitored
and that they have taken costly measures to
avoid being monitored-because we deem
that fear and those actions to be reasonable
in the circumstances of this caseestablishes injuries in fact that we find are
to
the
allegedly
causally
linked
unconstitutional FAA. We therefore find
that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the FAA in federal court.

CONCLUSION
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"Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case
on Electronic Surveillance"
The Washington Post
May 21,2012
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court will decide next term
whether a group of lawyers, human rights
activists and journalists may challenge the
federal government's widespread use of
electronic surveillance to monitor suspected
terrorist activities overseas.
The Americans challenging the program say
they have a "well-founded fear" that their
phone calls and other communications with
overseas clients and sources are swept up in
the "dragnet surveillance."
But the justices, in the term beginning in
October, will not rule on whether the 2008
law that authorized the program violates the
Americans' Fourth Amendment right to
protection from unreasonable searches.
Instead, the question is whether such a fear,
and the actions the plaintiffs have taken
because of the law, give them a rightwhich courts call "standing"-to proceed in
challenging the law.
A federal judge in New York ruled that they
did not. But a panel of the U.S. COUli of
Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed,
and a request by the government that the
entire cOUli overturn that decision failed on
a tie vote.
U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Ven-illi 1r.
asked the high court to step in. He said the
concerns of the plaintiffs, who are
represented by the American Civil Liberties
Union, reflect only "bare conjecture that the
government will choose to expend its

limited resources to target respondents'
foreign contacts."
The program began during the nation's
response to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001,
and eventually led to a broadening of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which
said the government generally must obtain a
search warrant from a judge to listen in to
conversations in the United States involving
people suspected of being spies or ten-orists.
The New York Times revealed in 2005 that
President George W. Bush had approved an
of
"warrantless
extensive
program
wiretapping" to intercept international phone
conversations and e-mails that began or
terminated in the United States, in order to
monitor potential plots.
In 2008, Congress responded to criticism
that the program was unconstitutional by
approving amendments to FISA. They gave
the attorney general and the director of
national intelligence broad powers to
monitor communications in the United
States, as long as one patiy in the
communication was abroad and the targets
were foreigners believed to be outside the
United States.
The ACLU filed its lawsuit the day the
amendments became law, saying the secret
orders permitted by the law would
undoubtedly ensnare Americans. Its clients
regularly spoke on the phone or exchanged
e-mails with those who might be included in
such surveillance orders.
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The law "allows the government to collect
these communications en masse without
specifying the individuals or facilities to be
monitored; without observing meaningful
limitations on the retention, analysis, and
dissemination of acquired information;
without individualized warrants based on
criminal or foreign intelligence probable
cause; and without prior judicial or even
administrative determinations that the
targets of surveillance are foreign agents or
connected in any way, however remotely, to
terrorism," the ACLU told the court.
The group said the lower court was correct
in agreeing that its clients had standing to

challenge the law because they had a
reasonable fear that their communications
would be targeted and disseminated. And it
said these clients had suffered "concrete"
damages because of the law, such as having
to travel overseas to meet their contacts in
person rather than communicating on the
phone or via e-mail.
If the plaintiffs have no standing to question
the program, the ACLU said, there could be
no judicial oversight of the law.
The case is Clapper
International USA.

v.

Amnesty
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"Standing to Challenge Wiretap
Law Divides Circuit"
New York Law J01lrnal
September 22, 2011
Mark Hamblett
The constitutionality of an amended national
security wiretapping law has triggered a
sharp split at the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
In a decision that sets up a trip to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit by the
narrowest of margins voted yesterday to
deny hearing en banc a decision recognizing
that lawyers, journalists and human rights
groups have standing to challenge
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) because they fear
their conversations are being, or will be,
intercepted by the U.S. government.
With a majority of the full panel of active
judges needed to win rehearing, judges in
favor of en banc review fell one vote ShOli,
with the panel splitting 6-6.
Judges Debra Ann Livingston, Dennis
Jacobs, Jose Cabranes, Reena Raggi and
Richard Wesley dissented, delivering or
joining in three opinions arguing that the full
court should rehear the case. The sixth vote
came from Judge Peter Hall, who did not
join the other dissenting opinions but said he
believed en banc review was merited
because the case involved a question of
"exceptional impoliance."
The plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statute
should be rejected because they cannot be
targeted under the statute, the dissenters
said, and they charged the original panel that
issued its decision in March in Amnesty
International United States v. Clapper, 09-

4112-cv, had turned
standing on its head.

the

standard for

Judge Gerard Lynch issued the lone opinion
defending the denial of rehearing. He first
agreed that the case met the "exceptional
importance" standard and acknowledged
that the original opinion "may be in tension"
with those of other circuits.
"But I dispute the dissenters assertions that
Amnesty somehow distorts the law of
standing, or, in Judge Livingston's words,
'threatens a sub silentio transformation of
this Circuit's case law, '" he said.
Judge Lynch was on the original panel that
decided the case last spring along with
Senior Judges Robeli Sack and Guido
Calabresi. That decision reversed Southern
District Judge John Koelti, who had ruled in
2009 that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
The other active judges on the circuit who
joined Judge Lynch in denying rehearing are
Rosemary Pooler, Robert Katzmann, Denny
Chin, Raymond Lohier and Susan Carney.
Judge Lynch said the original opinion spoke
for itself and he was writing only to respond
to points raised by the dissent.
In March, the panel said lawyers, journalists,
human rights groups, labor groups and
others could challenge §702 of FISA, 50
U.S.C. §1881a, a provision that was added
in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
(F AA) and set new procedures for electronic
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surveillance of non-U.S. citizens abroad.
It allows the executive branch to apply to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for
mass surveillance authorization instead of
making an individualized application
focused on specific targets or facilities,
requiring only a certification that "a
significant purpose of the acquisition is to
obtain foreign intelligence information" and
that the information will be obtained "from
or with the assistance of an electronic
communication service provider."

Plaintiffs argue the statute's provisions for
"targeting" to ensure authorization is limited
to people outside the United States and
"minimization procedures" designed to
ensure compliance with the Fourth
Amendment are inadequate.
Jameel Jaffer of the American Civil
Liberties Union argued before the Second
Circuit in 2010 that the new monitoring
regime had a chilling effect on the plaintiffs'
speech, as the fear of having their
conversations with their clients taped forced
them to take steps, such as traveling, to
avoid being overheard by the U.S.
government.
Douglas Letter, an appellate litigation
counsel with the U.S. Department of Justice,
argued that plaintiffs had no standing
because the contended injury to them was
too speculative.

In March, the three-judge panel said the
plaintiffs had alleged a "reasonable fear of
future injury and costs incurred to avoid that
injury."

joined in by all of the dissenters save Judge
Hall.
She said the March panel found standing
"even though plaintiffs cannot be targeted
for surveillance under that statute, cannot
demonstrate actual or imminent interception
of any of their communications, and may in
fact never experience such interception."
She added, "A rule that allows a plaintiff to
establish standing simply by incurring costs
in response to a not-irrational fear of
challenged conduct is unprecedented. On
that theory, every mobster's girlfriend who
pays for a cab to meet with him in person
rather than converse by telephone would be
acting on a not-irrational fear of a Title III
interception, and, therefore, have standing to
challenge."
The Supreme Court, she said, has held "that
subjective fear of challenged government
conduct is insufficient to support standing,
and that forbearance action can only do so
when a plaintiff would otherwise certainly
be subject to the challenged conduct."
Judge Livingston, joined by the same four
judges, said the March panel threatened to
upset case law regarding '''probabilistic
harm' meaning the narrow circumstances in
which this court has recognized injury in
fact to exist based on the risk of some future
harm."
The panel, she said, "did not explain its
of the
Supreme
Court's
disregard
requirement that injury must be actual or
imminently threatened," expressed in
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488
(2009).

'Unprecedented' Rule
Yesterday, Judge Raggi issued a 40-page
dissent to the denial of en banc reVIew,

Judge Jacobs, speaking for himself, said the
plaintiffs' averments on harm "seem to me
inadequate, implausible, and illusory."

185

He said it was a "defect" in the panel
opinion to avoid even a glance at merits
review that is needed to determine a Fourth
Amendment violation.

He agreed that, where subject matter
jurisdiction is at issue, there was an
independent obligation to question even
undisputed facts.

Such a review, he said, "refutes harm and
redressability, and should therefore have
defeated standing."

"Certainly, parties cannot confer jurisdiction
on the court by stipulating to facts that are
false," Judge Lynch said. "But this is hardly
an example of collusive stipulation to facts
that, as Chief Judge Jacobs would have it,
are fanciful," he said, adding that the
reasons for plaintiffs' belief that their
"communications are likely to be intercepted
by the government" under the amended act
"are anything but implausible."

The judge took aim at the "supposed
anxieties" of the plaintiffs.
Of those plaintiffs who submitted affidavits,
Judge Jacobs said, only two were lawyers
who represent clients: Scott McKay and
Sylvia Royce, who represent Guantanamo
detainees. But Mr. McKay did not specify a
single trip he took to avoid monitoring and
Ms. Royce took only one trip--to New York
to meet another lawyer for a conversation
she could have had by phone, Judge Jacobs
said, a call that would not have been subject
to the act.

In closing, Judge Raggi took issue with
Judge Lynch's statement that denying
standing would "close" courthouse doors.
"Rather, it is our remaining colleagues who
decline to consider whether a questionable
standing standard should become the law of
this circuit," she said. "There is, however,
another courthouse, and those of us here in
dissent can only hope that its doors will be
opened for further discussion of this case."

In his opinion, Judge Lynch took issue with
the "theme that runs through all the
dissents"-that the panel should have been
more skeptical about the plaintiffs'
averments.
He said the case came to the panel on
summary judgment, where a court must take
the allegations as true.

Broadened Risk

Judge Lynch continued, "As the panel
opinion explains, the FAA indisputably and
significantly
broadens
the
risk
of
interception, lowers the government's
probable-cause burden, and decreases the
oversight role of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court."
Before, he said, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court would issue a warrant
only if it saw probable cause that the target
was a foreign power or its agent and that the
target was using or about to use the facility
to be monitored. The court, he said, "had to
find probable cause for each specific search,
and maintained a continuing oversight role
after each probable cause determination."
But no longer, he said. Under the current
administration, the FISA court does not
monitor the "targeting" and "minimization"
procedures-that is left to the attorney
general, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Senate and House Judiciary
committees.
Judge Lynch said that, contrary to the
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dissents, the panel's OpInIOn did anything
but
muddle
the
well-established
requirements of "injury in fact, causation
and redressability."
He said the dissents "seem to misunderstand
our injury analysis," as the panel had
addressed both present and future injury.
Despite Judge Jacobs emphasis on two
lawyers, he said the panel made it
"abundantly clear" that it went beyond
lawyers and found "all of the plaintiffs
incurred professional and economic costs in
order to protect clients or sources."
Judge Lynch said it was "hard to take
seriously" the dissents' charge that the
plaintiffs' assertion their overseas contacts
are likely to be government targets was
"speculative. "

overseas contacts include, for example,
alleged al Qaida members (and Guantanamo
detainees) Khalid Sheik Mohammed and
Mohammedou QuId Salahi, as well as those
men's families," he wrote.
Judge Lynch said the plaintiffs faced "a
difficult road" in proving that the law
violates the Fourth Amendment in the face
of the "paramount necessity of protecting
the nation' security against very real and
dangerous external threats." But the
argument should be heard in open court, he
said.
"To reject the plaintiffs' arguments not
because they lack merit, but because we
refuse to hear them, runs a much graver risk
than whatever invasion of plaintiffs' privacy
might be occasioned by the surveillance
authorized by the challenged statute," he
said.

"As the opinion explains, the plaintiffs
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"Amnesty International USA v. Clapper and Standing to
Challenge Secret Surveillance Regimes"
The Volokh Conspiracy
March 24, 2011
Orin Kerr
On Monday, the Second Circuit handed
down a very imp011ant decision on standing
to challenge secret surveillance programs in

Amnesty International USA v. Clapper.
The decision, by Judge Gerard Lynch and
joined by Judges Calabresi and Sack, offers
a very easy way for plaintiffs to have Article
III standing to challenge secret surveillance
statutes. The opinion strikes me as puzzling,
however, and it appears to be in conflict
with other Courts of Appeals cases on
standing to challenge surveillance regimes. I
suspect Supreme Court review is a serious
possibility.
The new decision holds that the plaintiffs
have established Article III standing to
challenge Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which creates
new procedures for authorizing government
electronic surveillance targeting non-United
States persons outside the United States for
purposes of collecting foreign intelligence.
The plaintiffs in the case are attorneys,
journalists, and labor, legal, media, and
human rights organizations who claim to
believe that they may be monitored in the
future pursuant to the statute, and they are
claiming that their fear of surveillance-and
costly measures they have taken to
circumvent the monitoring that they think is
likely-gives them Al1icle III standing to
challenge the surveillance program. Al1icle
III standing requires three elements: (1)
injury in fact, which means an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is concrete and
particularized; (2) a causal relationship
between the injury and the challenged
conduct, which means that the injury fairly

can be traced to the challenged action of the
defendant, and (3) a likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.
The opinion is pretty complicated, but here's
the basic idea as I understand it. According
to Judge Lynch, there is obviously injury in
fact: By spending money to avoid
surveillance, the plaintiffs suffered an
injury-in-fact of losing money. Judge Lynch
then concludes that the injury is fairly
traceable to the surveillance if the plaintiffs'
belief that they are going to be monitored is
reasonable. Here's the key passage:
If the plaintiffs can show that it was
not unreasonable for them to incur
costs out of fear that the government
will intercept their communications
under the FAA, then the measures
they took to avoid interception can
support standing. If the possibility of
interception is remote or fanciful,
however, their present-injury theory
fails because the plaintiffs would
have no reasonable basis for fearing
interception under the FAA, and they
cannot bootstrap their way into
standing by unreasonably incurring
costs to avoid a merely speculative
or highly unlikely potential harm.
Any such costs would be gratuitous,
and any ethical concerns about not
taking those measures would be
unfounded. In other words, for the
purpose of standing, although the
plaintiffs' economic and professional
injuries are injuries in fact, they
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cannot be said to be "fairly
traceable" to the FAA-and cannot
support standing-if they are caused
by a fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise
unreasonable fear of the FAA.
Of course, no one really knows who is being
monitored or when. But Judge Lynch
concludes that the plaintiffs have standing
because their fear of being monitored does
not seem fanciful based on "a realistic
understanding of the world." From the
OpInIOn:
The plaintiffs have established that
they suffered present injuries in
fact-economic and professional
harms-stemming from a reasonable
fear of future harmful government
conduct. They have asserted that the
FAA permits broad monitoring
through mass surveillance orders that
authorize the government to collect
thousands
or
millions
of
communications,
including
communications
between
the
plaintiffs and their overseas contacts.
The FAA is susceptible to such an
interpretation, and the government
has
not
controverted
this
interpretation or offered a more
compelling
one.
The [plaintiffs] fears are fairly
traceable to the FAA because they
are
based
on
a reasonable
interpretation of the challenged
statute and a realistic understanding
of the world. . .. These plaintiffs ...
have successfully demonstrated that
their legitimate professions make it
quite
likely
that
their
communications will be intercepted
if the government-as seems
inevitable-exercises the authority
granted by the FAA.

The government argues the plaintiffs
have failed to establish standing
because the FAA does not itself
authorize surveillance, but only
authorizes the FISC to authorize
surveillance. As a result, the
government says the plaintiffs must
speculate about at least two
intervening steps between the FAA
and any harm they might suffer as a
result of the government conducting
surveillance:
first,
that
the
government
will
apply
for
surveillance 6 authorization under
the FAA, and, second, that the FISC
will grant authorization.
But this argument fails. The presence
of an intervening step does not, as a
general rule, by itself preclude
standing. Nor do the particular
intervening steps the government
identifies here-the government's
seeking authorization and the FISC's
approving it-preclude standing.
With respect to the first step, as
discussed above, it is more than
reasonable to expect that the
government will seek surveillance
authorization under the FAA. We
therefore cannot say that uncertainty
about
this
step
significantly
attenuates the link between the FAA
and the plaintiffs' harms. Nor does
the second intervening step add
significant unceliainty .... It verges
on the fanciful to suggest that the
government will more than rarely
fail to comply with the formal
requirements of the FAA once it has
decided that the surveillance is
warranted.
How do the judges know these things? As
best I can tell, they just sort of know, based
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on some news stories, an occasional FISA
report, and their "realistic understanding of
the world."
If this new decision is right, then
challenging secret surveillance statutes
would seem to be pretty easy-in stark
contrast with the previous understanding
that it was extremely difficult. Other courts
have held that standing requires a showing
of actually being monitored. Under that
standard, it is almost impossible to challenge
new statutory surveillance authorities under
the Fourth Amendment.

won't say what the new secret surveillance
program is, but the news reports usually
report the scope of surveillance programs as
extremely broad, no one will rebut the fears
of surveillance and the judges will find the
fears reasonable, creating A11icle III
standing. True, the judges won't know what
the program is, either. But because they
believe their own opinions are realistic, their
lack of actual knowledge is no longer a
barrier to standing. If this new decision
holds, Article III standing to challenge
surveillance programs would seem to now
be pretty simple.

According to Judge Lynch, however, a
reasonable fear of being monitored is
enough. Since no one knows what the new
secret programs actually are, but lots of
people fear that they are very broad, you just
need to get a broad class of people together
who are really afraid of the surveillance, and
then have them spend some money. On
summary judgment, the plaintiffs facts will
be treated as true. Since the Government

Whether you like the new decision or not, I
suspect it's not the last we've heard on this
issue. The opinion strikes me as in pretty
direct tension with cases like ACLU v. NSA,
the 6th Circuit's case rejecting standing for
the NSA's warrantless surveillance program
during the Bush years. Given the importance
of the issue, and the tensions among the
circuits, I would suspect this case may be
headed upstairs.
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"Why Clapper Matters: The Future
of Programmatic Surveillance"
Lavtjare
May 22,2012
Steve Vladeck

In light of the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari yesterday to review the Second
Circuit's decision in Clapper v. Amnesty
International, I thought I'd put together a
background post trying to explain why, in
my view, Clapper is such an important case.
To be sure, the Justices are only being asked
to decide a technical legal question, i. e.,
whether these plaintiffs have Article III
standing to challenge the key provisions of
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. But as
is often the case with standing, I think the
Justices' view of the merits may have a lot
to say about whether or not they agree with
the Second Circuit that this suit should be
allowed to go forward. And so some
discussion of the merits seems (for lack of a
better word) warranted:
I. FISA and the FISA Amendments Act
When it was enacted in 1978, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act was designed
to serve as a compromise-between
individual privacy values enmeshed within
the
Fourth
Amendment
and
the
government's need to be able to conduct
clandestine foreign intelligence surveillance.
Thus, although the Supreme Court had
repeatedly held that search warrants could
only issue upon a showing of individualized
suspicion, one of the central moves of FISA
was to shift the requisite burden: instead of
demonstrating probable cause to believe that
the surveillance will produce evidence of
criminal activity (the ordinary standard for
"Title III" warrants), FISA requires the
government only to demonstrate probable
cause to believe that the target of the

surveillance is a foreign power or an agent
thereof. In other words, "FISA warrants" are
still
predicated
upon
individualized
suspicion, but suspicion to believe that the
target is an agent of a foreign power, not that
s/he is actively engaged in specific criminal
activity. As a helpful CRS memo put it,
FISA orders are based "upon the probability
of a possibility; the probability to believe
that the foreign target of the order may
engage in spying, or the probability to
believe that the American target of the order
may engage in criminal spying activities."
Thus, whatever else might be said about
FISA, this lesser probable cause requirement
has been repeatedly upheld by lower courts
[although never the Supreme Court] against
Fourth Amendment challenges, largely
because it still requires a particular form of
individualized suspicion.
Although this is largely speculation, I think
it's widely believed that the individualized
suspicion requirement is a big part of why
the Bush Administration went around FISA
(and the FISA Court) in conducting the
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). After
all, it's difficult to reconcile programmatic
surveillance (wherein the government
intercepts all communications going through
particular nodes) with the individualized
suspicion and minimization requirements of
FISA. And so when Congress stepped back
into the fray, first in the Protect America Act
of 2007, and then in the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008, it was to provide statutory
authority
for
such
programmatic
surveillance, as well.
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The centerpiece of the FISA Amendments
Act is new 50 U.S.c. § J88Ja(a) (also
known as "section 702(a)"), which provides
that "the Attorney General and the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize
jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the
effective date of the authorization, the
targeting of persons reasonably believed to
be located outside the United States to
acquire foreign intelligence information." In
other words, without having to seek the
approval of the FISA Court (which merely
reviews certifications to ensure that theyand not the surveillance itself-comply with
the various statutory requirements), the AG
and the DNI can engage in sweeping
programmatic surveillance for one year at a
time.
To be sure, the FISA Amendments Act
includes a series of limitations on such
sweeping authority, lest the government mn
roughshod over individual privacy interests.
Thus, 50 U.S.C. § J88Ia(b) provides that:
An acquisition
subsection (a)-

authorized

under

(1) may not intentionally target any
person known at the time of
acquisition to be located in the
United States;

(2) may not intentionally target a
person reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States if
the purpose of such acquisition is to
target a patiicular, known person
reasonably believed to be in the
United States;
(3) may not intentionally target a
United States person reasonably
believed to be located outside the
United States;

(4) may not intentionally acquire any
communication as to which the
sender and all intended recipients are
known at the time of the acquisition
to be located in the United States;
and
(5) shall be conducted in a manner
consistent
with
the
fourth
amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
In other words,
the
programmatic
surveillance cannot be designed to acquire
communications within the United States or
communications by U.S. persons outside the
United States. But the statute says nothing
accidentally
acqUll'lng
about
communications within the United States or
by U.S. persons through overbreadth or
overzealousness; it just bars intentional
targeting of such communications. Thus, so
long as the government isn't intentionally
trying to target U.S. persons or U.S.
communications, the first four limitations
won't matter no matter how many of such
communications are actually intercepted.
Instead, the fifth limitation-the Fourth
Amendment-is the key (and would've been
even had the statute not expressly said so).

II. The Fourth Amendment and the
Foreign
Surveillance
Intelligence
Exception
Yet even the Fourth Amendment may not be
the constraint we'd expect. ... Thanks to the
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Verd1lgoUrq1lidez, non-citizens outside the United
States are going to have a very hard time
arguing that programmatic surveillance
violates the Fourth Amendment as applied to
their communications. But individuals
within the United States, and U.S. citizens
everywhere, are another matter. Thus, to the
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extent
section
1881 a( a)
authorizes
warrantless programmatic surveillance that
intercepts communications within the United
States or by U.S. citizens abroad, it seems
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment in
general, and the Warrant Clause, III
pat1icular.
In 2008, the FISA Court of Review
sidestepped this problem in its In re
Directives decision, formally recognizing
for the first time a "foreign intelligence
surveillance" exception to the Fourth
Amendment. Specifically, the court held that
"a foreign intelligence exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
exists when surveillance is conducted to
obtain foreign intelligence for national
security purposes and is directed against
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers
reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States." Just to be clear, such an
exception dovetails perfectly with section
1881 a(a), and, if sustained, would render the
Fourth Amendment limitation on such
surveillance entirely nugatory.
But it's hardly a given that such an
exception sho1lld be sustained given the
consequences-i.e., massive and effectively
unreviewable programmatic surveillance,
including the almost certain widespread
interception of us. communications. And
this, finally, is where the Clapper litigation
comes in. Decisions by the FISA COUl1 of
Review are not adversarial. As a result, it is
exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to
challenge them directly (as the ACLU
learned in trying to contest the COUl1 of
Review's 2003 decision in In re Sealed
Case, and in unsuccessfully trying to
intervene in proceedings under the FISA
Amendments Act). Thus, unless someone
could challenge the existence of such an
exception in some other judicial proceeding,
it seemed likely that the limits on the

government's authority under section
1881 a(a) would be entirely political.
Enter Amnesty International and the other
plaintiffs in Clapper. At its core, the claim
on the merits is that section 1881a(a) is
unconstitutional to the extent it authorizes
the government to obtain the plaintiffs'
international communications, both because
it violates the Fourth Amendment and
because it will have a chilling effect on the
plaintiffs' First Amendment speech rights.
And resolving the Fourth Amendment claim
necessarily turns on the existence (vel non)
of the foreign intelligence surveillance
exception recognized by the FISA Court of
Review in In re Directives. In other words,
for better or worse, the central merits issue
in Clapper is whether there will be a foreign
intelligence surveillance exception going
forward. If courts reach the merits, and
disagree with the FISA Court of Review
over the existence of such an exception, then
the Fourth Amendment could indeed
become a significant constraint on the scope
of section 1881a(a)-and the future of
programmatic (as opposed to individualized)
foreign intelligence surveillance.
III. Article III Standing in Clapper
Thus far, of course, the lower courts haven't
gotten to the merits in Clapper. The district
court granted summary judgment to the
government based on the plaintiffs' lack of
standing, and a unanimous panel of the
Second Circuit reversed. As Judge Lynch
explained, "Because standing may be based
on a reasonable fear of future injury and
costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the
plaintiffs have established that they have a
reasonable fear of injury and have incurred
costs to avoid it, we agree that they have
standing." There's more to say about the
substance of the Court of Appeals' standing
analysis (with which I largely agree),
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although I'll save that for later. For now, let
me just note that, as I've suggested before,
there is here (unlike in the AeLU v. NSA
case, in which the Sixth Circuit rejected
standing in a challenge to the TSP) "a
specific (and public) statutory authorization
for surveillance that necessarily gives some
fairly strong clues (to both private parties
and the courts) as to how those whom the
statute bars the government from targeting
could nevertheless end up having their
communications intercepted." Indeed, as we
noted last week in our discussions of the
Hedges case, one can hardly blame courts
for finding standing when the government
refuses to concede that it will not undertake
the measures to which plaintiffs fear they
may be subjected.
But at a more fundamental level, there's one
more point worth making: Readers are likely
familiar with Alex Bickel's Passive Virt1les,
and his thesis that, especially on such
sensitive questions where constitutional
rights intersect with national security, courts
might do best to rely on justiciability
doctrines to duck the issue-and to thereby
avoid passing upon the merits one way or
the other. [Think Joshua at the end of

WarGames: "The only winning move is not
to play."] And at first blush, this looks like
the perfect case for Bickel's thesis, given the
implications in either direction on the
merits: recognizing a foreign intelligence
surveillance
exception
and
thereby
endorsing such sweepmg, warrantless
interceptions of previously protected
communications vs. removing this particular
club from the government's bag ....

And
yet,
the
foreign
intelligence
surveillance exception only exists because it
has already been recognized by a circuitlevel federal couti, to wit, the FISA Court of
Review. Whether the passive virtues might
otherwise justify judicial sidestepping in
such a contentious case, the fact of the
matter is that this is a problem largely (albeit
not entirely, thanks to the FISA
Amendments Act) of the c01lrts' making. To
duck at this stage would be to let the FISA
Couti of Review-the judges of which are
selected by the Chief Justice-have the last
word on such a momentous question of
constitutional law. In my view, at least, that
would be unfortunate, and it's certainly not
what Bickel meant. ...
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Chaidez v. United States
11-820
Ruling Below: Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
2012 WL 1468539 (U.S. 2012).
In 2003 Chaidez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1977, became
involved in an insurance scheme in which she falsely claimed to have been a passenger in
a car collision and received $1,200 in the scheme. She pleaded guilty to fraud, but
claimed that her attorney at the time never informed her that by doing so would result in
automatic deportation. In 2010, Chaidez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis
arguing that her attorney was required to inform her of the consequences of pleading
guilty to fraud. The court found that the Supreme Court's holding in Padilla v. Kent1lcky,
applied to this case retroactively and therefore her attorney was required to inform her of
those consequences.
Questions Presented: Whether the holding in Padilla v. Kentllcky requiring counsel to
inform a defendant of immigration consequences of guilty plea applied retroactively.

Roselva CHAIDEZ, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decided August 23, 2010
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
FLAUM, Circuit Judge:
In Padilla v. Kentllcky,
U.S. - - , 130
S.Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010),
the Supreme Court held that an attorney
provides ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to inform a client that a guilty plea
carries a risk of deportation. The district
court concluded that Padilla did not
announce a new rule under the framework
set forth in Teaglle v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989),
and consequently applied its holding to

Petitioner Roselva Chaidez's collateral
appeal. Because we conclude that Padilla
announced a new rule that does not fall
within either of Teague's exceptions, we
reverse the judgment of the district court.

I. Background
Chaidez entered the United States from her
native Mexico in 1971, and became a lawful
permanent resident in 1977. In June 2003,
Chaidez was indicted on three counts of
mail fraud in connection with a staged
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accident insurance scheme in which the loss
advice of counsel, Chaidez pled guilty to
two counts on December 3, 2003. She was
sentenced to four years' probation on April
1, 2004, and judgment was entered in her
case on April 8, 2004. Chaidez did not
appeal.

to the vIctIms exceeded $10,000. On the
petition. The court granted the petition and
vacated
Chaidez's
conviction.
The
government appeals the district court's
underlying ruling regarding the retroactive
effect of Padilla.

II. Discussion
Federal law provides that an alien who is
"convicted of an aggravated felony at any
time after admission is deportable." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Chaidez's plea of guilty
to a fraud involving a loss in excess of
$10,000 rendered her eligible for removal
from the United States as an aggravated
felon. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The
government initiated removal proceedings in
2009, after Chaidez unsuccessfully filed an
application for U.S. citizenship.
In an effOli to avoid removal, Chaidez
sought to have her conviction overturned.
To that end, she filed a motion for a writ of
coram nobis in her criminal case on January
25, 2010. She alleges ineffective assistance
of counsel in connection with her decision to
plead guilty, claiming that her defense
attorney failed to inform her that a guilty
plea could lead to removal. Chaidez
maintains that she would not have pled
guilty if she had been made aware of the
immigration consequences of such a plea.
On March 31, 2010, while Chaidez's motion
was pending before the district cOUli, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in
Padilla. In a thoughtful opinion, Judge
Gottschall acknowledged that this case
presents a close call. She concluded that
Padilla did not announce a new rule for
Teague purposes, but rather was an
application of the Court's holding in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Having concluded that Padilla
applied to Chaidez's case, the district cOUli
considered the merits of her coram nobis

The writ of coram nobis, available under the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (a), provides
a method for collaterally attacking a
criminal conviction when a defendant is not
in custody, and thus cannot proceed under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Folak,
865 F.2d 110, 112-13 (7th Cir.1988). The
writ is an extraordinary remedy, allowed
only where collateral relief is necessary to
address an ongoing civil disability resulting
from a conviction. Because a writ of error
coram nobis affords the same general relief
as a writ of habeas corpus, we proceed as we
would in a habeas case. Our review is de
novo.
In Padilla, the Court considered the
petitioner's claim that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance by erroneously
advising him that pleading guilty to a drug
distribution charge would not impact his
immigration status. The Kentucky Supreme
Court had rejected Padilla's claim,
concluding that advice regarding the
collateral consequences of a guilty plea
("i.e., those matters not within the
sentencing authority of the state trial cOllli"),
including deportation, is "outside the scope
of representation required by the Sixth
Amendment." 130 S.Ct. at 1481. As the
Padilla Court noted, many state and federal
courts had similarly concluded that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel was limited
to advice about the direct consequences of a
guilty plea (i.e., length of imprisonment),
and did not extend to information regarding
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collateral consequences (i.e., deportation).
Justice Stevens, the Padilla Court concluded
that "advice regarding deportation is not
categorically removed from the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 130
S.Ct. at 1482. Noting that it had "never
applied a distinction between direct and
collateral consequences to define the scope
of constitutionally 'reasonable professional
assistance' required under Strickland," the
Court
declined
to
consider
the
appropriateness of the direct/collateral
distinction generally. lei. at 1481. Rather, it
found such a distinction "ill-suited to
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the
specific risk of deportation." lei. at 1481-82.
The majority based that conclusion on "the
unique nature of deportation"-specifically,
its severity as a penalty and its close
relationship to the criminal process. lei. at
1481. The Court noted that recent changes in
federal immigration law, including the
Immigration Act of 1990 and the Illegal
Immigration
Reform
and
Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), had
served to further "enmesh[ ] criminal
convictions and the penalty of deportation,"
by making "removal nearly an automatic
result for a broad class of noncitizen
offenders." lei. at 1478-81. Those changes
convinced the COUlt that "deportation is an
integral pmt ... of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes," and cannot
be "divorce[ d] ... from the conviction." lei.
at 1480-81. As a result, the Court concluded
that Strickland applied to Padilla's
ineffective assistance claim.
The Court went on to consider the first
Strickland prong-whether Padilla had
established that his counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. In order to determine what
constituted reasonable representation under

However, in a majority opinion authored by
the circumstances, the COUlt looked to
prevailing professional norms set forth by
the American Bar Association and numerous
other authorities. The Court found that,
dating back to the mid-1990s, those
authorities had been in agreement that
counsel must advise his or her client
regarding the risk of deportation. Thus, the
Court held that defense counsel provides
constitutionally deficient representation by
failing to inform a defendant that a guilty
plea carries a risk of depOltation.
Chaidez seeks to have Padilla applied to her
case on collateral review, despite the fact
that the criminal case against her was final
on direct review when Padilla was decided.
Teague governs our analysis. Under Teag1le,
a constitutional rule of criminal procedure
applies to all cases on direct and collateral
review if it is not a new rule, but rather an
old rule applied to new facts. A new rule
applies only to cases that still are on direct
review, unless one of two exceptions
applies. In particular, a new rule applies
retroactively on collateral review if (1) it is
substantive or (2) it is a "'watershed rul[ e]
of criminal procedure' implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding."
The parties agree that if Padilla announced a
new rule neither exception to nonretroactivity applies. Therefore, whether
Padilla announced a new constitutional rule
of criminal procedure is the sole issue before
us. The district courts that have addressed
that issue-including those in this circuitare split. The Third Circuit recently became
the first of our sister circuits to weigh in,
holding that Padilla simply applied the old
Strickland rule, such that it is retroactively
applicable on collateral review.
A rule is said to be new when it was not
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"dictated by precedent existing at the time
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. That definition of
what constitutes a new rule reflects the fact
that Teague was developed in the context of
federal habeas, which is designed "to ensure
that state convictions comply with the
federal law in existence at the time the
conviction became final, and not to provide
a
mechanism
for
the
continuing
reexamination of final judgments based
upon later emerging legal doctrine." Thus,
the Court has explained that Teague
"val idates
reasonab Ie,
good-fai th
interpretations of existing precedents made
by state courts even though they are shown
to be contrary to later decisions." Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) The
peltinent inquiry here is whether Padilla's
outcome was "susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds." Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
Put differently, "our task is to determine
whether a ... court considering [Chaidez's]
claim at the time [her] conviction became
final"-pre-Padilla-"would
have
felt
compelled by existing precedent to conclude
that [Padilla] was required by the
Constitution." Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488.
That task is a "difficult" one where, as here,
the decision at issue "extends the reasoning
of . . . prior cases," as opposed to
"explicit[ly] overruling . . . an earlier
holding." However, the Court's retroactivity
In
jurisprudence
provides
guidance.
assessing whether the outcome of a case was
susceptible to reasonable debate, the COUlt
has looked to both the views expressed in
the opinion itself and lower court decisions.
Lack of unanimity on the Court in deciding
a particular case supports the conclusion that
the case announced a new rule. Similarly, if
the lower COUltS were split on the issue, the
Court has concluded that the outcome of the
case was susceptible to reasonable debate.
These considerations convince us that
Padilla announced a new rule.

the defendant's conviction became final."
The majority opinion in Padilla drew a
concurrence authored by Justice Alito and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice
Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas. That
the members of the Padilla Court expressed
such an "array of views" indicates that
Padilla was not dictated by precedent.
O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 159. Moreover, the
views expressed in each of the opinions
SUppOlt that conclusion. Statements in the
concurrence leave no doubt that Justice
Alito and Chief Justice Robetts considered
Padilla to be ground-breaking. And the two
dissenting Justices, who expressed the view
that the majority's extension of the Court's
Sixth Amendment jurisplUdence lacked
"basis in text or in principle," certainly did
not see Padilla as dictated by precedent.
Even the majority suggested that the lUle it
announced was not dictated by precedent,
Padilla's
claim
stating that
while
"follow[ ed] from" its decision applying
Strickland to advice regarding guilty pleas in
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), Hill
"does not control the question before us." It
seems evident from Supreme COUlt
precedent that Padilla cannot be an old rule
simply because
existing
case
law
"inform[ ed], or even control[led] or
govern[ed]," the analysis. Saffle, 494 U.S. at
488. Nor will the rule of Padilla be deemed
old because precedent lent "general support"
to the rule it established, Sawyer, 497 U.S. at
236, or because it represents "the most
reasonable . . . interpretation of general
law," Lambrix v. SingletalY, 520 U.S. 518,
538 (1997). Padilla can only be considered
an old lUle if Supreme Court precedent
"compel[ledJ "the result. Saffle, 494 U.S. at
490. The majority's characterization of Hill
suggests that it did not understand the rule
set forth in Padilla to be dictated by
precedent.

198

Our conclusion that Padilla announced a
new rule finds additional support in prePadilla decisions by state and federal comis.
Prior to Padilla, the lower federal courts,
including at least nine Comis of Appeals,
had uniformly held that the Sixth
Amendment did not require counsel to
provide advice concerning any collateral (as
opposed to direct) consequences of a guilty
plea. Courts in at least thirty states and the
District of Columbia had reached the same
conclusion. 87 CORNELL L.REV. at 699.
Such rare unanimity among the lower courts
is compelling evidence that reasonable
jurists reading the Supreme Court's
precedents in April 2004 could have
disagreed about the outcome of.
In concluding that Padilla did not announce
a new rule, the Third Circuit downplayed the
significance of the contrary lower court
decisions, reasoning that they generally predated the adoption of the professional norms
relied on by the Padilla Court. Grocio, 645
F.3d at 639-40. Not so. While Justice Alito
cited primarily pre-1995 cases in his
concurrence, in the years preceding Padilla,
the lower federal courts consistently
reaffirmed that deportation is a collateral
consequence of a criminal conviction and
that the Sixth Amendment does not require
advice regarding collateral consequences. In
doing so, three Courts of Appeals explicitly
rejected the argument that the enactment of
the IIRIRA altered the calculus.
We acknowledge that "the mere existence of
conflicting authority does not necessarily
mean a rule is new." Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362,410 (2000). But, in our view, "an
objective reading of the relevant cases"
demonstrates that Padilla was not dictated
by precedent. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S.
222, 237 (1992). It is true that, unlike so
many lower courts, the Supreme Court has

"never applied a distinction between direct
and collateral consequences to define the
scope of constitutionally 'reasonable
professional assistance' required under
Strickland." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. As
such, prior to Padilla, the Court had not
foreclosed the possibility that advice
regarding collateral consequences of a guilty
plea could be constitutionally required. But
neither had the Court required defense
counsel to provide advice regarding
consequences collateral to the criminal
prosecution at issue.
Moreover, the distinction between direct and
collateral consequences was not without
foundation in Supreme Court precedent. It
can be traced to the Court's jurisprudence
regarding the validity of guilty pleas. To be
valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary
and intelligent. Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 747 (1970). The Court has long
held that a plea is voluntary where the
defendant is "fully aware of the direct
consequences" of the plea. The Court also
has said that where "a defendant is
represented by counsel during the plea
process and enters his plea upon the advice
of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea
depends on whether counsel's advice 'was
within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases. '" Hill, 474
U.S. at 56. At least some lower cOUlis
extrapolated from these holdings that
counsel performs effectively by advising a
client as to the direct consequences of
conviction.
Therefore, we "cannot say that the large
majority of federal and state cOUlis that
ha[ d] rejected" ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims based on advice about the
deportation consequences of a plea were
"unreasonable" in their reading of existing
Supreme Court precedent. Sajjle, 494 U.S. at
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490. We consequently remain persuaded by
2004, a jurist could reasonably have reached
a conclusion contrary to the holding in
Padilla, such that Padilla announced a new
rule for purposes of Teag1fe.
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court recently noted, "[t]here is no question
that the holding in Padilla is an extension of
the rule in Strickland," "[n ]or is there any
question that the Supreme Court was
applying the first prong of the Strickland
standard when it concluded that the failure
of counsel to provide her client with
available advice about an Issue like
deportation was constitutionally deficient."
Clarke, 460 Mass. at 37, 949 N.E.2d 892.
However, we disagree with that court's
conclusion that, because "the OpInIOn in
Padilla relies primarily on citation to
Strickland itself," Padilla was dictated by
Strickland. Id. at 44, 949 N.E.2d 892. Under
Teague, a rule is old only if it sets forth the
sole reasonable interpretation of existing
precedent. Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 538. The
fact that Padilla is an extension of
Strickland says nothing about whether it was
new or not.
We recognize that the application of
Strickland to unique facts generally will not
produce a new rule. However, that guiding
principle is not absolute. We believe Padilla
to be the rare exception. Before Padilla, the
Court had never held that the Sixth
Amendment requires a criminal defense
attorney to provide advice about matters not
directly related to their client's criminal
prosecution. In Padilla, the Court held that
constitutionally effective assistance of
counsel requires advice about a civil penalty
imposed by the Executive Branch (now the
Department of Homeland Security, formerly
the Immigration and Naturalization Service)
after the criminal case is closed. In our view,
that result was sufficiently novel to qualify

the weight of lower court authority that, in
as a new rule. Indeed, if Padilla is
considered an old rule, it is hard to imagine
an application of Strickland that would
qualify as a new rule. Perhaps in the future
the Court will conclude, given the breadth
and fact-intensive nature of the Strickland
reasonableness
standard,
that
cases
extending Strickland are never new. But
until that time, we are bound to apply
Teague in the context of Strickland.
The specific contours of the Padilla holding
further indicate that it is a new rule. Under
the rule set forth in Padilla, the scope of an
attorney's duty to provide immigrationrelated advice varies depending on the
degree of specialization required to provide
such advice accurately. In particular, the
Court held that "when the deportation
consequence [of a guilty plea] is truly clear,"
counsel has a duty to "give correct advice."
130 S.Ct. at 1483. But "[w]hen the law is
not succinct and straightforward," such that
"the dep0l1ation consequences of a
particular plea are unclear or uncertain," "a
criminal defense attorney need do no more
than advise a noncitizen client that pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse
immigration consequences." That nuanced,
new analysis cannot, in our view, be
characterized as having been dictated by
precedent.
The district court relied on the fact that
Padilla itself was before the Court on a
motion for post-conviction relief for its
conclusion that the Court intended for
Padilla to apply retroactively to cases on
collateral appeal. In light of the fact that
Kentucky did not raise Teag1fe as a defense
in Padilla, we do not assign the significance
to Padilla's procedural posture that the
district com1 did. While "[r]etroactivity is
properly treated as a threshold question,"
Teag1fe "is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense
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that [the] Court ... must raise and decide the
497 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1990). Therefore, if a
State does not rely on Teague, the Court has
no obligation to address it, and can consider
the merits of the claim. We believe it is
more likely that the Court considered
Teaglle to be waived, than that it silently
engaged in a retroactivity analysis.

issue Sua sponte." Collins v. Y01lngblood,
though not dispositive, is strong evidence
that reasonable jurists could have debated
the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, we
REVERSE the judgment of the district court
and REMAND the case for fUliher
proceedings.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Finally, the district court reasoned that the
best way to make sense of the Padilla
Court's discussion (and dismissal) of
concerns that its ruling would undermine the
finality of plea-based convictions was to
conclude that the majority intended Padilla
to apply retroactively. 130 S.Ct. at 1484-85.
The Third Circuit reached a similar
conclusion. That is a reasonable reading, and
certainly is the most compelling argument
that Padilla is an old rule. However, we are
hesitant to depart from our application of the
test set forth in Teague and its progenywhich points clearly in the direction of new
rule-based on inferences from indirect
language. Moreover, to the extent that we
attempt to discern whether members of the
COUli understood Padilla to be a new rule,
we find the clearest indications in the
concurrence and dissent, which leave no
doubt that at least four Justices view Padilla
as new.
III. Conclusion
The Supreme COUli has defined the concept
of an old rule under Teag1le narrowly,
limiting it to those holdings so compelled by
precedent that any contrary conclusion must
be deemed unreasonable. While determining
whether a rule is new can be challenging,
and this case provides no exception, we
conclude that the narrow definition of what
constitutes an old rule tips the scales in favor
of finding that Padilla announced a new
rule. Moreover, that numerous cOUlis had
failed to anticipate the holding in Padilla,

At the time Roselva Chaidez, a lawful
permanent resident since 1977, entered her
plea, prevailing professional nOllTIS placed a
duty on counsel to advise clients of the
removal consequences of a decision to enter
a plea of guilty. I would join the Third
Circuit in finding that Padilla v. Kentucky,
_U.S. _,130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d
284 (2010), simply clarified that a violation
of these norms amounts to deficient
v.
performance
under
Strickland
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). As such,
Padilla did not announce a "new rule" under
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and is
therefore
retroactively
applicable
to
Chaidez's coram nobis petition seeking to
vacate her guilty plea on the grounds that
her counsel was ineffective. For the reasons
set fOlih below, I dissent.
I do not disagree that Teague holds that a
"case announces a new rule when it breaks
new ground or imposes a new obligation on
the States or Federal Government," and "if
the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the [petitioner's]
conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S.
at 301. I do, however, disagree with the
majority as to how Teaglle's holding applies
in the context of Strickland v. Washington.
In Padilla, the Court found that because
"deportation is a particularly severe
'penalty,' ... advice regarding deportation
is not categorically removed from the ambit
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
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The Court then stated that the first inquiry
representation "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness," Stricklancl, 466
U.S. at 688, is "necessarily linked to the
practice and expectations of the legal
community." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482.
Noting that Strickland's standard looked to
"reasonableness
under
prevailing
professional norms," the Padilla Court held
that "[t]he weight of prevailing professional
norms supports the view that counsel must
advise her client regarding the risk of
deportation.
By citing and relying on Strickland, and
applying that case to Padilla's claim, the
Court "broke no new ground in holding the
duty to consult also extended to counsel's
obligation to advise the defendant of the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea."
United States v. Gracia, 645 F.3d at 639.
The decision "is best read as merely
recogmzmg that a plea agreement's
immigration consequences constitute the
sort of information an alien defendant needs
in making 'impOliant decisions' affecting
'the outcome of the plea process,' and
thereby come within the ambit of the 'more
particular duties to consult with the
defendant' required of effective counsel."
Under such a reading, Padilla was a mere
application of Strickland to the facts before
the Court, and therefore not a "new rule."
Following Teag1le, the early Supreme Court
retroactivity cases cast the "new rule"
inquiry as whether or not "reasonable
jurists" would agree that a rule was not
"dictated" by precedent. But this narrow
conception of the "dictated" language from
Teague is not the relevant inquiry in the
Strickland context. "The often repeated
language that Teag1le endorses 'reasonable,
good-faith interpretations' by state courts is
an explanation of policy, not a statement of
law." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 383

under
Strickland,
whether
counsel's
(2000). As the Court has stated, and as the
majority today recognizes, "the Strickland
test provides sufficient guidance for
resolving virt1lally all ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claims." "[W]here the starting
point is a rule of general application such as
Strickland, it will be the infrequent case that
yields a result so novel that it forges a new
rule, one not dictated by precedent," Wright
v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992).
Given this clear language regarding
Teag1le's applicability in the Strickland
context, I cannot find that the Supreme
Court's retroactivity cases where Strickland
is not implicated compel a finding that the
rule announced in Padilla is "new."
In Williams, the Court was addressing
Strickland under the "clearly established
law" requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254( d)(1),
which a plurality found codified Teag1le's
requirement that federal habeas courts must
deny relief that is contingent upon a rule of
law not "clearly established" at the time the
state conviction became final. 529 U.S. at
379-80. Parts 1, III, and IV of the opinion
were on behalf of a majority. The opinion of
the Court stated:
It is past question that the rule set
forth in Strickland qualifies as

"clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Comi of
the United States." That the
Strickland test "of necessity requires
a case-by-case examination of the
evidence," Wright, 505 U.S., at 308,
112 S.Ct. 2482, obviates neither the
clarity of the rule nor the extent to
which the rule must be seen as
"established" by this Court. This
Court's precedent "dictated" that the
Virginia Supreme Court apply the
Strickland test at the time that court
enteliained Williams' ineffective-
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assistance claim. . . . And it can
right to effective counsel "breaks
new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States."
529 U.S. at 391. Where such a "case-by-case
examination" is required, "we can tolerate a
number of specific applications without
saying that those applications themselves
create a new rule." Wright, 505 U.S. at
308-09.
This case is one of those "specific
applications" that does not create a new rule.
In applying Strickland to this particular set
of facts, the Court found that prevailing
professional norms in place at the time of
the defendant's plea required counsel to act
in accordance with those norms, and that the
advice required was clear and apparent.
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. That the Padilla
Court began by addressing whether
Strickland applied to Padilla's claim is of no
consequence. As the Third Circuit
recognized, the true question addressed by
Padilla is whether counsel has been
constitutionally adequate in advising a
criminal defendant as to whether or not to
accept a plea bargain. Grocio, 645 F.3d at
637-38. The analytical mechanism by which
the Court applied Strickland does not detract
from the fact that Strickland is the general
test governing ineffective assistance claims,
and that the Padilla Court did no more than
recognize that removal is the type of
consequence that a defendant needs to be
informed of when making the decision of
whether to plea.
Given how Teague and Strickland co-exist, I
would not find that the concurring and
dissenting views in Padilla compel a finding
that the majority's opinion is a "new rule."
Despite using dissenting views to inform the
analysis of whether reasonable jurists could
differ on whether precedent dictates a

hardly be said that recognizing the
particular result, the Court has "not
suggest[ ed] that the mere existence of a
dissent suffices to show that the rule is
new." Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406,416 n.
5 (2004). And where the Court has relied on
an "array of views" to find a rule "new," the
underlying case that the petitioner sought to
have applied in fact had no majority opinion.
The existence of concurring and dissenting
views does not alter the fact that the
prevailing professional norms at the time of
Chaidez's plea required a lawyer to advise
her client of the immigration consequences
of a guilty plea. Even in light of dissenting
views, "Strickland did not freeze into place
the objective standards of attorney
performance prevailing in 1984, never to
change again." Grocio, 645 F.3d at 640. The
concurring and dissenting opinions do not
alter the straightforward application of
Strickland that the majority engaged in. In
Padilla, even the concurring Justices agreed
that counsel must, at the very least, advise a
noncitizen "defendant that a criminal
conviction may have adverse immigration
consequences." And Justices have disagreed
on whether an outcome was "dictated" by
precedent where a majority found that a
novel application of an old precedent was
not a "new rule."
The strongest argument that the government
and majority opinion make is the unanimity
among the lower courts prior to Padilla that
the Sixth Amendment does not require
counsel to warn clients of the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea. The early
cases, however, relied on the categorization
of removal or deportation as a "collateral"
consequence. This is a classification that the
Padilla court specifically rejected. The
Court found that deportation is "intimately
related to the criminal process," and that
"[ o]ur law has enmeshed criminal
convictions and the penalty of dep0l1ation
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for nearly a century." The Court also found
have made removal nearly an automatic
result for a broad class of noncitizen
offenders." The Court therefore found it
'''most difficult' to divorce the penalty from
the conviction in the depOliation context."
Despite the drastically changed immigration
landscape following the passage of IIRlRA
in 1996, more recent lower cOUli decisions
did not revisit earlier holdings regarding
deportation's collateral nature, and declined
to find deportation any less collateral. These
cases, however, cannot change the fact that
the Supreme Court itself "never applied a
distinction between direct and collateral
consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally 'reasonable professional
assistance' required under Strickland, ... "
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481, a more relevant
inquiry for Teague purposes. Not only did
the Supreme Court never make this
distinction, but in 2001 the Court stated that
"preserving the client's right to remain in
the United States may be more impOliant to
the client than any potential jail sentence."
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001).
The flaw in the collateral versus direct
consequences distinction was known at the
time of Chaidez's plea. And as the majority
recognizes, "the mere existence of
conflicting authority does not necessarily
mean a rule is new." Williams, 529 U.S. at
410. The only question for Teaglle purposes
in the Strickland context is whether counsel
was constitutionally adequate in advising a
criminal defendant as to whether or not to
accept a plea bargain. Gracia, 645 F.3d at
637-38. Relying on lower court decisions to
the contrary would overlook Strickland's
straightforward language that "[t]he proper
measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms"-professional norms
that the Padilla Court found had been in
place for at least fifteen years prior to its

that "recent changes in our immigration law
holding. I would therefore not find the
unanimity among the lower courts predating Padilla "compelling" for purposes of
our current Teag1le analysis.
My colleagues downplay the plain language
in Padilla that itself signals anticipated
retroactive application. The majority in
Padilla specifically stated that its decision
will not "open the floodgates" to challenges
of convictions and further stated that "[i]t
seems unlikely that our decision today will
have a significant effect on those
convictions already obtained as the result of
plea bargains." This floodgates argument is
a clear reference to petitions such as the one
at hand that challenge the past deficient
performance of counsel. The Court's use of
the past tense in Padilla forecloses an
argument that it was only referring to
prospective challenges, especially when the
two subsequent sentences of the opinion
speak of professional norms over the "past
15 years" and that courts should presume
that counsel satisfied their obligation "at the
time their clients considered pleading
guilty." Such a discussion would be
unnecessary if the Court intended that
Padilla only apply prospectively. The
government argues that the floodgates
discussion referred only to state postconviction proceedings, as states are free to
offer post-conviction relief without regard to
Teag1le. However, in its floodgates
discussion, the Padilla Court relied on
research that included both state andfederal
post conviction proceedings when citing
how many habeas petitions filed arise from
guilty pleas.
As the COUli in Padilla signaled, if mere
applications of Strickland are "old rules," it
does not necessarily follow that every
petitioner will be able to take advantage of
those mere applications. First, the Padilla
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Court relied on the professional norms in
Padilla's counsel "could have easily
determined that his plea would make him
eligible for deportation simply from reading
the text of the statute. . . ." Not every
noncitizen who pled to an offense will be in
that position. Additionally, Strickland also
requires a showing of prejudice. Showing
prejudice, much like deficient performance,
is adjudicated depending on the facts of each
particular case, and the fact that courts must
engage in such case-by-case analysis should
not influence whether or not the rule itself is
"new."

place at the time of plea, and the fact that
We can rest assured that defense lawyers
will now advise their clients prior to
pleading guilty about the immigration
consequences of such a plea, as the Court
has clarified that such advice is required
under the Sixth Amendment. But given
today's holding, this is of no consequence to
Roselva Chaidez despite the fact that
professional norms in place at the time of
her plea placed the same duty on her
counsel. Because I find that Padilla simply
extended the Supreme Court's holding in
Strickland, and itself signaled an intent to be
applied to noncitizens in Chaidez's position,
I respectfully dissent.
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"New Look at Lawyers' Advice"
SCO TUSb log
April 30,2012
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
settle a dispute among lower courts on
whether to give more immigrants the benefit
of a ruling that requires their lawyers to
advise them more clearly on what can
happen if they plead guilty to a crime. At
issue in the new case of Chaidez v. United
States (11-820) is the potential retroactivity
of the Court's 2010 ruling in Padilla v.
Kent1lcky. This was the only new case
granted on Monday; it will be heard and
decided in the new Term starting October 1.
In the Padilla decision, the Court ruled that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
includes a right for a non-citizen living in
the U.S. to be advised by a lawyer of the
consequences under immigration law of
pleading guilty to a crime that could lead to
deportation. The majority noted that, under
dramatic changes recently in immigration
law, deportation is virtually automatic after
one is convicted of an "aggravated felony."
Relying on the constitutional standard that a
lawyer's professional advice to clients must
satisfy a minimum level of performance, the
Court in Padilla found that prevailing
standards dictate that a lawyer for a noncitizen faced with a criminal charge must
advise that individual of the risk of being
depOlied if a plea of guilty is entered. If the
immigration law outlook is not clear, the
Court said, the lawyer at least must tell the
client that there could be adverse
immigration consequences.
The sequel case arose before the Padilla
decision was issued, and the Seventh Circuit

Court
ruled that
the non-citizen
involved-Roselva Chaidez, now living in
Chicago-could not take advantage of that
precedent because it did not apply
retroactively. The Padilla decision came
down on March 31, 2010, and the Seventh
Circuit said that it established a new rule of
criminal law and thus, under Supreme Court
precedent, it could not apply to any case in
which a guilty plea had been entered prior to
that March 2010 date.
Chaidez, a native of Mexico, came to the
U.S. in the 1970s, and became a lawful
permanent resident in 1977. She has three
children and three grandchildren, all of
whom are U.S. citizens. She had been
involved in an insurance fraud scheme, in
which others had persuaded her to claim
falsely that she had been a passenger in a car
involved in a collision; she had received
$1,200 for her role. In 2003, she was
charged with two counts of mail fraud for
two separate billings after the underlying
dispute was settled out of court.
Her lawyer did not advise her about the risk
of deportation if she pleaded guilty, and did
not seek to negotiate a plea deal for her. She
pleaded guilty. It is not disputed that, had
she known of the deportation prospect, she
would not have pleaded guilty. She was
sentenced to four years on probation and
ordered to pay the insurance company a total
of $22,500. Her conviction became final in
2004. Three years later, federal officials
became aware of her conviction, and moved
to deport her. She challenged that in federal
cOllli, claiming that her lawyer had failed to
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advise her fully. That was the claim the
Seventh Circuit rejected. Other federal
courts,
however,
disagree
on
the
retroactivity point.

the Supreme Court that the Seventh Circuit
was correct in denying retroactivity, it
nevertheless urged the Court to hear the case
to clear up the conflict among lower courts.
The Justices accepted that advice.

While the U.S. Solicitor General argued to
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"7 th Circuit Holds Lawyer Rule on Impact of Guilty Plea for
Immigrants not Retroactive"
The Indiana Lawyer
August 24, 2011
Michael Hopkins
A three-judge panel for the 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals has determined a
landmark decision from the Supreme
Court of the United States last year isn't
retroactive. That rule required criminal
defense attorneys to advise clients about
the immigration impact of signing a
guilty plea, and this means past cases
wouldn't benefit from that holding even
if those individuals had been deprived of
that Sixth Amendment right.
The ruling came Tuesday in Roselva
Chaidez v. U.S., No. 10-3623, a
Northern District of Illinois case
involving a woman from Mexico who
entered the United States and became a
lawful resident in the 1970s. She was
indicted in 2003 on mail fraud in
connection with a staged accident
insurance scheme that took more than
$10,000 from the victims. On the advice
of her counsel, Chaidez pleaded guilty to
two counts and received a sentence of
four years probation.
The
federal
government
began
deportation proceedings in 2009 because
the law dictates that for anyone
convicted of an aggravated felony. In an
attempt to halt the deportation, Chaidez
tried to have her conviction overturned
despite not originally appealing the
conviction and sentence. Filing a motion
for the court to correct a previous error
that couldn't be fixed by any other
remedy, Chaidez in January 2010
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
in connection with her decision to plead

guilty, and she claimed that her defense
attorney failed to infOlm her that a guilty
plea could lead to her depOliation.
While the motion was pending before
the Northern District of Illinois, the
Supreme COUli on March 31, 2010,
decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1486 (2010). The holding in that
case upheld the argument Chaidez was
trying to make.
Considering that new holding, U.S.
Judge Joan Gottschall in Illinois ruled
later in the year that this was a close call
but that Padilla didn't announce a new
rule and should apply retroactively to
Chaidez's case. The District judge
applied that ruling to this case and
granted the petition, vacating Chaidez's
conviction.
The federal government appealed that
ruling regarding the retroactive effect
of Padilla, an issue that mUltiple District
and Circuit courts have addressed
recently and ruled on differently. Now,
the 7th Circuit has chimed in, with the
full Circuit rejecting a request to rehear
the case en bane despite objections from
Judges David Hamilton, Ilana Diamond
Rovner, Diane Wood, and Ann C.
Williams, who would have reheard the
case. Judges William Bauer and Joel
Flaum were in the majority reversing the
lower District couli, while Judge
Williams disagreed and penned a
lengthy dissent.
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Despite the court's division, the holding
is now in place for TIIinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin: Padilla is not retroactive
prior to March 31, 2010.
Specifically under SCOTUS precedent
from 1989, a constitutional rule of
criminal procedure applies to all cases
on direct and collateral review if it's not
a new rule but rather is an old rule
applied to new facts. That is what the
cOUlis
are
debating
federal
about Padilla, and whether that holding
is a new rule that should apply to future
cases.
Examining pre-Padilla caselaw from
nine federal appellate courts, the twojudge majority for the 7th Circuit panel
found that those other jurisdictions had
Sixth
uniformly
held
that
the
Amendment did not require counsel to
provide
advice
about
collateral
consequences of guilty pleas.
The 7th Circuit panel described Judge
Gottschall's rationale as reasonable and
compelling-that the SCOTUS majority
intended Padilla to apply retroactively
because of concerns that its ruling would
undermine the finality of plea-based
convictions. But the majority hesitated to
turn away from its long-established
application of the test it had used prior to
the SCOTUS decision and found that it
was a new groundbreaking rule that
couldn't have been anticipated and
should not be retroactive.

"While determining whether a rule is
new can be challenging, and this case
provides no exception, we conclude that
the narrow definition of what constitutes
an old rule tips the scales in favor of
finding that Padilla announced a new
rule," Judge Flaum wrote. "Moreover,
that numerous courts had failed to
anticipate the holding in Padilla, though
not dispositive, is strong evidence that
reasonable jurists could have debated the
outcome."
In her 12-page dissent, Judge Williams

wrote that Padilla's plain language
indicates it anticipated retroactivity
because it used past tense and discussed
application to convictions already
obtained,
not
only
prospective
challenges.
"We can rest assured that defense
lawyers will now advise their clients
prior to pleading guilty about the
immigration consequences of such a
plea, as the Court has clarified that such
advice is required under the Sixth
Amendment. But given today's holding,
this is of no consequence to Roselva
Chaidez despite the fact that professional
norms in place at the time of her plea
placed the same duty on her counsel,"
Judge Williams wrote. "Because I find
that Padilla simply extended the
Supreme Court's holding (from 1984)
and itself signaled an intent to be applied
to noncitizens in Chaidez's position, I
respectfully dissent."
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"Opening the Gate to Criminal Alien Appeals"
UP]

May 6, 2012
Michael Kirkland
Is the u.s. Supreme Court about to open
the appeal floodgates for legal aliens
who committed crimes in the United
States, pleaded guilty but weren't told
they would face deportation under
federal law?
Maybe. Argument on the issue will be
heard next term, which begins on the
first Monday of October.
The genesis of the dispute arose in 2010,
when the Supreme COUli ruled in Padilla
vs. Kentllcky that non-citizens who
pleaded guilty to felonies, but weren't
advised
by
their
lawyers
they
automatically would be depOlied, were
unconstitutionally deprived of their Sixth
and 14th Amendment rights to effective
counsel.
The vote was 7-2.
Now the Supreme Court has agreed to
review whether the Padilla ruling should
be made retroactive. In other words,
should it be applied to any non-resident
who pleaded guilty to a felony without
effective counsel from 1996, when the
depoliation law was passed, to 2010,
when the decision was handed down.
How big a universe would be affected is
up for speculation.
In urging that the new case, Chaidez vs.
USA, be reviewed to resolve conflicting
rulings in the lower courts, the Obama
administration told the Supreme Court:
"Many non-citizens are now attempting

to overturn their long-final convictions
based on this court's decision in Padilla.
These collateral proceedings threaten
society'S interest in the finality of
criminal convictions."
The issue, the administration said, "also
will have a significant impact on the
federal government's efforts to enforce
this nation's immigration laws against
those who have become removable as a
of
pre-Padilla
criminal
result
convictions."
A friend-of-the-court brief filed by the
National Association of Criminal
Defense
Lawyers,
the
National
Immigration Project of the National
Lawyers Guild, the Immigrant Legal
Resource Center and the Immigrant
Defense project, refers to "countless"
defendants.
"The lack of a remedy [for pre-Padilla
ineffective counsel] imposes intolerably
harsh consequences on countless noncitizens facing detention and deportation
as a result of wrongfully procured pleabased convictions," the brief said. "For
these non-citizens and their familieswhich often include both citizen and
children-the
grave
non-citizen
misfortune of a pre-Padilla final
conviction in a federal judicial circuit
that does not recognize a remedy for
such Padilla violations, is deeply unjust
and damaging: It can separate long-time
residents from their loved ones and
communities; tear apali families; impair
children's health and education; and
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cause severe economic hardship.
Moreover, the conflict creates a
regrettable
disuniformity
in
the
enforcement of federal immigration
law."

the number of deportations "has steadily
increased over the past few years, rising
from 291,060 in fiscal year 2007 to
396,906 in fiscal year 2011, according to
ICE."

Another friend-of-the-court brief filed in
support of the defendant in the new case
points out that the rights involved have a
deep history.

The number being detained pending
deportation "has also skyrocketed. At the
end of fiscal year 2002 the average daily
population of detainees was 19,922. That
rose to 33,330 in fiscal year 2011."

The brief by the Constitutional
Accountability
Center,
based
in
Washington, cites the "landmark English
Treason Act of 1696, which first
affirmed a right of counsel, explicitly
spoke of[c]ounsellearned in the law."

It also cites James Madison, a founding
father and one of principal drafters of the
Constitution who argued against the
Alien and Sedition Act.
"If the banishment of an alien ... be not
a punishment, and among the severest of
punishments, it will be difficult to
imagine a doom to which the names can
be applied," Madison wrote.
Even if the number of non-U.S. citizens
who would be affected by applying
Padilla retroactively is just a small
fraction of those aliens being held in
detention for deportation, the number
itself could be large.
The Esperanza Immigrant Rights
Project, a program of Catholic Charities,
says the "number of non-citizens who
are arrested, detained and placed into
removal proceedings is rising every year.
In 2010 approximately 400,000 noncitizens were detained by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement."

The Dallas Post also reported last week

The Post said there were 32,191
immigrants detained nationwide as of
last Feb. 20, at an average cost of $122
per day. The newspaper said that equates
to $3.9 million each day, or $1.43 billion
for this year.
Though most illegal immigrants who
have received a final removal order are
depOited within a month, the American
Civil Liberties Union says "there are
hundreds of cases, particularly those
involving immigrants seeking political
asylum and those convicted of criminal
charges, that can take a year or more,"
the Post reported.
The new case accepted by the Supreme
Court for next term involves Roselva
Chaidez, who was born in Mexico but
has lived in the United States since the
1970s. She has been a lawful permanent
U. S. resident since 1977 and lives in
Chicago with her three U.S.-citizen
children
and
two
U.S.-citizen
grandchildren, her petition to the high
COUlt says.
"Several years ago, Chaidez became
involved III an insurance scheme," the
petition says. "As the government
explained, she was 'not aware of the
specifics of the scheme,' but others
persuaded her to falsely claim to have
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been a passenger in a car involved in a
collision. . .. Chaidez received $1,200
for her minor role. . . . [and] the
insurance company paid a total of
$26,000 to settle the claims that Chaidez
and others made."
That was enough to push the fraud into
"aggravated felony" territory under a
1996 federal law. Prosecutors charged
Chaidez in 2003 with two counts of mail
fraud for two separate mailings related to
collecting her settlement. Her attorney
recommended she accept a plea bargain
offered by the government.
Her petition said Chaidez was not told
by her attorney if she pleaded guilty she
would be deported, as required by law.
She pleaded guilty, was sentenced to
probation and ordered to pay $22,000
restitution.
When she later applied for U.S.
citizenship, drawing the attention of
officials,
the
government
began
deportation proceedings. After the lower
courts ruled against her, she asked the
Supreme Court for review.

Chaidez' case is one of a dozen or so
accepted by the Supreme Court for
argument next term. Given the 7-2 vote
in Padilla, her chances of success at the
high court level may be quite good.
But first her lawyers will have to get
through Justice Antonin Scalia, who
dissented in Padilla and was joined
by Justice Clarence Thomas.
"In the best of all possible worlds,
criminal defendants contemplating a
guilty plea ought to be advised of all
senous collateral consequences of
conviction, and surely ought not to be
misadvised," Scalia wrote in the 2010
dissent. "The Constitution, however, is
not an all-purpose tool for judicial
construction of a perfect world; and
when we ignore its text in order to make
it that, we often find ourselves swinging
a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused a lawyer for his defense against
a 'criminal prosecutio[n]'-not for
sound advice about the collateral
consequences of conviction."
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"On the Two Year Anniversary of Padilla v. Kentucky, Preziosi Says
Supreme Court Decision's Significance Still Debated"
PRWeb
March 28, 2012
While the United States Supreme Court
ruled on Padilla v. Kentllcky nearly two
years ago, courts in New York and
around the country have made little
progress on implementing the decision.
So says Stephen Preziosi, New York
Criminal Appeals Lawyer, who now
tries to offer a framework for moving
forward.
"It has been almost two years since the
Supreme Court's ruling in Padilla v.
Kentucky (130 S.Ct. 1473176 (2010)),
and courts across the State of New York
and across the Nation are still struggling
and disagreeing on how the holding in
the Padilla case should be applied," said
Preziosi. "Some coutis say it is a new
rule and should not be applied
retroactively, with some exceptions;
other courts say that it is an old rule
being applied to a new set of facts and
should be applied retroactively; finally,
there are various coutis that say it is a
rule that should only be applied
retroactively on cases of direct appellate
review and not on collateral review. I
believe the correct interpretation is that
the decision applies retroactively." This
is an impOliant concept in both federal
criminal appeals and state criminal
appeals.

"The retroactive application of the rule
in Padilla is significant for many cases
working their way through the court
systems in New York right now. This
means that many noncitizens should
have the opportunity to have their cases

re-opened by submitting an Article 440
motion to the trial court to request that
the conviction be vacated.
In the majority opinion offered by
Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held
that if an attorney fails to warn a client
about adverse immigration consequences
of a plea in a criminal case, this fulfills
the first part of the two-part test for
ineffective assistance of counsel outlined
in Strickland v. Washington (Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
The question becomes whether all
defendants agreeing to plea deals under
these circumstances should have their
cases
reconsidered,
or
if
that
reconsideration should be extended to
only certain of these defendants.
"Two impOliant cases that were decided
shortly after Padilla shed light on how I
believe the law will be applied," said
Preziosi. "Although neither of them
received equivalent acclaim, they may
help to clear the air on the subject of
retroactivity of the Padilla rule, and on
the issue of applicability of that rule on
direct versus collateral review."
In both Santos-Sanchez v. United States,
U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 2340, 176
L.Ed.2d 559 (2010) and Chapa v. United
States, _ U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 3504, 177
L.Ed.2d 1086 (2010), the Supreme Court
vacated the decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and remanded the
cases to be decided in light of Padilla v.
Kent1lcky.

213

In the Santos-Sanchez case the defendant
had been a legal resident of the United
States since 2001. According to court
documents, he was arrested in 2003 and
charged with aiding and abetting the
illegal entry of an alien into the US. He
pleaded guilty after consulting with an
Assistant Public Defender and was
sentenced to one year of probation. As a
result of his guilty plea the Department
of Homeland Security found SantosSanchez removable because of his plea
in the criminal case.
He filed a Writ of Errors Coram Nobis
(collateral review) before a Magistrate
Judge in the Southern District of Texas
who granted the writ and vacated the
conviction; however, the District COUli
for the Southern District of Texas
eventually vacated the Magistrate's
ruling and denied the petition for a Writ
of Errors Coram Nobis; Santos-Sanchez
appealed.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
is
a
collateral
that
deportation
consequence of the plea in the criminal
case and that the defendant's attorney
was, therefore, not obligated to inform
him of the immigration consequences of
his guilty plea, and his counsel was
therefore not ineffective. Santos-Sanchez
v. u.s., 548 F.3d 327 (2008).
The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari (just one week after Padilla v.
Kentllcky was decided) and vacated the
judgment of the Fifth Circuit and
remanded the case with an order that it
be re-decided in light of the holding in
Padilla v. Kent1lcky-the Supreme
COUli's direction to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals was to retroactively
apply the Padilla holding in a case that

was on collateral review.
Approximately three months after the
Supreme COUli decided Padilla v.
Kent1lcky they decided the case of Chapa
v. United States,
U.S._, 130 S.Ct.
3504, 177 L.Ed.2d 1086 (2010).
In the Chapa case the defendant argued
on direct appeal that her plea counsel
had failed to warn her that it was a
virtual celiainty she would be deported
because of her plea. The Fifth Circuit
COUli of Appeals, citing to its prior
decision in Santos-Sanchez, held that
counsel was not ineffective in failing to
warn his client of the immigration
consequences of a plea in a criminal case
and affirmed the conviction.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted
celiiorari and vacated the Fifth Circuit's
judgment and remanded the case for it to
be decided in light of the holding of
Padilla v. Kent1lcky, again, directing that
the holding in Padilla be applied
retroactively to a case that was on direct
appellate review.
"In both cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that the holding in Padilla is
applicable
retroactively,
and
furthermore, it is applicable on both
direct appellate review and on collateral
review of criminal cases," said Preziosi.

In New York the issue of the retroactive
application has not yet reached the
appellate courts and has yet to be
definitively decided. New York Criminal
Appeals Lawyer Stephen Preziosi will
be arguing two cases in the Appellate
Division with regard to issue of
retroactivity of Padilla in the coming
months.
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Moncrieffe v. Holder
11-702
Ruling Below: Moncreiffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1857
(2012).

Born in Jamaica, Adrian Moncriffe became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in
1984. In Georgia in 2008, he was arrested and pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute. Two years later, the Department of Homeland Security began removal
proceedings, arguing that Moncrieffe should be removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony. The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals endorsed felony
classification of Moncrieffe's act, holding that the Georgia state law he was convicted under was
analogous to a section of the Controlled Substances Act that makes possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for
review, arguing that the conviction was not an aggravated felony but rather equivalent to a
misdemeanor due to the small amount, thus he would not be removable. The Fifth Circuit denied
Moncrieffe's petition, holding that Moncrieffe bore the burden of proof in establishing a
misdemeanor over a felony, and he failed to meet this burden at the immigration hearing. The
deportation order was upheld.
Questions Presented: Whether a conviction under a provision of state law that encompasses but
is not limited to the distribution of a small amount of marijuana without remuneration constitutes
an aggravated felony, notwithstanding that the record of conviction does not establish that the
alien was convicted of conduct that would constitute a federal felony.

Adrian Phillip MONCRIEFFE, Petitioner,

v.
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided November 8, 2011; As Corrected November 14, 2011
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted]
EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge

Adrian Moncrieffe petitions for review of a
removal order of the Board of Immigration
Appeal's ("BIA"). After he pled guilty to
possessing marijuana with intent to
distribute in Georgia, the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") charged

Moncrieffe with being removable for this
crime, which it contends should be
considered a felony under the Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA") and an "aggravated
felony" under immigration law. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The immigration judge
("IJ") agreed, and on appeal, the BIA
endorsed the felony classification and
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dismissed Moncrieffe's appeal. For the
following reasons we DENY the Petition for
Review.
BACKGROUND
Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, entered the
United States legally as a permanent resident
in 1984 at the age of three. Moncrieffe pled
guilty to "Possession of Marijuana With
Intent to Distribute" under Georgia law in
2008 and was sentenced to five years
probation. Because of his guilty plea, DHS
charged Moncrieffe with being removable
under both 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(2)(B) relating
to controlled substances offenses and under
§ 1227(a)(2) "as an aggravated felon"
because the conviction was for a "drug
trafficking crime" as defined by 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). DRS produced the Georgia
judgment and charging document at the
immigration hearing in support of its
position. The IJ ruled that the state
conviction was analogous to a federal felony
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and that
Moncrieffe was thus removable as an
aggravated felon.
Moncrieffe appealed to the BIA arguing that
the Georgia crime should not be considered
an aggravated felony. Moncrieffe argued
that GA. CODE § 16-13-30(j) punishes acts
that are equivalent to misdemeanors under
the CSA. Specifically, distribution of "a
small amount of marijuana for no
remuneration" falls under the Georgia
provision but is only a misdemeanor under
21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(4). The charging
document and Georgia judgment did not
indicate how much marijuana Moncrieffe
possessed. Because the government did not
prove that there was remuneration or more
than a small amount of marijuana,
Moncrieffe argued that his conviction
should
be
considered
a
federal
misdemeanor. In an unpublished Fifth

Circuit case, Jordan v. Gonzales, 204
Fed.Appx. 425 (5th Cir. 2006), this court
held that a conviction for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute was
considered a federal misdemeanor under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) in the absence of proof
of remuneration or of more than a small
amount of marijuana.
The BIA was not swayed by Jordan. Under
BIA precedent, a state conviction for
possessing an indeterminate amount of
marijuana with intent to distribute is
considered an aggravated felony under the
CSA.In re Matter of Arlma, 24 I. & N. Dec.
452,2008 WL 512678 (BIA Feb. 26,2008).
The BIA found no reversible error in the IJ's
decision to follow its precedent rather than
an unpublished, non-precedential circuit
court opinion. Moncrieffe petitions for a
review of the BIA decision dismissing his
appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court has jurisdiction to review
questions of law in petitions from the BIA. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). We review such
questions de novo. Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288
F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2002). Whether a
prior state conviction falls within the federal
definition of aggravated felony is also
reviewed de novo because "[ d]etermining a
particular federal or state crime's elements
lies beyond the scope of the BIA's delegated
power or accumulated expertise." Id. We
review only the BIA decision "unless the
U's decision has some impact on the BIA's
decision." Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299,
306 (5th Cir. 1997). Factual findings are
reviewed for substantial evidence and are
overturned only if "the evidence is so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could reach a contrary conclusion." Chen v.
Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.
2006).
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DISCUSSION
An alien who is convicted of an "aggravated
felony" is removable. 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). "Drug trafficking crimes"
are considered "aggravated felonies." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). "Drug trafficking
crimes" include any felony punishable under
the CSA, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), even if
the offense is a misdemeanor under state
law. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60
(2006) (noting that there "is no reason to
think Congress meant to allow the States to
supplant its own [misdemeanor/felony]
classifications
when
it
specifically
constructed its immigration law to turn on
them"). Felonies under § 924(c )(2) are those
crimes that are punishable by more than one
year in prison. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 56 n. 7.
The Fifth Circuit uses a categorical approach
to determine whether a state conviction
qualifies as a felony under the CSA. Omari
v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir.
2005). Under the categorical approach, the
court considers whether the elements of the
state statute are analogous to a federal
felony instead of looking at the underlying
facts of the crime. Id. If a state statute is
divisible, meaning that some conduct would
be punished as a felony but other conduct
only punished as a misdemeanor under the
CSA, then some evidence of the underlying
criminal act can be considered in the
determination. Id. at 308. We have limited
the government to presenting evidence
approved in Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13 (2005), to determine whether a
guilty plea conviction under a divisible state
law was an aggravated felony. Omari, 419
F.3d at 308. Acceptable evidence includes
the "charging document, written plea
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and
any explicit factual finding by the trial judge

to which the defendant assented." Shepard,
544 U.S. at 16.
Ordinarily, convictions for possession with
intent to distribute are felonies under the
CSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. A subsection of
the provlSlon, however, provides for
misdemeanor treatment for distribution of
small amounts of marijuana without
remuneration. 21 U.S.c. § 841 (b)(4). When
a state criminal statute covers both the
felony and misdemeanor conduct proscribed
by § 841, the courts of appeals are split on
whether the conviction, if lacking specifics
of the underlying criminal conduct, should
be treated as a felony or a misdemeanor. The
First and Sixth Circuits hold that the default
punishment under § 841 is a felony, while
the Second and Third Circuits hold that the
default punishment is a misdemeanor. In an
unpublished opinion preceding these circuit
cases, Jordan, 204 FedAppx. 425, this court
held that when there was no evidence of
how much marijuana was involved or of
remuneration, the state conviction could not
be considered a federal felony. Jordan,
however, conflicts with published Fifth
Circuit precedent construing the CSA. We
decline to follow it and adopt the First and
Sixth Circuits' approach.
While acknowledging the circuit split, the
Sixth Circuit recently ruled that the felony
provision, not the misdemeanor sub-section
(§ 841 (b)(4)), is "the default provision for
punishing possession of the drug with intent
to distribute." Garcia, 638 F.3d at 516. The
amount of marijuana is not, the court noted,
an element that prosecutors must establish
for conviction under the felony provision.
Id. (citing United States v. Bartholomew,
310 F.3d 912, 925 (6th Cir. 2002)). As a
result, the misdemeanor provision "is 'best
understood as a mitigating sentencing
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provision'
and
not
'a
standalone
misdemeanor offense. '" Id. (quoting J1Iice,
530 F.3d at 34-36).
The Second and Third Circuits, in contrast,
focus on the doctrine of "least culpable
offense." Martinez, 551 F.3d 113; Je1lne,
476 F.3d 199. The Second Circuit
emphasized that "only the mInimUm
criminal conduct necessary to sustain a
conviction under a given statute is relevant"
to the categorical approach. Martinez, 551
F.3d at 118 (quoting Gertsenshteyn v.
M1Ikasey, 544 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Because a New York statute covered
offenses involving only two grams of
marijuana, the court concluded that the
conviction at issue could possibly have been
a non-remunerative transfer of a small
amount of marijuana and therefore should be
treated as a misdemeanor under § 841(b)(4).
Jd. at 120.
Published Fifth Circuit case law compels us
to reject the Second Circuit's approach and
agree with the First and Sixth Circuits. In
United States v. Walker, 302 F.3d 322, 324
(5th Cir. 2002), this court held that the
default sentencing range for a marijuana
distribution offense is the CSA's felony
provision, § 841 (b)(1 )(D), rather than the
misdemeanor provision. Prior to Walker,
this cOUli held that for sentencing purposes,
when no jury determination of drug quantity
is available, the default punishment is a
felony-based maximum of five years under §
841 (b)(1 )(D). United States v. Garcia, 242
F.3d 593, 599 (5th Cir. 2001). The First
Circuit relied on Walker as evidence that the
default punishment for any possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute is
equivalent to a felony under the CSA and
that the defendant bears the burden of
producing mitigating evidence in order to
qualify for misdemeanor treatment. J1Iice,

530 F.3d at 35. We adopt the same
interpretation of § 841 for immigration
purposes as for sentencing purposes. United
States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505,
509 (5th Cir. 2001) ("We fail to see the
validity of interpreting this statute
differently based on this distinction between
sentencing and immigration cases; it is, after
all, the same words of the same phrase from
the same statute that is being interpreted in
each instance."), overruled on other
gr01lnds, Lopez, 549 U.S. at 60; see also
Lopez, 549 U.S. at 58 (concluding that
Congress incorporated "its own statutory
scheme of felonies and misdemeanors" in
the immigration removal context). While
this approach conflicts with the unpublished
opinion in Jordan, it is important to follow
our published Fifth Circuit sentencing cases.
See Garcia, 638 F.3d at 517-18 (Sixth
Circuit "declin[ing] to interpret a drug-based
aggravated felony differently in immigration
and criminal-sentencing contexts"). B1It see
Martinez, 551 F.3d at 121 (Second Circuit
acknowledges conflict between its own
sentencing
and
immigration
cases
interpreting § 841).
Based on this reading of § 841, we deny
Moncrieffe's Petition for Review. He pled
guilty to possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute under GA. CODE § 16-1330(j). Even if that section of the Georgia
code could cover conduct that would be
considered a misdemeanor under §
841 (b)(4), Moncrieffe bore the burden to
prove that he was convicted of only
misdemeanor conduct. In re Matter of
Aruna, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 457. Otherwise, as
is true for federal defendants charged under
§ 841, his crime is equivalent to a federal
felony. The petitioner's other arguments are
without merit.
Petition DENIED.
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"Supreme Court to Review Moncrieffe v. Holder"
Bromberg, Kohler Maya & Maschler
May 1,2012
Jennifer Miller
On April 2, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Comi
granted certiorari in Moncrieffe v. Holder to
review the judgment of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme
Court will decide whether a conviction
under state law that encompasses but is not
limited to the distribution of a small amount
of
marijuana
without
remuneration
constitutes a "drug trafficking crime" within
the meaning of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as well as an "aggravated
felony."
In 2008, Georgia police arrested Adrian
Moncrieffe, a Lawful Permanent Resident
(LPR) for possessing 1.3 grams of marijuana
(about the weight of a paperclip). Mr.
Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to the offense of
"Possession of Marijuana With Intent To
Distribute," pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 1613-30(j)(1). This statute is not limited to a
minimum amount of marijuana and does not
require proof that Mr. Moncrieffe obtained
payment in exchange for the drugs.
In April of 2010, the Department of
Homeland Security charged that Mr.
Moncrieffe had been convicted in Georgia
of an aggravated felony, which under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
subjects any noncitizen to removal
(deportation),
and
initiated
removal
proceedings against him. A state law offense
may constitute an aggravated felony if it is
the equivalent of a felony punishable under
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(2). Under the CSA, while a person
who possesses with intent to distribute less
than 50 kilograms of marijuana commits a

felony and is subject to up to five years
imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. § 841, an offense
involving distributing a small amount of
marijuana for no remuneration is viewed as
simple possession, a misdemeanor, id. §§
841 (b)(4), 844, thus not being considered an
aggravated felony and not triggering
removal proceedings.
Although it may seem that Mr. Moncrieffe
committed a misdemeanor under the CSA
because the amount of marijuana he
possessed was so small, and because there
was no evidence in the record of conviction
that Mr. Moncrieffe's offense involved
payment, the immigration judge held that
Mr. Moncrieffe had committed the
aggravated felony of drug trafficking, a
decision upheld by the BIA and then by the
Fifth Circuit.
Despite the Court's
recognition that the courts of appeals are
split on whether a conviction that lacks the
details of the criminal conduct should be
presumed to be a felony or a misdemeanor,
the Court did not disturb the finding that Mr.
Moncrieffe had been convicted of an
aggravated felony. Mr. Moncrieffe then
filed the petition for a writ of certiorari in
order for the Supreme Court to review the
case.
This case highlights discrepancies between
state and federal immigration laws and the
injustice that can result from these
differences. It is unconscionable that the
Court would deem Mr. Moncrieffe's
possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana to be
an aggravated felony, which would make a
long-term LPR not only removable, but also
ineligible
for
discretionary
relief,
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permanently barred from readmission to the
U.S., ineligible for asylum, and barred from
establishing "good moral character" for the
rest of his life. Mr. Moncrieffe's case also
highlights the importance of having criminal

and immigration attorneys confer In
reaching a plea and/or establishing the
record of conviction. Our office awaits the
Supreme Court's decision in this case,
which will be argued in the fall of2012.
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"Supreme Court to Revisit 'Aggravated Felony' Provision: Is a Crime That
Might be a Federal Misdemeanor a Drug Trafficking Offense?"
crimmigration
April 2, 2012
Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez
Having just decided in February that two tax
crimes constitute aggravated felonies under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the
u.s. Supreme Court will again jump into the
messy nuances of the aggravated felony
provision in Moncrieffe v. Hohler, in which
the
court granted
certiorari today.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, No. 11-702 (see order
granting cert). This time the Court will
decide whether possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute comes within this broad
category of offenses that significantly
decreases a non-citizen's ability to remain in
the United States.
Last November, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that a Georgia
convIctIOn for possessing marijuana with
intent to distribute constitutes a drug
trafficking type of aggravated felony.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, No. 1060826, slip op. (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011)
(Jones, Haynes, and Crone, JJ.). Chief Judge
Jones wrote the panel's opinion.
This case involved a lawful permanent
resident who pleaded guilty to possessing
marijuana with intent to distribute, Ga. Code
§ 16-13-300). Originally, the Department of
Homeland Security alleged that this was
both a controlled substances offense (CSO),
INA § 237(a)(2)(B), and a drug trafficking
aggravated felony, INA § 101(a)(43)(B).
Because the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BTA) only decided the aggravated felony
issue, however, the Fifth Circuit had no need
to address the CSO charge. Moncrieffe, No.
10-60826, slip op. at 2.

Thus, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by
explaining that "[ d]rug trafficking crimes'
include any [crime that would constitute a]
felony punishable under the
CSA
[Controlled Substances Act], see 18 U.S.c.
§ 924(c)(2), even if the offense is a
misdemeanor under state law." Moncrieffe,
No. 10-60826, slip op. at 4 (citing Lopez v.
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)). In
Lopez, the Supreme Court determined that
while "[m Jere possession is not ... a felony
under the federal CSA," possession with
intent to distribute is. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53.
The only exception to this rule is for
possession with intent to distribute "small
amount[ s]" of marijuana, which is classified
as a misdemeanor. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4).
The Fifth Circuit was then left with the
of
determining
whether
challenge
Moncrieffe's conviction under Georgia law
was for conduct that fell within the
misdemeanor or felony provision of the
federal CSA. To do this, the court stated that
it applied "a categorical approach to
determine whether a state conviction
qualifies as a felony under the CSA."
Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op. at 4.
Despite the court's reference to a
"categorical" analysis, it actually applied a
modified
categorical
approach.
The
categorical approach allows a court to
consider only the state statute of conviction
in comparison with the relevant federal
provisions, while the modified categorical
approach allows consideration of the record
of conviction in state court as well. Indeed,
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it is appropriate that the Fifth Circuit applied
a modified categorical approach because the
Georgia statute is divisible-that is "some
conduct would be punished as a felony,"
thus coming within the drug trafficking
definition of aggravated felony, "but other
conduct only punished as a misdemeanor
under the CSA," thus not constituting a drug
trafficking type of aggravated felony.
Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op. at 4.
Here, Moncrieffe's record of conviction did
not specify the quantity of marijuana
involved in his conviction. This fact is
critical because "[ 0 ]rdinarily, convictions
for possession with intent to distribute are
felonies under the CSA," but the federal
statute "provides for misdemeanor treatment
for distribution of small amounts of
marijuana
without
remuneration."
Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op. at 5
(citing 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(4)).
If Moncrieffe were convicted for possession
of a quantity of marijuana that would
constitute a federal misdemeanor, then his
conviction would not be an aggravated
felony. If, however, he were convicted for
an amount punishable as a federal felony,
then his conviction would be an aggravated
felony. Even if, on remand, he is found to
have been convicted of a CSO, which the
Georgia offense almost certainly is, not
falling within an aggravated felony
provision has real consequences for his
An
chance to remain in the country.
aggravated felony conviction would render
him removable and ineligible for the most
charitable form of relief from removal that
currently exists in immigration law,
cancellation of removal, relief that would
still be available if his conviction is only for
a CSO. INA § 240A(a).
Because the record of conviction did not
indicate the amount of marijuana involved,

the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether
not knowing the amount means that the
conviction should be treated as a
misdemeanor or felony. After recognizing a
circuit split on this issue (with the "First and
Sixth Circuits hold[ing] that the default
punishment under § 841 is a felony, while
the Second and Third Circuits hold that the
default punishment is a misdemeanor."), the
Fifth Circuit chose to treat the conviction as
a felony. Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op.
at 5.
Relying on the Sixth Circuit's approach, the
Fifth
Circuit determined that "the
misdemeanor provision [of the federal
possession with intent to distribute offense]
'is best understood as a mitigating
sentencing provision' and not a stand alone
misdemeanor offense." Moncrieffe, No. 1060826, slip op. at 6 (quoting United States v.
Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 925 (6th Cir.
2002)).
Borrowing from the comparable criminal
sentencing context involving the same
federal statute, the Fifth Circuit explained
that it previously held "the default
sentencing range for a marijuana distribution
offense is the CSA's felony provision, §
841 (b)(1 )(D), rather than the misdemeanor
provision." Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip
op. at 6 (discussing United States v. Walker,
302 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Following this logic, the Fifth Circuit went
on to hold that the burden is on the LPR to
show that his conviction involved an amount
of marijuana that would fall within the
misdemeanor provision rather than require
the government to show that the conviction
involved a felony amount. In the comi's
words, "Even if that section of the Georgia
code could cover conduct that would be
considered a misdemeanor under §
841 (b)(4), Moncrieffe bore the burden to
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prove that he was convicted of only
misdemeanor conduct." MoncriefJe, No. 1060826, slip op. at 7. The court placed the
burden on Moncrieffe despite the INA's
explicit provision that the government bears
the "burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that, in the case of an
alien who has been admitted to the United
States, the alien is deportable." INA §
240(c)(3).
Thus, the Supreme Court will decide
whether a state possession with intent to
distribute
conviction
that
includes
distribution of small amounts of marijuana
constitutes
an
aggravated
felony
"notwithstanding that the record of
conviction does not establish that the alien
was convicted of conduct that would
constitute a federal law felony." Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, MoncriefJe v. Holder, No.
11-702 (Dec. 7,2011).

Attesting to the nebulous state of many
crime-based immigration law provisions,
today's grant follows two decisions already
issued this Term about other aspects of the
intersection of criminal law and immigration
law: Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. -, No. 101211, slip op. (March 28 2012), and
Kawashimi v. Holder, 565 U.S. _ _ , No.
10-577, slip op. (Feb. 21, 2012). Hovering
above all of these cases, of course, is the
Court's much anticipated consideration of
Arizona v. United States, Arizona's attempt
to revive its controversial immigration law
(Senate Bill 1070), scheduled for oral
argument on April 25.
Arizona is likely to be a blockbuster
decision, no matter what the Court decides.
Moncrieffe won't get the media attention of
Arizona, but it will ensure that the Court's
efforts to make sense of Immigration law
will continue.
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Garcia v. Thomas
Ruling Below: Garcia v. Benov, 395 Fed.Appx. 329 (9th Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc
granted, Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9 th Cir. 2012).
Hedelito Trinidad y Garcia was charged in the Philippines with kidnapping for ransom.
He was arrested by FBI agents at his residence in Los Angeles, California in 2004.
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rica had ordered his return to the Philippines for
prosecution, but a Federal District Court in California ruled that a transfer would violate
his rights under the anti-torture treaty, and ordered him released. The Ninth Circuit
initially agreed. The case went to rehearing en bane.

Question Presented: Whether an extraditee like Trinidad may challenge the Secretary of
State's decision to extradite him based on the conditions he expects to face upon return to
the requesting country.

Hedelito TRINIDAD Y GARCIA, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Linda THOMAS, Warden, Metropolitan Detention Center-Los Angeles,
Respondent-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted En Bane June 23, 2012
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]

PER CURIAM:
Trinidad y Garcia alleges that his extradition
to the Philippines would violate his rights
under the Convention Against Torture
(CA T) and the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. The CAT is a treaty signed
and ratified by the United States, but is nonself-executing. Congress, however, has
implemented the treaty by statute as part of
the
Foreign
Affairs
Reform
and
Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA). 8
U.S.C. § 1231 note. That statute declares it
"the policy of the United States not to ...
extradite . . . any person to a country in
which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture." The statute

requires that "the appropriate agencies . . .
prescribe regulations to implement the
obligations of the United States under
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture."
The appropriate agency is the Department of
State, and it adopted regulations specifying
that, "[i]n each case where allegations
relating to torture are made ... , appropriate
policy and legal offices review and analyze
information relevant to the case in preparing
a recommendation to the Secretary as to
whether or not to sign the surrender
warrant." 22 C.F.R. § 95.3(a). An extraditee
may be surrendered only after the Secretary
makes a determination regarding possible
torture. lei. § 95.2-.3.
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1. The district court had jurisdiction over the
action pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 2241, which
makes the writ of habeas corpus available to
all persons "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States," and under the Constitution. 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas
corpus historically provides a remedy to
non-citizens
challenging
executive
detention.
2. Neither the REAL ID Act (8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(4)) nor FARRA (8 U.S.C. § 1231
note) repeals all federal habeas jurisdiction
over Trinidad y Garcia's claims, as the
govemment asselis. A statute must contain
"a particularly clear statement" before it can
be construed as intending to repeal habeas
jurisdiction. Even if a sufficiently clear
statement exists, cOUlis must determine
whether "an altemative interpretation of the
is
'fairly possible'
"before
statute
concluding that the law actually repealed
habeas relief.
PARRA lacks sufficient clarity to survive
"patiicularly
clear
statement"
the
requirement. The REAL ID Act can be
construed as being confined to addressing
final orders of removal, without affecting
federal habeas jurisdiction. Given a
plausible alternative statutory construction,
we cannot conclude that the REAL ID Act
actually repealed the remedy of habeas
corpus. The government also suggests that
the rule of non-inquiry precludes the
exercise of habeas jurisdiction. But the rule
implicates only the scope of habeas review;
it does not affect federal habeas j1lrisdiction.
3. The CAT and its implementing
regulations are binding domestic law, which
means that the Secretary of State m1lst make
a tOliure determination before surrendering
an extraditee who makes a CAT claim.
PARRA and its regulations generate

interests cognizable as liberty interests under
the Due Process Clause, which guarantees
that a person will not be "deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law."
4. The process due here is that prescribed by
the statute and implementing regulation: The
Secretary must consider an extraditee's
torture claim and find it not "more likely
than not" that the extraditee will face torture
before extradition can occur. 22 C.P.R. §
95.2. An extraditee thus possesses a narrow
liberty interest: that the Secretary comply
with
her
statutory
and
regulatory
obligations.
5. The record before us provides no
evidence that the Secretary has complied
with the procedure in Trinidad y Garcia's
case. The State Department has submitted a
generic declaration outlining the basics of
how extradition operates at the Department
and acknowledging the Depatiment's
obligations under the aforementioned treaty,
statute and regulations, but the Department
gives no indication that it actually complied
with those obligations in this case.
Trinidad y Garcia's liberty interest under the
federal statute and federal regulations
entitles him to strict compliance by the
Secretary of State with the procedure
outlined in the regulations. He claims that
the procedure has not been complied with,
and the Constitution itself provides
jurisdiction for Trinidad y Garcia to make
this due process claim in federal court.
In the absence of any evidence that the
Secretary has complied with the regulation,
we lack sufficient basis in the record to
review the district cOUli's order granting
Trinidad y Garcia's release. We remand to
the district court so that the Secretary of
State may augment the record by providing
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a declaration that she has complied with her
obligations. Counsel for the government
represented that the Secretary would provide
such a declaration if the court so instructs.
We so instruct.
6. If the district court receives such a
declaration, it shall determine whether it has
been signed by the Secretary or a senior
official properly designated by the
Secretary. If so, the court's inquiry shall
have reached its end and Trinidad y Garcia's
liberty interest shall be fully vindicated. His
substantive due process claim is foreclosed
by Muna! v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
The doctrine of separation of powers and the
rule of non-inquiry block any inquiry into
the substance of the Secretary's declaration.
To the extent that we have previously
implied greater judicial review of the
substance of the Secretary's extradition
decision other than compliance with her
obligations under domestic law, we overrule
that precedent.
7. The district court's order is vacated, and
the case is remanded to the district court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

THOMAS, Circuit Judge, concurring,
with whom WARDLAW, Circuit Judge,
joins and BERZON, Circuit Judge, joins
as to Part I:
I concur in the Per Curiam opinion. I write
separately to express my views on
jurisdiction and the scope of our habeas
reVIew.

II
Once a federal court has completed its
extradition determinations under 18 U.S.c. §
3184, the Secretary of State in her discretion
may determine whether the alien should be
surrendered to the custody of the requesting
state. We have long held that it is the
Secretary's role, not the courts', to
determine "whether extradition should be
denied on humanitarian grounds or on
account of the treatment that the fugitive is
likely to receive upon his return to the
requesting state." However, celiain aspects
of the Secretary's decision are reviewable.
The Convention Against Torture (CAT), as
implemented by FARRA and State
DepaIiment regulations, is binding domestic
law. Before finalizing an extradition order,
the Secretary of State has a clear and
nondiscretionary duty pursuant to the
implementing regulations to consider
whether a person facing extradition from the
U.S. "is more likely than not" to be tOliured
in the State requesting extradition when
determining whether to surrender a fugitive
to a foreign country by means of extradition.
In assessing whether the Secretary has
complied with her statutory and regulatory
obligations, our review differs from the
ordinary analysis that we apply to petitions
for review of decisions on CAT claims by
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Immigrations judges and the BIA are
charged with deciding CAT claims on the
evidence presented. Therefore, in reviewing
BIA decisions, we have a developed
administrative record before us.

I
The district court had jurisdiction over
Trinidad y Garcia's claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and the Constitution of the
United States.

Our role in reviewing the Secretary's
extradition determinations is far different
because the surrender of a person to a
foreign
government
is
within
the
Executive's powers to conduct foreign
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affairs and the Executive is "well situated to
consider sensitive foreign policy issues."
The Judiciary is "not suited to second-guess
such determinations" because the Executive
"possess[ es] significant diplomatic tools and
leverage the judiciary lacks." Therefore, the
proper separation of powers among the
branches prevents us from inquiring into the
merits of the Secretary's extradition
decision.
Although we cannot review the merits of the
Secretary's internal extradition review, the
Secretary's legal obligation to comply with
the CAT, as implemented by FARRA and
accompanying State Department regulations,
is not a part of that review process.
Therefore, the scope of habeas review
allows courts to examine whether the
Secretary has complied with her nondiscretionary obligations. This limited
review process of simply determining that
the Secretary has complied with the law is
the least intrusive method of maintaining the
delicate balance between the competing
concerns of respecting executive prerogative
in foreign relations and ensuring that the law
has been followed.
Once the district court determines that the
Secretary has complied with her legal
obligations, its review ends. Any further
inquiry into the executive branch's internal
extradition review process would exceed our
proper role under the Separation of Powers
doctrine.

III
In this case, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the Secretary has fulfilled her
non-discretionary
obligations.
The
government suggested in briefing that the
Secretary's signature on the surrender
warrant itself should be considered as proof
of her determination that Trinidad y Garcia

is not likely to be tortured. But the surrender
warrant is not in the record.
Trinidad y Garcia has alleged in his habeas
petition that the Secretary has not complied
with FARRA's implementing regulations
and violated his right to due process. In the
absence of any evidence that the Secretary
has complied with the regulation, we lack
sufficient basis in the record to review the
district court's order granting Trinidad y
Garcia's release. Therefore, the appropriate
remedy is to vacate the district court order
and remand the case to the district court with
directions that the government may be
afforded the opportunity to supplement the
record with an appropriate declaration that
the Secretary has complied with her nondiscretionary statutory and regulatory duties.

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, with whom
Circuit Judges CLIFTON, M. SMITH,
and IKUTA join, dissenting:
A
Trinidad raises two distinct rationales for
why he may not be extradited. First, he
contends that he may "invoke the writ to
challenge the Secretary's decision to
surrender him in violation of his substantive
due process right to be free from torture" at
the hands of a foreign government.
Alternatively, he asselis that even in the
absence of a constitutionally protected
interest to be free from the specter of foreign
torture, he possesses a statutory right under
the Convention and the F ARR Act that
precludes the United States from extraditing
him to a country where torture is "more
likely than not" to occur.
Long ago, the Court established that
extraditees may not oppose their extraditions
on the ground that the law of the receiving
country does not provide them the full
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panoply of rights guaranteed them by the
Constitution of the United States. Munaf,
553 U.S. at 696-97 (discussing Neely).
Trinidad's second claim is not so easily
resolved, however. As the Court recognized
in Valentine, the Executive does not possess
plenary power to extradite. Accordingly,
extradition proceedings "must be authorized
by law" and compoti with peliinent statutory
limits. Thus, Trinidad is correct insofar as he
argues that we must determine whether any
of the pertinent statutory limits on which he
relies actually limit Executive authority
under the relevant treaty.
Trinidad misjudges the effect of that inquiry,
however. Even were we to agree that either
the Convention, the FARR Act, or the
regulations limit Executive authority, it does
not necessarily follow that the scope of our
habeas review would grow in kind. Rather,
because the Rule of Non-Inquiry remains,
these limits would only establish the
concerns that might be cognizable on habeas
review. It is only when Congress pairs a
limitation on the Secretary's extradition
authority with an express invitation for
judicial review that the Rule of Non-Inquiry
retracts to permit that review.
The scope of our habeas review 111 the
extradition context wholly depends on the
will of Congress. The judiciary participates
in the extradition process only by
congressional invitation, and thus our power
extends no further than the bounds of that
invitation. When, as under the 1890 form of
§ 5270, Congress prefers that the courts play
a minimal role, our review is just that,
minimal.

applicable only in the immigration context.
Among other things, Congress enacted §
1252(a)(4) as pmi of the REAL ID Act.
And, as the House Committee Repoti
explicitly states, Congress did not intend to
"preclude habeas review over challenges to
detention that are independent of challenges
to removal orders Finally, the section title
itself, "Judicial revIew of orders of
removal," and the subchapter title,
"Immigration," only further reaffirm this
cabining of the section's effect.
2
Having concluded that we have habeas
jurisdiction, I move to the first merits
question: whether, as Trinidad contends,
Congress actually intended to restrict the
Executive's extradition authority via the
Convention, the FARR Act, or the
implementing regulations. To resolve that
question, I consider each in turn.

The Convention satisfies neither condition.
The Senate expressly conditioned its
ratification of the Convention on the fact
that it was "not self-executing." And, as 1
will explain shortly, the FARR Act did not
implement the Convention in a manner that
curtails the Secretary's authority to
extradite. The Convention therefore cannot
affect the Executive's authority under §
3184 except to the extent directed by the
relevant regulations.

ii
The F ARR Act requires greater scrutiny. In
relevant detail, it provides:

1

There are a number of indicators that
Congress intended § 1252(a)(4) to be

(a) Policy.-It shall be the policy of
the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the
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involuntary return of any person to a
country in which there
are
substantial grounds for believing the
person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, regardless of
whether the person is physically
present in the United States.
Subsection (a) "is too thin a read to support
the rights and obligations read into it by"
Trinidad. It only "fits" as part of a
"harmonious whole" with the entirety of the
Act if interpreted as a "nudge" by Congress
indicating Congress' "preference" that when
implementing the mandated regulations, the
agency heads bear in mind the general
policy of the United States "not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary
return of any person to a country in which
there are substantial grounds for believing
the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." It does no more.

iii
Finally, we reach those regulations
promulgated to implement the obligations of
the United States under the Convention: 22
C.F.R. §§ 95.1-95.4.
Decisions oj the Secretary concerning
s1lrrender oj jifgitives Jar extradition are
matters oJexec1ltive discretion not s1lbject to
judicial review. Furthermore, pursuant to
section 2242(d) of the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, P.L.
105-277,
notwithstanding
any
other
provision of law, no court shall have
jurisdiction to review these regulations, and
nothing in section 2242 shall be construed as
providing any court jurisdiction to consider
or review claims raised under the
Convention or section 2242, or any other
determination made with respect to the
application of the policy set f01ih in section
2242(a), except as part of the review of a

final order of removal pursuant to section
242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1252), which is not applicable to
extradition proceedings.
In sum, neither the Convention, the F ARR
Act, nor the implementing regulations alter
the historically recognized discretion
accorded to the Secretary by Congress to
determine whether "to surrender [a] fugitive
to the requesting State, to deny surrender of
the fugitive, or to surrender the fugitive
subject to conditions."

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, with whom
Judge W. FLETCHER joins:
I begin by outlining the basic building
blocks of Trinidad's substantive, statutebased claim.
First, we may grant a writ of habeas corpus
where a prisoner is "in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Second, Aliicle 3 of the Convention Against
Tmiure (CAT), which entered into force for
the United States in 1994, states:
No State Party shall expel, return
("reJouler") or extradite a person to
another state where there are
substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being
sUbjected to torture.
United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted by unanimous agreement of the
U.N. General Assembly.
Contrary to Judge Kozinski's assertion,
Trinidad's claim is not that he is entitled to

229

habeas because of the treatment he is likely
to face in the Philippines. Rather, his claim
is a claim that because the FARR Act
prohibits extradition if, on the information
available to the Secretary, he more likely
than not will be tortured, the Secretary's
decision to extradite him would be illegal
under positive, Congressionally enacted
federal law.
Neither the Supreme COUli's decision in
M1lna! nor the rule of non-inquiry entirely
forecloses our ability to review the
lawfulness of an extradition decision by the
Executive. I would hold, therefore, that we
have the authority-and, indeed, the
obligation-to review the Secretary of
State's determination and to decide-under
a standard highly deferential to the Secretary
and procedures carefully tailored to ensure
the protection of the Secretary's diplomatic
concerns-whether it is more likely than not
that petitioners such as Trinidad will be
tOliured if extradited. For that purpose, it
may be that in many circumstances a
declaration such as the one the majority
requires will suffice.
Chief Judge KOZINSKI, dissenting in
part:

1. The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2241, simultaneously provides jurisdiction
to hear habeas petitions and remedies for
successful ones. Just because someone in
custody files a document styled "habeas
petition" doesn't mean a federal court has
jurisdiction to entertain it. Instead, the
petitioner must allege a type of claim
cognizable on habeas. In the extradition
context, habeas corpus isn't available to
challenge just any aspect of the executive
branch's authority an extraditee seeks to
question. Rather, the case law-including
our own opinion in Cornejo-Barreto v.
Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (9th

Cir.2000)-makes clear that an extraditee
may raise only certain claims on habeas.
Trinidad y Garcia fails to make out a claim
cognizable on habeas by invoking the
Convention Against Torture ("CAT") and
alleging that, if extradited, he'll face tOliure
at his destination. What's been historically
cognizable on habeas review in the
extradition context is (l) whether the
executive branch has the authority to detain
the extraditee in the first place and whether
the judicial branch has exercised proper
jurisdiction over him, all of which has
already been litigated and resolved against
Trinidad; (2) whether the executive is
operating under a valid treaty authorizing
extradition, which isn't disputed here; and
(3) whether the extraditee's crime falls into
the political offense exception, which
Trinidad doesn't allege.
There's absolutely no authority suppOliing
Trinidad's claim that habeas review is
available to challenge the destination to
which a detainee is to be extradited based on
how he might be treated there. He therefore
fails to present a claim for which the federal
habeas statute provides jurisdiction.

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), on
which my colleagues rely heavily in their
various opinions, stands in marked contrast.
St. Cyr challenged the executive's authority
to continue to detain and then deport him
The Court found abundant historical
evidence that such a challenge was
traditionally cognizable on habeas review.
Also in contrast is M1lna! v. Geren, 553 U.S.
674 (2008), where the Supreme Court found
habeas jurisdiction to consider a challenge to
petitioners' transfer based on the treatment
they'd receive, then rejected that challenge
on the merits. The only claims entertained in
Muna! were constitutional ones. And M1lna!

230

does not suggest there's statutory habeas
jurisdiction for claims of this kind.
There's thus no need to assess the effect of
the FARR Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1231 note, or the
REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4). Both
statutes
explicitly
disavow
any
congressional intent to create jurisdiction for
review of CAT claims outside a limited
immigration context.

St. Cyr urged against "adopting a [statutory]
construction that would raise serious
constitutional questions" by "preclud[ing]
judicial consideration on habeas," but
recognizing our lack of jurisdiction here
does no such thing. A serious constitutional
question would arise only if we interpreted a
statute to preclude the type of habeas review
protected by the Constitution's Suspension
Clause. But, unlike St. Cyr, Trinidad doesn't
present a claim implicating this type of
habeas review, because his claim isn't
cognizable on habeas. How Trinidad will be
treated by the government of another
country after he leaves the United States
doesn't implicate any of his rights under the
United States Constitution. In finding his
challenge outside the bounds of the federal
habeas
statute,
there's
no judicial
consideration to "preclude" and thus no
constitutional problem to "avoid."
The per curiam thus rightly overrules
Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F .3d at 1015-16,
which held in the context of a CAT
challenge to extradition that, "since potential
extraditees meet the other requirements for
habeas standing under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(2000), a habeas petition is the most
appropriate form of action for fugitives
seeking review ofthe Secretary's extradition
decisions."
Cornejo-Barreto
somehow
found jurisdiction in the federal habeas
statute via the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 703. But, as Cornejo-

Barreto itself acknowledged, "[t]he APA is
not an independent grant of jurisdiction."
Because there's no jurisdiction under the
habeas statute, there can be no jurisdiction
under the AP A.
While, as in MlInaf, we have jurisdiction to
hear Trinidad's due process claim, I agree
with the per curiam that the claim is
foreclosed by MlInaf itself, which found that
identical claims in the transfer context "do
not state grounds upon which habeas relief
may be granted."
2. The per curiam offers little explanation
for finding jurisdiction to entertain
Trinidad's CA T claim, instead simply
asserting that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus
historically provide[ d] a remedy to noncitizens challenging executive detention."
This characterizes Trinidad's claim at too
high a level of generality and therefore
conflate Trinidad's particular claim with
other claims that are cognizable on habeas
review in the extradition context. Trinidad,
in fact, challenges something very specific:
the destination to which the executive seeks
to extradite him, based on his potential
treatment there. As the Second Circuit has
explained, "consideration of the procedures
that will or may occur in the requesting
country is not within the purview of a
habeas corpus judge." That leaves Trinidad
beyond the scope of habeas review-and,
because the federal habeas statute predicates
the exercise of habeas jurisdiction on the
existence of a cognizable habeas claim, that
also leaves Trinidad beyond the scope of our
habeas jurisdiction.
Statiing from a mistaken characterization of
Trinidad's claim leads my colleagues to an
equally mistaken conclusion about the role
of the FARR and REAL ID Acts. Because
they erroneously view habeas jurisdiction
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over Trinidad's claim as preexIstmg and
presupposed, they ask the wrong question:
whether these statutes have clearly
"preclude [d]"
or
"repeal [ed]"
such
jurisdiction.
Consider In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
176 (1847). After receiving an extradition
request, the President referred it to a district
judge, who approved Metzger's extradition.
Metzger then filed a habeas petition with the
Supreme Court. The Court found that it had
no jurisdiction to grant habeas relief. Its
reasoning was somewhat technical-the
district judge had been acting in chambers
rather than exercising Article III judicial
power-but the result is instructive for our
case: The Court saw no constitutional
problem whatsoever in finding the absence
of any jurisdiction, whether appellate or
original, over Metzger's habeas petition
challenging his extradition. That's because
extraditees have no free-floating right to
challenge their extradition via habeas
petition. If an extraditee isn't challenging
one of the few issues deemed by Congress to
be suitable for judicial inspection, a federal
court lacks jurisdiction over the challengeand that raises no constitutional problem.
3. I note the thoughtful views of our
colleague on the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Griffith, on similar issues that have
confronted his cOUli. Starting in Kiyemba v.
Obama (Kiyemba 11), 561 F.3d 509
(D.C.Cir.2009), Judge Griffith has asserted
in the context of detainee transfers "that
jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' claims
against unlawful transfer-a fundamental
and historic habeas protection-is grounded
in the Constitution." What concerned Judge
Griffith in Kiyemba 11 was very different
from what's before our court: He addressed
whether the transfer of the prisoners "will
result in continued detention on behalf of the
United States in a place where the writ does

not run." Judge Griffith's concern that the
United States would maintain control over
the prisoners while evading judicial review
doesn't apply to our case, where the United
States seeks to extradite Trinidad and
relinquish all control over him. Trinidad
doesn't allege otherwise-indeed, his
motivating concern is precisely that he'll be
mistreated once he's no longer in American
custody and instead in Filipino hands.
Judge Griffith expanded on his earlier
position with his dissental in Abdah v.
Obama, 630 F.3d 1047 (D.C.Cir.2011). In
suppOli of his assertion of "the longestablished right of a prisoner to question his
jailer's authority to transfer him to a place
where it would be difficult or impossible to
execute the writ," Judge Griffith provides
the history of habeas challenges to the
executive transferring a prisoner beyond the
writ's reach in order to evade habeas
jurisdiction. None of his examples, however,
involves extradition, in which the executive
transfers a prisoner abroad, not to evade
habeas review, but to deliver him pursuant
to an extradition treaty to a country seeking
to prosecute him for crimes he allegedly
committed there. Judge Griffith's examples
of American colonial state laws demonstrate
an extradition exception to the general
prohibition on transfers and, accordingly, an
exception to the reviewability of such
transfers via habeas petition.
Most recently, Judge Griffith concurred in
Omar, 646 F.3d 13, 646 F.3d 13, where he
"disagree[ d] with the majority's suggestion
that we have no jurisdiction to consider [the
claim"
because
"the
transferee's]
Constitution's guarantee of habeas corpus
entitles him to asseli any claim that his
detention or transfer is unlawful." Judge
Griffith thus finds constitutional habeas
jurisdiction to hear CAT claims. But his
assertion that there's constitutional habeas
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jurisdiction for "any claim" of unlawful
detention or transfer suffers from the same
flaw that afflicts the analysis of Judges
Thomas and Tallman here: It's too broad.
Centuries of extradition case law have
carved out the specific types of challenges
an extraditee may raise on habeas review.
To sayan extraditee can find jurisdiction in
the federal habeas statute to raise "any
claim" would be a radical departure from
those centuries of unbroken precedent.
4. While federal habeas jurisdiction IS
enshrined in a federal statute, the writ of
habeas corpus remains a common law writ.
And, like all creatures of the common law, it
can and should evolve over time. What
yesterday may have failed to qualify as a
cause of action seeking habeas relief may
qualify tomorrow. Because, in the habeas
context, a cause of action and the
jurisdiction to hear it are inextricably linked,
federal habeas jurisdiction also can evolve
through common law decision-making.
This raises the question: Even if habeas
jurisdiction has never before included the

type of claim Trinidad raises, why not start
today? That is, why shouldn't we embrace
the evolution of habeas review so as to
encompass a claim that challenges
extradition on the basis of the conditions the
extraditee may face in the receiving
country?
I'm a firm believer in robust federal habeas
review where it's appropriate. But the
federal habeas statute is not an open-ended
invitation for federal judges to join the party
whenever they're invited by someone who
happens to be "in custody." 28 U.S.c. §
2241(c), (d). Petitioning for the Great Writ,
like filing most lawsuits, requires a
cognizable cause of action. Exercising
federal jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition
requires the same. Centuries of case law
show that Trinidad fails to present such a
claim, and my colleagues show why there's
wisdom in that practice. They simply fail to
take that teaching to its logical conclusion. I
therefore dissent as to Trinidad's CAT
claim, and would order the district court to
dismiss that claim for lack of jurisdiction.
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"MunafSequel on Way to Court"
SCOTUSblog
July 9,2012
Lyle Denniston

A Philippine national who fears he will be
tortured if he is returned to his home country
will be asking the Supreme Court this
summer to hear his challenge-a case that
would put before the Justices a major test of
what they meant in the unanimous decision
in Munaf v. Geren four years ago. The
Ninth Circuit COUli has blocked his transfer
for 90 days to allow his lawyers to file at the
Supreme Court.
The case involves Hedelito Trinidad y
Garcia, who has been charged in the
Philippines with kidnapping for ransom.
His lawyers submitted evidence to the Ninth
Circuit when his extradition was under
review that five other men accused in the
same criminal case have been tortured by
Philippine officials. The Circuit Court also
accepted a State Department report asseliing
that torture is common among the security
forces and police in that country. His
attorneys are relying upon a 1984 treaty, the
Convention Against Torture, that has been
in force in the U.S. since 1994.
While the Circuit Court has allowed
Trinidad y Garcia's attorneys to put before
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton their best
case for barring his extradition under that
treaty, the decision actually leaves Clinton
almost complete discretion to turn down the
plea. All she needs to do is to file with a
District Court judge a formal paper saying
that she has done her legal duty to weigh his
claim, that she has considered his evidence,
and that she had made a ruling. Justice
Department attorneys told the Circuit COUli
that Clinton would do just that when the
case got back to her. Under the Circuit

Court ruling, the federal judge has no
authority to inquire in any way into whether
the Secretary's decision was justified or
satisfied the anti-torture treaty. That is the
conclusion that his attorneys will be
challenging in their forthcoming plea to the
Supreme COUli.
The Circuit Court decision is based in large
part on the 2008 Munaf decision, which was
not an extradition case, as such. Rather, it
involved a request by the government of
Iraq to turn over to its custody, for criminal
prosecution, two U.S. citizens who were
being held by the U.S. military in Iraq.
They had been accused of violating Iraq's
criminal laws and were wanted for trial
there. The Supreme Court concluded that,
while a U.S. court had the authority to hear
the challenge by the two citizens to being
handed over, an American judge had no
authority to second-guess the validity of
Iraq's planned prosecution.
The Supreme Court decided the MlIna! case
on the same day in June 2008 that it decided
the more famous case of BOll1nediene v.
Blish, giving detainees at Guantanamo Bay a
constitutional right to challenge their
captivity in a U.S. habeas court. That
decision far overshadowed Muna! when the
two rulings came out. Since then, however,
MlIna! has turned out to have more staying
power, and, in fact, a considerable capacity
to expand in scope. It has been used to bar
habeas judges from second-guessing U.S.
decisions on when a detainee may leave
Guantanamo, and now, in the Trinidad y
Garcia case, to bar a federal judge from
second-guessing the Secretary of State's
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rulings on when to allow an accused noncitizen to be sent home even in the face of a
claim of potential torture. In the meantime,
the D.C. Circuit Court has taken away much
of the meaning of Boumediene, leaving
federal habeas judges with only a kind of
advisory role to the Executive Branch on
when a detainee at Guantanamo is being
lawfully held, and with no power to order
directly that a detainee be released in the
face of Executive Branch objection.

In the Philippine extradition case, former
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had
ordered his return for prosecution, but a
federal District judge ruled that a transfer
would violate his rights under the antitorture treaty, and ordered him released.
The Ninth Circuit initially agreed in a threejudge panel decision, but then the en bane
Circuit Court, dividing 8-3, overturned the
release order, and directed that the case go
to Clinton, the current Secretary, for final
action.

In asking the Ninth Circuit for a stay,
Trinidad y Garcia's attorneys argued that his
case "involves critical issues regarding the
ability of a person facing torture to obtain
meaningful judicial review." They added
that the Circuit COUli ruling "addresses
separation of powers concerns and the
availability of 'the Great Writ' and
undoubtedly presents an impOliant question
of federal law."
The stay motion also noted that three
Supreme Court Justices, in a dissent in a
Guantanamo transfer case involving a
detainee who had a fear of being tOliured if
sent abroad, that such a dispute raised
"impOliant questions" about what the Muna!
precedent meant for habeas corpus law,
issues that the Supreme Court had not
resolved in Muna! itself. Those three were
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was
joined in dissent by Justices Stephen G.
Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.
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"DoJ to Seek Extradition of No.3 Kidnapper"
The Philippine Star
October 12, 2004
Aurea Calica
The government will seek the extradition of
Hedelito Trinidad, the country's No.3 most
wanted kidnapper, who was arrested in the
u.s. last week, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzalez said yesterday.
Gonzalez said he has asked the Department
of Foreign Affairs to cancel the passport of
Trinidad and put him under the watchlist of
the Bureau of Immigration.
The DOJ chief said he has also asked the
Philippine consulate in Los Angeles to
coordinate with the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation for the early return of
Trinidad.
He said the DO] would prepare the
extradition request to be sent to the US
government.
Trinidad, a dentist, allegedly financed
kidnap gangs in the country and had an
P850,000 bounty on his head.
He was arrested by the FBI agents at his
residence in West Covina near Los Angeles,
California on Thursday.

Officials of the Department of the Interior
and Local Government said Trinidad was
arrested while trying to sell a van to an FBI
agent who posed as buyer.
The National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force
(Naktf) and the FBI had been working since
March to capture Trinidad.
They got a break last month after members
of the Filipino community in West Covina
told them their prey was engaged in the
vehicle buy-and-sell business in the area as a
cover, officials said.
Trinidad did not resist arrest when five FBI
agents went on Thursday to his Los Angeles
home pretending to buy his van.
Philippine National Police (PNP) chief
Director General Edgar Aglipay said
Trinidad was this year's biggest catch in the
government's anti-kidnapping effOlis.
Several Philippine cOUlis issued arrest
warrants for Trinidad, who is the alleged
mastermind of six kidnappings in 2001
alone, Aglipay said.
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"Why the 'Munaf Sequels' Matter: A Primer on FARRA, REAL ID, and
The Role of the Courts in Transfer/Extradition Cases"
Lal1jare
June 12,2012
Steve Vladeck
Yesterday's news out of the Supreme Court
may well have obscured another significant
detainee-related legal development: As Lyle
Denniston has noted over at SCOTUSblog,
on Friday, the en banc Ninth Circuit handed
down a thoroughly fractured decision in
Garcia v.
Thomas, a complicated
extradition-related habeas case raising the
question whether courts may inquire into
Executive Branch assurances that an
individual facing extradition will not be
tortured or otherwise mistreated by the
country to which his extradition is being
sought. To make a (as we'll see, very) long
story short, the Court of Appeals held that,
while the federal courts have j1lrisdiction to
entertain such habeas claims, they may not
provide relief so long as the Secretary of
State complies with her statutory and
regulatory obligations, i.e., she avers that it
is not "more likely than not" that the
detainee in question will be tortured
subsequent to his transfer. In other words,
merely by filing a piece of paper, the
Executive Branch can make these cases go
away, albeit on the merits.
In the process, the Ninth Circuit
simultaneously (1) embraced the D.C.
Circuit's logic in "Kiyemba 11," which so
held in the context of the Uighurs; (2)
thereby compounded the Kiyemba 11 panel's
(in my view, egregious) misreading of the
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in M1Ina! v.
Geren in applying it to an entirely ordinary
extradition case; and (3) created a circuit
split with a different D.C. Circuit opinion
("Omar 11"), which had held that the REAL
ID Act of 2005 divested the federal coutis of

jurisdiction in such cases. Even without
trying to count the votes from the 110 pages
worth of concurring and dissenting opinions
in Garcia, I think it's safe to say that the
Ninth Circuit has only made a complicated
legal issue that much murkier, and it may
well be time for the Supreme Court to pay
attention ... Below the fold, I try to explain
how the pieces all unfold (with my
apologies in advance for the preposterous
length; my hope is to bring some clarity to
the complexity).

I. CAT and FARRA
What's behind all of these cases is the U.N.
Convention Against TOliure (CAT), Article
3 of which provides that "No State Party
shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a
person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to
tOliure." There are no exceptions to Article
3's "nonrefoulment" principle, and there is
substantial authority for the proposition that
nonrefoulment is itself a "jus cogens" norm
of customary international law. Regardless,
although the United States has taken the
position that CAT is non-self-executing, we
implemented most of our obligations under
CAT (including Article 3's "nonrefoulment"
mandate) through the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
(FARRA), which provides that "It shall be
the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary
return of any person to a country in which
there are substantial grounds for believing
the person would be in danger of being
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subjected to torture, regardless of whether
the person is physically present in the
United States."
Although there is therefore no question that
non-citizens in removal proceedings may
invoke FARRA/CAT defensively as a basis
for relief from deportation, the harder
question is whether FARRA may be
enforced offensively in civil litigation,
especially habeas, by those who can't raise a
claim
in
a removal
FARRA/CAT
proceeding (including individuals facing
extradition and military transfer, as opposed
to deportation). This issue is complicated by
section 2242(d) of FARRA, which provides
that "nothing in this section shall be
construed as providing any court jurisdiction
to consider or review claims raised under the
Convention or this section, . . . except as
part of the review of a final order of removal
pursuant to [the immigration laws]."
Importantly, though, that FARRA doesn't
provide jurisdiction should not matter in
habeas cases, since a different federal statute
already confers power upon the federal
courts in such cases so long as the petitioner
claims detention "in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." The question is whether FARRA
avvay habeas
jurisdiction
over
takes
FARRAICAT claims. And at least initially,
every circuit court to reach the issue
answered that question in the negative,
holding that nothing in FARRA provided the
kind of "clear statement" that the Supreme
Court's St. Cyr decision required to find that
Congress meant to take away habeas
jurisdiction. Thus, at least until 2005, it was
settled that U.S. detainees facing transfer
or extradition (or non-citizens facing
removal who couldn't pursue relief in
immigration proceedings) could raise
FARRA/CAT as a basis for habeas relief,
and numerous litigants did so.

II. The REAL ID Act of 2005
As part of the judicial review provisions of
the REAL ID Act of 2005, the purpose of
which was to streamline judicial review in
immigration cases, Congress enacted new 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section
2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus
provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of
such title, a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals in accordance
with this section shall be the sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of any
cause or claim under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, except as
provided in subsection (e) of this section.
Because the point of REAL ID was to
channel review of immigration claims into
the direct review process, it is thoroughly
unlikely that Congress thereby intended to
take away all jurisdiction in cases in which
such review was unavailable (e.g., detainee
transfer and extradition cases). Put another
way, it seems difficult to read a provision
designed to deal only with immigration
cases as also applying to claims that could
never arise in deportation proceedings.
Nevertheless, the categorical language of
REAL ID does appear to satisfy St. Cyr's
"clear statement" requirement, and thereby
raises a constitutional question about
whether the Suspension Clause protects the
ability of individuals facing transfer or
extradition to challenge their transfer or
extradition via habeas ....
III. Munafv. Geren
Ironically, that constitutional question went
wholly unaddressed by the Supreme Court
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in its 2008 decision in M1Ina! v. Gerenwhich raised the substantive question of
what, exactly, federal courts reviewed m
cases in which an individual objected to
their potential transfer based on torture.
Writing for a unanimous COUli, Chief
Justice Roberts suggested that, although the
Court clearly had jurisdiction over a claim
brought by two u.s. citizens detained in
Iraq, the merits were settled by the State
Department's assurance that the two
detainees would not be tortured in Iraqi
custody. As he explained,
Petitioners here allege only the possibility of
mistreatment in a prison facility; this is not a
more extreme case in which the Executive
has determined that a detainee is likely to be
tortured but decides to transfer him anyway.
... In these cases the United States explains
that, although it remains concerned about
torture among some sectors of the Iraqi
Government, the State Department has
determined that the Justice Ministry-the
department that would have authority over
Munaf and Omar-as well as its prison and
detention facilities have " 'generally met
internationally accepted standards for basic
prisoner needs. '" ...
The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess
such determinations-determinations that
would require federal courts to pass
judgment on foreign justice systems and
undermine the Government's ability to
speak with one voice in this area.
Although the Chief's opmlOn thereby
seemed to suggest that there was nothing for
courts to do in such cases once the
Executive Branch made the relevant
assurance, there were two critical caveats:
First, as he noted, "this is not a more
extreme case in which the Executive has
determined that a detainee is likely to be
tortured but decides to transfer him

anyway." (As Justice Souter noted in his
concurrence, "I would extend the caveat to a
case in which the probability of torture is
well documented, even if the Executive fails
to acknowledge it"). Second, the Court
specifically sidestepped the possibility that
FARRA might require relief in such cases
notwithstanding the Executive Branch's
assurance. As the Chief explained, "Neither
petitioner asserted a FARR Act claim in his
petition for habeas, and the Act was not
raised in any of the certiorari filings before
this Court. ... Under such circumstances we
will not consider the question." (In a
footnote, the Chief raised two potential
shortcomings with a FARRA claim in that
case, but didn't resolve either of them.) In
other words, Mlinafrequired deference to
the Executive Branch, but did not address
whether such deference could ever be
overcome, whether in a case where the
detainee's claim arose under FARRA or
otherwise.

IV. Kiyemba II
This is where we finally get to the
Guantanamo litigation. In Kiyemba ll, the
Uighurs detained at Guantanamo filed suit
seeking notice and a hearing before their
transfer to a third-party country, in order to
ensure an opportunity to contest that transfer
on the ground that they credibly feared
tOliure. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit
held that M1Ina! pretermitted such claims, in
light of the government's blanket (and not
country-specific assurance) that it doesn't
transfer to torture. I've previously explained
in some detail why, as Judge Griffith
explained in his partial concurrence / paliial
dissent, this result simply doesn't follow
from M1Ina/, including that (I) unlike in
M1Ina/, the government's assurance didn't
address the conditions in a specific country;
(2) Muna! didn't deal with claims arising
under FARRA; and (3) MlI1uif itself wasn't
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categorical (as noted above), leaving open
the possibility that the detainee might
introduce evidence
contradicting the
government's own conclusion.
For present purposes, the relevant point is
that the D.C. Circuit's rationale went to the
merits: the misreading of M1lna! aside,
Judge Ginsburg's logic was that the
government's assurances foreclosed relief,
not that the courts were otherwise powerless
to intervene. The D.C. Circuit declined to
revisit that conclusion by a 6-3 vote, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari (although
in a related case, Justice Ginsburg noted for
herself and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor
that they would have granted a stay of a
detainee's involuntary repatriation to
Algeria "to afford the Court time to
consider, in the ordinary course, important
questions raised in this case and not resolved
in Munaf."

V.OmarII
Okay. So far, we've introduced the statutory
background, M1Inaj, and the D.C. Circuit's
perversion thereof in Kiyemba ll. In one
sense, that's all one needs to understand
Friday's decision in Garcia, because the
heart of the en bane Ninth Circuit's per
curiam opinion is its agreement with
Kiyemba ll-the courts have jurisdiction,
but once the Secretary of State makes the
relevant promises, that's the end of the
matter. But earlier this summer, the D.C.
Circuit went one significant step further, and
here the Ninth Circuit has now created a
circuit split:
In "Omar 11," which is the case of the
other detainee in M1Ina! on remand from the
Supreme Comi, Judge Kavanaugh wrote for
a divided panel (the same panel that decided
Kiyemba II) that the REAL ID Act does in
fact divest the federal courts of habeas

jurisdiction over CAT/F ARRA claims, and
that, in the process, it does not violate the
Suspension Clause. I won't rehash here my
detailed series of posts on why Omar 11 fails
to persuade. For present purposes, the
relevant point is that on this point, the Ninth
Circuit has now created a circuit split.
Here's what the per curiam opinion in
Garcia says:
Neither the REAL IO Act nor
FARRA repeals all federal habeas
jurisdiction over Trinidad y Garcia's
claims, as the government asserts. A
statute must contain "a particularly
clear statement" before it can be
construed as intending to repeal
habeas jurisdiction. Even if a
sufficiently clear statement exists,
courts must determine whether "an
alternative interpretation of the
is
'fairly
statute
possible'" before concluding that the
law actually repealed habeas relief.
FARRA lacks sufficient clarity to
survive the "paliicularly clear
statement" requirement. The REAL
ID Act can be construed as being
confined to addressing final orders of
removal, without affecting federal
habeas
jurisdiction.
Given
a
plausible alternative
statutory
construction, we cannot conclude
that the REAL 10 Act actually
repealed the remedy of habeas
corpus.
Thus, Garcia does two very different things:
(1) it endorses Kiyemba II's misreading of
M1lna! as categorically foreclosing on the

merits CA T/F ARRA claims in cases in
which the Executive Branch promises that
the detainee will not be transferred to
torture; and (2) it rejects Omar II's holding
that the REAL ID Act deprives the federal
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courts of jurisdiction in such cases (and
thereby sidesteps the constitutional question
that Dmar II resolved).
VI. Taking Stock
If you've made it this far, congratulations!
You may be wondering why all of this
matters .... Let me suggest two reasons:
1. The law governing detainee transfers is
going to continue to matter at least until and
unless we're no longer holding individuals
in military detention at Guantanamo or
inside the United States. To that end,
understanding whether courts may hear such
claims on the merits, and what the
appropriate standard is, is a pretty big dealand there's now arguably a circuit split on
the subject. Ultimately, whatever the right
answers are (is there jurisdiction? can
detainees attempt to rebut the government's
assurances?), clarity would be useful.

2. Reasonable people may disagree with me
(and Judge Griffith) that Kiyemba II badly
misreads Muna! But assume for the moment
that we're right-and that it does. One could
possibly have dismissed Kiyemba II as a
Guantanamo-specific decision, and therefore
one that could largely be ignored going
forward. The Ninth Circuit's decision
in Garcia converts Kiyemba II into generally
applicable law that will prevent litigants in
even totally conventional extradition cases
from attempting to vindicate claims under
F ARRAICAT (at least so long as it is
official U.S. policy not to transfer to
tOliure), and may therefore put the United
States in violation of its obligations under
CAT. To the extent that this is not what the
Justices had in mind in M1fna/(or Congress
in the REAL ID Act), this is a pretty big
deal. ..

241

"Blocking Parts of Arizona Law,
Justices Allow Its Centerpiece"
New York Times
June 25, 2012
Adam Liptak
The Supreme Com1 on Monday delivered a
split decision on Arizona's tough 2010
immigration law, upholding its most hotly
debated provision but blocking others on the
grounds that they interfered with the federal
government's role in setting immigration
policy. The court unanimously sustained the
law's centerpiece, the one critics have called
its "show me your papers" provision, though
they left the door open to further challenges.
The
prOVISIOn
reqmres
state
law
enforcement officials to determine the
immigration status of anyone they stop or
arrest if they have reason to suspect that the
individual might be in the country illegally.
The justices parted ways on three other
provisions, with the majority rejecting
measures that would have subjected illegal
immigrants to criminal penalties for
activities like seeking work.
The ruling is likely to set the ground rules
for the immigration debate, with supporters
of the Arizona law pushing for "show me
your papers" provisions in more states and
opponents trying to overturn criminal
sanctions for illegal immigrants.
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy said, "Arizona may have
understandable
frustrations
with
the
problems caused by illegal immigration
while that process continues, but the state
may not pursue policies that undermine
federal law."
Justice Antonin Scalia summarized his
dissent from the bench, a rare move that

indicated his deep disagreement. Rarer still,
he criticized a policy that was not before the
court:
President
Obama's
recent
announcement that his administration would
not deport many illegal immigrants who
came to the United States as children.
Justice Scalia's point was a naITOW onethat the states should have the right to make
immigration
policy
if the
federal
government is not enforcing its own
policies-but it continued a charged back
and forth between the conservative justices
and Mr. Obama. In his 2010 State of the
Union address, Mr. Obama criticized the
court's Citizens United campaign finance
ruling, which the court reiterated in a
separate ruling on Monday.
The court also announced that it was
extending its term until Thursday, signaling
that it would issue its much-anticipated
ruling on Mr. Obama's health care law then.
Both Mr. Obama and Mitt Romney, the
presumptive
Republican
presidential
nominee, quickly responded to the
immigration ruling. Mr. Romney-traveling,
by coincidence, in Arizona-said in a brief
statement that states had the right and the
duty to secure their borders.
Mr. Obama emphasized his concern that the
remaining provision could lead to racial
profiling, an issue that the court may yet
consider in a future case. "No American
should ever live under a cloud of suspicion
just because of what they look like," Mr.
Obama said in a statement, adding that he
was "pleased" about the parts that were
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stlUck down.
In her own statement, Gov. Jan Brewer of
Arizona, a Republican, said she welcomed
the decision to uphold what she called the
heart of the law. The decision, she said, was
a "victory for the lUle of law" and for "the
inherent right and responsibility of states to
defend their citizens."
Still, the lUling was a partial rebuke to state
officials who had argued that they were
entitled to supplement federal eff011s to
address illegal immigration.
The Obama administration argued that
federal immigration law trumped-or preempted, in legal jargon-the state's efforts.
Last year, the United States C0U11 of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San
Francisco, blocked the four provisions on
those grounds, including the one the
Supreme C0U11 upheld.
In its challenge, the administration did not
argue that it violated equal-protection
principles. At the Supreme C0U11 argument
in April, Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli Jr. acknowledged that the federal
case was not based on racial or ethnic
profiling.
In the majority OpInIOn, Justice Kennedy
wrote that the lUling did not foreclose other
"constitutional challenges to the law as
interpreted and applied after it goes into
effect."
Meanwhile, Attorney General Eric H.
Holder Jr. said on Monday that the federal
government would "continue to vigorously
enforce federal prohibitions against racial
and ethnic discrimination."
Five other states have enacted tough
measures to stem illegal immigration, more

or less patterned after the Arizona law:
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina
and Utah. But most states avoided creating
new crimes for immigration violations, as
Arizona did in two provisions that were
struck down.
Lower courts have stayed the carrying out of
parts of those laws, and they will now revisit
those decisions.
In upholding the requirement that the police
ask to see people's papers, the court
emphasized that state law enforcement
officials already possessed the discretion to
ask about immigration status. The Arizona
law merely makes that inquiry mandatory if
the police have reason to suspect a person is
an illegal immigrant.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A.
Alito Jr. called the administration's attack
on the provision "quite remarkable."
"The United States suggests," he wrote,
"that a state law may be pre-empted, not
because it conflicts with a federal statute or
regulation, but because it is inconsistent
with a federal agency's current enforcement
priorities. "
Justice Kennedy added that the state law
contained safeguards, including ones
instlUcting officials not to consider race or
national origin unless already permitted by
law.
Further restricting the sweep of the majority
OpInIOn, Justice Kennedy wrote that
"detaining individuals solely to verify their
immigration
status
would
raise
constitutional concerns." The decision left
open, he said, "whether reasonable suspicion
of illegal entry or other immigration crime
would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a
detention, or whether this too would be pre-
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empted by federal law."
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G.
Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion. Justice Elena
Kagan disqualified herself from the case,
Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182,
presumably because she had worked on it as
the solicitor general.
Had the case ended in a 4-to-4 tie, the
appeals court's ruling blocking all four
aspects of the Arizona law would have
stood.
Three justices dissented in part, each writing
separately and only for himself. Justices
Scalia and Clarence Thomas said they would
have sustained all three of the blocked
provisions. Justice Alito would have
sustained two of them while overturning one
that makes it a crime under state law for
immigrants to fail to register with the federal
government.
The two other prOVisiOns blocked by the
majority were one making it a crime for
illegal immigrants to work or to try find
work and another allowing the police to
arrest people without warrants if they have
probable cause to believe they have done
things that would make them deportable
under federal law.
Scholars who have followed the work of the
court for decades said they could not recall
an instance similar to Justice Scalia's
commentary on a political dispute outside
the record of the case under consideration.
"After this case was argued and while it was
under consideration," Justice Scalia said in

his written dissent, "the secretary of
homeland security announced a program
exempting from immigration enforcement
some 1.4 million illegal immigrants." This
month, the Obama administration said it
would
let
younger
immigrants-the
administration estimates the number at
800,000-who came to the United States as
children avoid deportation and receive
working papers as long as they are not over
the age of 30 and have clean criminal
records, among other conditions.
"The president said at a news conference
that the new program is 'the right thing to
do' in light of Congress's failure to pass the
administration's proposed revision of the
Immigration Act," Justice Scalia went on.
"Perhaps it is, though Arizona may not think
so. But to say, as the court does, that
Arizona contradicts federal law by enforcing
applications of the Immigration Act that the
president declines to enforce boggles the
mind."
He added that Arizona and other states
should not be left helpless before the "evil
effects of illegal immigration."
Justice Kennedy responded that "federal law
makes a single sovereign responsible for
maintaining a comprehensive and unified
system to keep track of aliens within the
nation's borders."
"The national government has significant
power to regulate immigration," he wrote.
"The sound exercise of national power over
immigration depends on the nation's
meeting its responsibility to base its laws on
a political will informed by searching,
CiViC discourse."
thoughtful, rational
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"S.B. 1070: In Plain English"
SCOTUSblog
June 25, 2012
Amy Howe

The Court didn't rule on the health care
cases today, but it still issued a blockbuster:
its decision in Arizona v. United States, the
federal government's challenge to Arizona's
controversial
immigration
law.
And
although Arizona prevailed last year at the
Court in a case involving a different effort to
regulate immigration (in that case, by
punishing businesses that hire illegal
immigrants), it did not fare as well this year.
Instead, the decision was largely (but not
entirely) a victory for the federal
government: the Court held that three of the
four provisions of the law at issue in the
case cannot not go into effect at all because
they are "preempted," or trumped, by federal
immigration laws. And while the Court
allowed one provision-which requires
police officers to check the immigration
status of anyone whom they detain or arrest
before they release that person-to go into
effect, even here it left open the possibility
that this provision would eventually be held
unconstitutional if not applied narrowly in
Arizona.
Background
As I explained before the oral argument, the
Arizona legislature believed that the federal
government was not doing enough to fight
illegal immigration. So it took matters into
its own hands by passing S.B. 1070, which
seeks to put so many restrictions on illegal
immigrants in the state that they will give up
and go home-a policy known as "attrition
by enforcement."
But before S.B. 1070 could go into effect,
the United States went to federal court to

block it, arguing that the law violates the
Constitution (and therefore cannot be valid)
because it is trumped by federal immigration
laws. (The federal government's suit did not
present the question whether the statute
exhibited racial discrimination.) The lower
courts agreed that four provisions of S.B.
1070 were invalid:
•

•

•

•

Section 2(B), popularly known as
"show me your papers," which
requires police officers to check the
immigration status of anyone whom
they arrest or detain and allows them
to stop and arrest someone if they
believe that he is an undocumented
immigrant;
Section 3, which makes it a crime to
be ill Arizona without valid
immigration papers;
Section 5(C), which makes it a crime
to apply for or hold a job without
proper immigration papers; and
Section 6, which allows a police
officer to arrest someone, without a
warrant, if the officer believes that
he has committed - at some point in
time-a crime that could cause him
to be deported.

Decision
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the
Court, which had the full support of the
Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor. (Justice Elena Kagan did
not participate in the case, presumably
because she was involved in earlier stages of
the case while she served as the Solicitor
General of the United States.) So the fifth

245

vote of the Chief Justice was critical to
having an actual ruling by the Supreme
Court; otherwise, the Court would have tied
four-to-four on three provisions of S.B.
1070, leaving no final Supreme Court
decision.
Before turning to the specific provisions of
the law at issue, the Court began with an
overview of the federal government's nearexclusive authority over immigration issues
that left the reader with little doubt that
much-if not all-of S.B. 1070 would be
struck down: while the Court acknowledged
that Arizona had valid concerns about the
effects of illegal immigration, the Court
explained that the federal government's
power to regulate immigration is "extensive
and complex." Among other things, the
Court emphasized that it is "fundamental"
that foreign countries be able to
communicate with just one governmentthe federal government-about immigration
issues; equally important is the "broad
discretion" that the federal government has
when it decides whether and how to enforce
immigration laws.
With that groundwork laid, the Court then
turned to the four provisions of S.B. 1070 at
issue in this case. First up was Section 3 of
the law, which makes it a crime to fail to
carry valid immigration papers while in
Arizona. The state had argued that this
prOVISIOn should survive because it
essentially does the same thing as federal
law, which also requires immigrants to carry
valid papers. But the majority of the Court
was unconvinced. First, the Court explained
that Congress had already made clear that it
would provide the full (and only) set of
standards to govern when and how
immigrants must register with the federal
government-a concept known as "field
preemption." When Congress has provided
this full set of standards, the Court

continued, state efforts to govern the same
thing cannot be valid, even if the state laws
and regulations are identical to the federal
ones. So it wouldn't matter if Section 3 did
the exact same thing as the federal laws. But
in any event, the Court continued, it doesn't,
because the penalties for a violation of
Section 3 are different from (and tougher
than) those imposed by federal law.
The Court next turned to Section S(C) of
S.B. 1070, which would make it a crime to
apply for or hold a job in Arizona unless you
have valid immigration papers. Unlike
Section 3, Section S(C) has no counterpart in
federal law. But the Court again relied on
the concept of "field preemption" to hold
Section S(C) invalid, explaining that
Congress had set up a comprehensive
system to deal with employment of
undocumented workers. Although Arizona
argued that Section S(C) does not conflict
with any federal laws because the federal
system only deals with employers, and does
not make it a crime for undocumented
workers to work in this country, the Court
was unmoved. To the contrary, it explained,
Congress made a "deliberate choice" not to
criminalize the very conduct that Arizona
now seeks to make a crime.
The third and final provision that the Court
struck down was Section 6 of S.B. 1070,
which received virtually no attention at the
oral argument in April. It would allow police
officers to arrest someone without a warrant
if the police officer has probable cause to
believe that the individual has done
something that would justify his deportation
from the United States. Here too the COUli
emphasized the federal government's
control of the process of deporting (also
known
as
removing)
undocumented
immigrants from the United States. Under
the federal system, an undocumented
immigrant can only be arrested and held for
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possible removal if there is a warrant for his
arrest or if he is likely to escape before
police can get a warrant. Because Section 6
would give state law enforcement officials a
much broader power to make arrests than
under the federal system, the Court
concluded, it cannot stand.
Much of the late April oral argument in the
case focused on Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070,
labeled by opponents as the "show me your
papers" provision, which requires police
officers to check the immigration status of
anyone whom they arrest or detain and
allows them to stop and arrest someone if
they believe that he is an undocumented
immigrant. At oral argument in April, it
seemed likely that the provision could
survive, and it did-at least for now. The
COUli relied heavily on the fact that Section
2(B) requires police officers to contact the
federal government to verify an individual's
immigration status, which is something that
police officers could do on their own
initiative anyway (and which Congress has
in fact encouraged state and local
governments to do).
Citing language in the Arizona law that
prohibits police officers from considering
race or national origin, the Court held that
the provision could at least go into effect for
now. But it left open the possibility that
opponents of the law could return to comi to
challenge it once it has been enforced and
Arizona courts have a chance to interpret it.
The Supreme Court made quite clear that the
key to the provision surviving in the future
will be whether it is interpreted in a way that
does not prolong detentions of people who
are stopped by police. The upshot is that if a
person is arrested, Arizona can check his
immigration status while it holds him. But if
the person is merely detained-for example,
at a traffic stop-the immigration check will

probably take too long and he will probably
have to be released. The check can then
continue without the individual there.
Three Justices-Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito--agreed with the other five members
of the Court that Section 2(B) was not
trumped by federal law and could go into
effect, but they disagreed with other aspects
of the majority's conclusions. Justice
Scalia's opinion (which represented his
views alone) was by far the most strongly
worded of the three, with the same mix of
scorn and disbelief that he displayed at oral
argument. And the overarching theme of his
dissent was the same as well: as a sovereign
state, Arizona has a right to keep out people
who aren't supposed to be in this country,
much less in Arizona. And S.B. 1070 only
applies to people who aren't supposed to be
here at all.
Justice Scalia singled out for special
criticism the federal government's argument
that it needs sole control over immigration
issues because it needs "to allocate scarce
enforcement resources wisely." Given the
myriad problems that illegal immigration
has created for Arizona, Justice Scalia
asked, why on earth should this mean that
Arizona can't spend its own money and
resources to combat illegal immigration?
But what Justice Scalia seemed to find
particularly galling was the President's
recent announcement-made after the oral
arguments in this case-that it would allow
some young adults who came to the country
illegally as children to remain here
indefinitely if they can meet celiain criteria.
The administration of the new program,
Justice Scalia predicted, will entail
"considerable" costs that "will necessarily
be
deducted
from
immigration
enforcement"-casting doubt on the validity
of the federal government's lament
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regarding the need to conserve scarce
resources.
Justices Thomas and Alito filed OpInlOnS
that were both shorter and more reserved
than Justice Scalia's. Like Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas would have allowed all of
the provisions of S.B. 1070 to go into effect,
based on his own narrow views about
federal preemption generally. Justice Alito,
by contrast, agreed with the Court that
Section 2(B) should be allowed to go into
effect and that Section 3 is trumped by

federal immigration laws, but he disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that Sections
5(C) and 6 were trumped as well.
After today's decision in this case, the Court
recessed until Thursday morning at ten,
setting the stage for an all-but-celiain
announcement of the Court's decision in the
challenges to the Affordable Care Act. We'll
be back at nine that morning to cover the
release in our Live Blog; later on that day,
we'll repoli on the opinion in Plain English.
Once again, stay tuned ....
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"Raising Arizona: Supreme Court's Immigration Decision
Creates More Questions Than It Answers"
The Huffington Post
July 19,2012
Ginny Sloan

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Arizona v. United States, a closely watched
case in which the federal government
challenged
Arizona's
controversial
immigration law, SB 1070. The decision and
its impact has since been dissected in both
legal and media circles. Perhaps more than
anything, however, the immediate aftermath
of Arizona highlights the host of difficult
questions around state and local immigration
enforcement that the Supreme Court didn't
answer.
Specifically at issue in Arizona were four
provisions of SB 1070: Section 3, which
criminalizes willful failure to complete or
carry immigration papers; Section 5, which
makes it a crime for undocumented
noncltizens to work; Section 6, which
authorizes the warrantless arrest of any
person police have probable cause to believe
is removable from the United States; and
Section 2B, which requires law enforcement
officials to verify the immigration status of
any person lawfully stopped or detained
when they have reason to suspect that the
person is here unlawfully.

Security (DHS) responded by promptly
terminating agreements that had authorized
Arizona state and local law enforcement
agents, under federal supervision, to enforce
immigration law in the field. DHS also set
limits on when its immigration officials
should respond to a scene at the request of
Arizona law enforcement, and set up a
hotline to report civil rights violations.
Governor Brewer railed against the
"disarmament" of Arizona's immigration
enforcement capabilities, calling the actions
"a new low" for the Obama administration.

The Court cautiously upheld Section 2B-at
least for now-but struck down sections 3,
5, and 6. The fallout was immediate.

It bears emphasizing that the only question
before the Court in this case was whether
four provisions of SB 1070 were
"preempted;" that is, whether Arizona
overstepped its bounds by passing state
legislation
that
undermines
federal
immigration law. Many other questions
remain: Can "show me your papers" laws
like Section 2B be implemented without
racial profiling? What aspects of copycat
laws now subject to constitutional
challenges in states like Alabama, South
Carolina, Georgia, Utah and Indiana will
survive post-Arizona? And, in particular,
how free are states and local jurisdictions
across the country to choose a different
path?

Arizona Governor Jan Brewer claimed
victory, not just for Arizona but for the 10th
Amendment, explaining that by upholding
"the heati of SB 1070" the Court had
reaffirmed "the inherent right and
responsibility of states to defend their
citizens." The Depatiment of Homeland

A longstanding battle being waged at both
the state and local level over the
government's Secure Communities program
is in many ways the flip side of the Arizona
fight.
Under
Secure
Communities,
fingerprints collected during the booking
process that are regularly sent to the FBI to
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be checked against its criminal databases are
also sent to DHS to be checked against its
immigration databases. If there is an
"hit,"
Immigration
and
immigration
Customs
Enforcement
(ICE)
is
automatically notified. ICE can then issue a
"detainer," or a request to local law
enforcement to hold the person up to 48
hours beyond when he or she would
otherwise be released so that ICE can
assume custody.
The
government
describes
Secure
Communities as a simple information
sharing mechanism. Some critics believe it's
a dangerous depOliation dragnet. The rub is
that the federal government says the Secure
Communities is mandatory-and will be
extended to all jurisdictions in the country
by 2013-notwithstanding that some states
and localities simply don't want it. Just last
week, the Washington D.C. City Council
passed legislation limiting the circumstances
under which the District will honor
immigration detainers. Other localities
across the country have adopted, or are
considering, similar limits on their
cooperation with federal enforcement
efforts. At the state level, the California
Senate recently passed the Trust Act,
legislation that would prohibit California
law enforcement from complying with an
immigration detainer unless the arrestee was
convicted of a serious or violent felony and
the detaining agency has adopted a plan to
guard against racial profiling and other
potentially damaging consequences of
Secure Communities.
In contrast to Arizona, these and other
states' and localities' view certain federal

immigration enforcement efforts as overly
harsh or detrimental and don't want to
participate, at least not on the federal
government's terms. What's the scope of
their right to resist (rooted in the 10th
Amendment or otherwise)?
The questions raised in Arizona and that
remain in its aftermath lie at the heart of a
series of ongoing tugs of war between the
federal government and states and localities
that are playing-and in the absence of
comprehensive immigration reform will
continue to play-a critical role in setting
the boundaries of immigration enforcement.
In Arizona, Justice Kennedy urged that these
struggles take the form of a "searching,
thoughtful, rational civic discourse." We at
The Constitution Project (TCP) couldn't
agree more, and in an effort to make a
meaningful contribution to such a discourse,
TCP has assembled a new Immigration
Committee that includes members with
widely divergent views and experiences who
are eager to heed Justice Kennedy's call.
Although TCP has already made a few
forays into immigration policy-calling for
reform of both the immigration detention
system and the ways in which we use
immigration law as a counterterrorism
tool-it is clearly an area where TCP's
approach to assembling a panel of issue
experts from across the ideological
spectrum, then asking them to develop
bipartisan, consensus-based solutions to
tough constitutional questions, can be more
fruitfully brought to bear. We look forward
to being a part of the national conversation
on this impOliant issue.

250

"Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on the Supreme Court's
Ruling on Arizona v. The United States"
Department ofJustice
June 25,2012
Attorney General Eric Holder issued the
following statement today:
"I welcome the Supreme Court's decision
to strike down major provisions of Arizona's
S.B. 1070 on federal preemption grounds.
Today's ruling appropriately bars the State
of Arizona from effectively criminalizing
unlawful status in the state and confirms the
federal government's exclusive authority to
regulate in the area of immigration.

"While I am pleased the Court confirmed
the serious constitutional questions the
government raised regarding Section 2, 1
remain concerned about the impact of
Section 2, which requires law enforcement
officials to verify the immigration status of
any person lawfully stopped or detained
when they have reason to suspect that the
person is here unlawfully. As the Court
itself recognized, Section 2 is not a license
to engage in racial profiling and 1 want to
assure communities around this country that
the Department of Justice will continue to

vigorously enforce federal prohibitions
against racial and ethnic discrimination. We
will closely monitor the impact of S.B. 1070
to ensure compliance with federal
immigration law and with applicable civil
rights laws, including ensuring that law
enforcement agencies and others do not
implement the law in a manner that has the
purpose or effect of discriminating against
the Latino or any other community.
"We will also work to ensure that the
verification provision does not divert police
officers away from traditional law
enforcement efforts in order to enforce
federal
immigration
law,
potentially
impamng local policing efforts and
discouraging crime VIctIms, including
children of non-citizens, victims of domestic
violence, and asylum seekers, from
repoliing abuses and crimes out of fear of
detention or deportation. We will continue
to use every federal resource to protect the
safety and civil rights of all Americans."
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"Closing Guantanamo Fades as a Priority"
The Nevil York Times
June 25,2010
Charlie Savage

Stymied by political opposition and focused
on competing pnontIes, the Obama
administration has sidelined efforts to close
the Guantanamo prison, making it unlikely
that President Obama will fulfill his promise
to close it before his term ends in 2013.

"Our commanders have made clear that
closing the detention facility at Guantanamo
is a national security imperative, and the
president remains committed to achieving
that goal," said a White House spokesman,
Ben LaBolt.

When the White House acknowledged last
year that it would miss Mr. Obama's initial
January 2010 deadline for shutting the
prison, it also declared that the detainees
would eventually be moved to one in
Illinois. But impediments to that plan have
mounted in Congress, and the administration
is doing little to overcome them.

Still, some senior officials say privately that
the administration has done its part,
including identifying the Illinois prison-an
empty
maximum-security
center
in
Thomson, 150 miles west of Chicagowhere the detainees could be held. They
blame Congress for failing to execute that
endgame.

"There is a lot of inertia" against closing the
prison, "and the administration is not putting
a lot of energy behind their position that I
can see," said Senator Carl Levin, the
Michigan Democrat who is chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and
supports the Illinois plan. He added that "the
odds are that it will still be open" by the next
presidential inauguration.

"The president can't just wave a magic
wand to say that Gitmo will be closed," said
a senior administration official, speaking on
condition of anonymity to discuss internal
thinking on a sensitive issue.

And Senator Lindsey Graham, a South
Carolina Republican who also supports
shutting it, said the effort is "on life support
and it's unlikely to close any time soon." He
attributed the collapse to some fellow
Republicans' "demagoguery" and the
administration's poor planning and decisionmaking "paralysis."
The White House InSIStS it IS still
determined to shutter the prison. The
administration argues that Guantanamo is a
symbol in the Muslim world of past detainee
abuses, citing military views that its
continued operation helps terrorists.

The politics of closing the prison have
clearly soured following the attempted
bombings on a plane on Dec. 25 and in
Times Square in May, as well as Republican
criticism that imprisoning detainees in the
United States would endanger Americans.
When Mr. Obama took office a slight
majority suppOlied closing it. By a March
2010 poll, 60 percent wanted it to stay open.
One administration official argued that the
White House was still trying. On May 26,
Mr. Obama's national security adviser,
James Jones, sent a letter to the House
Appropriations Committee reiterating the
case.
But Mr. Levin portrayed the administration
as unwilling to make a serious effort to exert
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its influence, contrasting its muted response
to legislative hurdles to closing Guantanamo
with "very vocal" threats to veto financing
for a fighter jet engine it opposes.
Last year, for example, the administration
stood aside as lawmakers restricted the
transfer of detainees into the United States
except for prosecution. And its response was
silence several weeks ago, Mr. Levin said,
as the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees voted to block money for
renovating
the
Illinois
prison
to
accommodate detainees, and to restrict
transfers from Guantanamo to other
countries-including, in the Senate version,
a bar on Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Somalia. About 130 of the 181
detainees are from those countries.
"They are not really putting their shoulder to
the wheel on this issue," Mr. Levin said of
White House officials. "It's pretty dormant
in terms of their public positions."
Several administration officials expressed
hope that political winds might shift if, for
example, high-level Qaeda leaders are
killed, or if lawmakers focus on how
expensive it is to operate a prison at the
isolated base.
A recent Pentagon study, obtained by The
New York Times, shows taxpayers spent
more than $2 billion between 2002 and 2009
on the prison. Administration officials
believe taxpayers would save about $180
million a year in operating costs if
Guantanamo detainees were held at
Thomson, which they hope Congress will
allow the Justice Department to buy from
the State of Illinois at least for federal
inmates.
But in a sign that some may be making
peace with keeping Guantanamo open,
officials also praise improvements at the

prison. An interagency review team brought
order to scattered files. Mr. Obama banned
brutal interrogations. Congress overhauled
military commissions to give defendants
more safeguards.
One category-detainees cleared for release
who cannot be repatriated for their own
safety-is on a path to extinction: allies
have accepted 33, and just 22 await
resettlement. Another-those who will be
held without trials-has been narrowed to
48.
Still, the administration has faced a
worsening problem in dealing with the
prison's large Yemeni popUlation, including
58 low-level detainees who would already
have been repatriated had they been from a
more stable country, officials say.
The administration asked Saudi Arabia to
put some Yemenis through a program aimed
at rehabilitating jihadists but was rebuffed,
officials said. And Mr. Obama imposed a
moratorium on Yemen transfers after the
failed Dec. 25 attack, planned by a Yemenbased branch of Al Qaeda whose members
include two former Guantanamo detainees
from Saudi Arabia.
As a result, the Obama administration has
been further entangled in practices many of
its officials lamented during the Bush
administration. A judge this month ordered
the government to release a 26-year-old
Yemeni imprisoned since 2002, citing
overwhelming evidence of his innocence.
The Obama team decided last year to release
the man, but shifted course after the
moratorium. This week, the National
Security Council decided to send the man to
Yemen in a one-time exception, an official
said on Friday.
Meanwhile, discussions have faltered
between Mr. Graham and the White House
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aimed at crafting a bipartisan legislative
package that would close Guantanamo while
bolstering legal authorities for detaining
terrorism suspects without trial.
Mr. Graham said such legislation would
build confidence about holding detainees,
including future captures, in an untainted
prison inside the United States. But the talks
lapsed.
"We can't get anyone to give us a final
answer," he said. "It just goes into a black
hole. I don't know what happens."

In any case, one senior official said, even if
the administration concludes that it will
never close the prison, it cannot
acknowledge that because it would revive
Guantanamo as America's image in the
Muslim world.
"Guantanamo is a negative symbol, but it is
much diminished because we are seen as
trying to close it," the official said. "Closing
Guantanamo is good, but fighting to close
Guantanamo is O.K. Admitting you failed
would be the worst."
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"What's Left of the Guantanamo Litigation? Nothing."
The BlIffington Post
June 11,2012
Shayana Kadidal

Four years ago tomorrow, the Supreme
Court ruled that Guantanamo detainees have
a right to challenge the legality of their
detention in federal court. The case,
BOllmediene v. Blish, was at the time hailed
as
a
landmark
separation-of-powers
decision, routinely assigned as required
reading in law schools now as part of the
first-year curriculum. Today, the Supreme
Court effectively undid that decision.
In the four years since the Bo1tmediene
decision, detainees have won approximately
two-thirds of the cases that have been heard
by federal trial courts (the "district" courts).
However, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, the most conservative court of
appeals in the nation, has reversed every
single detainee victory that the government
has chosen to appeal. Seven detainees had
petitioned the Court to hear their appeals
from D.C. Circuit decisions in the last few
months, and the Court had gathered the
cases for consideration over the last few
weeks. Today, the Court announced that it
would not review any of them-without
even so much as a peep of dissent from any
of the nine justices.

Most of the detainees in Guantanamo are not
litigating their cases because they have
already been cleared for release-87 of the
remaining 169. In the few dozen contested
cases occupying the middle ground between
"cleared" and "likely to be charged in
military commission," many detainees won
rulings that their detention was unlawful
throughout 2009 and 2010. But the Court of
Appeals, in the course of a few months,

ruled that hearsay was broadly admissible in
these cases. That was enormously significant
because, as numerous newspaper accounts
over the last four years have demonstrated, a
small number of prisoners at Guantanamo
lodged accusations against hundreds of
fellow detainees (often while suffering clear
symptoms of mental illness or post-abuse
trauma, and reportedly receiving benefits
like video game systems). Their years-old
hearsay statements during interrogations
could now be taken seriously without giving
the accused's lawyers a chance to crossexamine them. Nearly every detainee ever
held at Guantanamo faces hearsay
allegations that they were, for example, seen
at one of the numerous hostels where other
foreigners suspected of ties to the Taliban
also stayed. The Court of Appeals has
opined that that in itself is "overwhelming"
evidence of detainability. And it has robbed
the trial courts of an age-old prerogative-to
judge the testimony of the accused more
trustworthy that the hearsay from his
accusers-by ruling in one case that a mass
of such hearsay must outweigh the judge's
determination that the accused was telling
the truth. The leading case in the group of
seven seeking review by the court today,
Latif v. Obama, challenged a Court of
Appeals
decision
allowing
that
a
government intelligence report should be
presumed to be accurate. That document
was the government's primary evidence
justifying Latirs detention, and the district
judge found in Latirs favor despite it, but
two judges of the Court of Appeals reversed
that rUling. In dissent, Judge Tatel stated that
the ruling "moving the goal posts" and
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"calls the game in the government's favor."
The net effect is that it is now next to
impossible to win a case through appeal-a
fact confirmed by a concurring opinion from
a D.C. Circuit judge stating baldly that he
doubted "any of [his Court of Appeals]
colleagues will vote to grant a petition" if
the government could "muster even 'some
evidence'" (no matter how dubious the
source) against the detainee. Because of the
skewed legal standards created by the
appeals comi, only one of the last 12 cases
before the trial courts has resulted in a
detainee victory. As Judge Tatel said in
Latif, "it is hard to see what is left of the
In
Supreme
Court's
command
Boumediene. "
Since Boumediene, the Supreme COUli has
not heard argument in another Guantanamo
case. Up till now we had assumed that was
largely because Justice Kagan, as an
administration insider, had recused herself
from hearing detainee cases. There seemed
grounds for hope in the possibility that she
would eventually stop recusing herself and
vote in favor of review on one of these
cases. But in today's votes she did not
recuse herself-and we still lost.
In the wake of the justices' continued
silence, the judges of the D.C. Circuit have
been left with the last word in Guantanamo
cases. They have used it to openly mock the
Supreme COUli's authority, with one
claiming that BOllmediene made "airy
suppositions" about the practicality of
providing judicial review, another stating
"taking a case [for review] might obligate
[the Supreme COUli] to assume direct
responsibility" for the decision, and a third
comparing the Justices to Tom and Daisy
Buchanan in The Great Gatsby as "careless
people, who smashed things up" and who

"let other people clean up the mess they
made."
In BOllmediene the Supreme Court's stated
that Guantanamo detainees must receive
"meaningful review of both the cause for
detention and the Executive's power to
detain." But that great victory in
BOllmediene now means next to nothing to
our clients, because the D.C. Circuit is
playing the part Arkansas Governor Orval
Faubus played at Little Rock. The problem
for us is that no one is playing the part of
Dwight Eisenhower or the Warren Court.
Ironically, today has proved that the D.C.
Circuit's scalding criticism of the Supreme
COUli was largely correct-the high court is
happy to lay down platitudes, without the
courage or commitment to follow through
on enforcing the details as the Warren Court
did in Cooper v. Aaron, when it forced
school desegregation down the throat of an
intransigent Arkansas state government.
Perhaps the real loser today, as nowdepmied Justice Stevens said after Bush v.
Gore, "is the Nation's confidence in the
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of
law."
That this happened without a single dissent
is even more shocking (and probably a sign
of what the Court has lost with the departure
of Justices Stevens and Souter). Put to one
side concerns about granting everyone a day
in court, and fair process. Innocence, after
all, is what caused most people to care about
Gtmo in the first place-the fact that
hundreds of detainees were sold into custody
by bounties paid to warlords and corrupt
Pakistani police, and held based on no real
evidence. Surely the Court knows that this
still characterizes the typical detainee rotting
in Guantanamo today. The majority of
detainees today are cleared for release-87
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in total-and they have been detained now
for three years since the interagency Task
Force cleared them by unanimous consent of
the CIA, FBI, DOD, State and Justice
Departments. Yet only two detainees have
been released by the Obama administration
since January 2011. Ultimately the fate of
the rest is in the hands of the president, who
seems utterly uninterested in fulfilling the
promise he made on his second day in office
to close what is the most infamous prison in
the world.
Lost in all of this is what motivated
President Bush and candidates McCain and
Obama to call for closure of the prison back
in 2008-not humane concerns for men
wrongly held for nearly 10 years (for the
three reasons above, politicians need not
pretend to care about that anymore), not the
$700,000 cost per year per prisoner of
continuing to hold all those cleared
detainees (which, in a sign of the cynicism

of the American public, seems to be the
talking point with the most traction), but
rather the impact the whole system of
indefinite detention without charge (of
which Guantlnamo is merely the prime
symbol) has on the international perception
of the United States. The cost of a false
positive may in fact be higher than the cost
of a wrongful release when our
government's announced enemies in the
"war on terror" are first and foremost
seeking to convert young men to their
po litical cause. Yet the most signi ficant
political upheaval in the Muslim world-the
many revolutions of the Arab Springmoves forward without any perceptible
influence from an administration desperate
for credibility with the democratic
movements on the ground. As long as the
reality at Guantanamo is so far out of sync
with our aspirational values as a nation, that
is as it should be.
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"D.C. Circuit: Last Stop for Detainees?"
SCOTUSblog
March, 9, 2012
Lyle Denniston
For almost four years, the Supreme COUli
has left it to lower courts to SOli out the legal
review that the Justices mandated for
prisoners held by the U.S. military at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with a remarkable
result: the detainees very often win in
District Court, but not one has ever gotten
released from confinement by court order.
The reason: the government has never lost
any of its appeals in the D.C. Circuit Court,
and that series of rulings has been
accompanied by caustic criticism of the
Supreme Court by three of the Circuit
Court's judges. The Supreme Court has
never reacted, but lawyers in eight new
cases are now urging it to do so.
Based on actual experience since the Court's
historic ruling in 2008 in BOllmediene v.
BliSh, one of two things appears to be true:
the COUli is satisfied with the results and
essentially has taken itself out of the
Guantanamo controversy, or the COUli has
not found a suitable new case that four
Justices want to review and is still waiting.
In the meantime, the Executive Branch,
though frustrated by frequent efforts in
Congress to control the fate of the 171 men
still at Guantanamo on the theory that most
if not all of them are terrorists, has not again
suffered a courthouse setback like the one in
BOllmediene and in three other Supreme
Court decisions before that.
Last Term, the Court opted not to hear any
of eight cases brought to it by Guantanamo
detainees' lawyers. One factor that seemed
to be at work then was that Justice Elena
Kagan, a former U.S. Solicitor General who
previously had some role in detainee matters
in the Obama Administration, took no part

in most of those cases. With eight new cases
now on file, Kagan so far has not
disqualified herself from any, although the
occasion for doing so has not yet arisen in
several of them. She did recuse in a
preliminary vote in a potential ninth new
case, but that one has not developed fully
yet. There is another pending case, but it
was filed for former detainees, no longer
held by the U.S.
The government-in both the Bush and
Obama Administrations-has taken the view
that the BOllmediene decision entitles
Guantanamo detainees to a single court test
of their detention, but that, if they win that
case, actual release or transfer is a matter for
the Executive Branch, either under its
control of immigration and deportation
matters or its diplomatic authority. The
Circuit Court has embraced that claim, but
also has gone far to make it harder for any
detainee to win such a case in the first place.
In one of the more recent Circuit Court
rulings, the dissenting judge argued that it
was "hard to see what is left of the Supreme
Court's command in BOllmediene that
habeas review be 'meaningful. '" The
majority of the Circuit Court, that judge
added, has "called the game in the
government's favor."
Among the lengthy list of cases in which
District COUli judges have ruled against
further detention, a number have involved a
judge's sharp criticism of the quality of
proof in intelligence reports offered by the
government. But, when the Circuit Court has
decided appeals, it has regularly found the
evidence sufficient to support futiher
confinement on the theory that official
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evidence is entitled to judicial deference. It
has sent a few cases back to District Comi
for further review, but has yet to clear any
detainee for release. Releases that have
occurred have been at the discretion of the
Executive Branch.
Although the government has regularly won
in the Circuit Court with an argument that
only the lowest accepted standard of proof
need be satisfied to justify continued
detention, a senior judge on the Circuit
Court, Laurence H. Silberman, has criticized
the Justice Department for not pressing for
an even more permissive view of detention
authority and has expressed doubt that any
of his colleagues would vote to release any
detainee without viliually absolute proof
that they do not actively support a terrorist
group. "Some evidence" should be enough,
Silberman has written. Another senior
judge, A. Raymond Randolph, has likened
the Justices in the majority in B01l1nediene to
fictional characters in The Great Gats by,
"careless people" making messes for other
people to clean up. One of the more junior
judges, Janice Rogers Brown, has castigated
the B01imediene ruling for its "airy
suppositions" about the nature of war and
for using logic that would lead the Executive
Branch to adopt a policy of taking no
prisoners. Judge Brown has also argued that
international law should put no limits on the
President's detention power.
Lawyers in some of the new cases in the
Supreme Court have recounted those
criticisms, just to be sure the Justices are
aware of them. In one of the new petitions,
the lawyers argued that the Circuit Court
had "demonstrated open disdain" for the
BOllmediene ruling, and had "whittled
procedural protections in these habeas
hearings down to almost nothing."
The Obama Administration, by contrast, has

filed papers in a few of the new cases,
contending-as it did in the previous ones
that the system of court review of
Guantanamo cases that has unfolded since
the BOllmediene ruling is working as it
should, and that the government will do its
best diplomatically to find a place to
relocate any prisoner who has won a courtordered release-if the government lost an
appeal. It has also said that Judge
Silberman's remarks on how hard it should
be for any detainee to gain release is not the
view that prevails on the Circuit Court, and
that the government does not share Judge
Brown's view that international law does not
limit detention power. The government's
basic view on detention authority is that it
may hold anyone who was "part of' a
terrorist network or organization. When the
government has chosen not to respond to
some of the new petitions, the Court has
sought a response.

It is not clear at this point just how the Court
is processing the new cases. None is
currently
scheduled
for
a
specific
Conference of the Justices, although some
were set previously and then were postponed
without explanation. Two cases, though, are
on temporary hold at the lawyers' request
while a later case was being prepared; it has
since been filed. That is the case of Latif v.
Obama (11-1027), which is the one in which
Judge Brown leveled her harshest criticisms
at the BOllmediene decision.
As usual, it will take the votes of four
Justices to grant review of any of the cases.
Because the BOllmediene decision came on a
5-4 vote, and the four Justices who were in
dissent remain on the Comi, votes to review
more recent Circuit Court decisions that
went against detainees probably would have
to come from among the three Justices who
remain from the 2008 majority-Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy (the opinion's author),
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Stephen G. Breyer, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg-along with at least one vote from
one of the two newer Justices, Kagan and
Sonia Sotomayor. Two years ago, Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor indicated
a willingness to take on a new case at some
point. Kennedy did not join in that
comment, and Kagan was not on the Court
then. Kagan's recusals last Term thus
lowered the prospect of four votes to grant
in earlier cases. As a matter of pride of
authorship, though, Kennedy is the Justice
whose work in BOllmediene has drawn the
sharpest critique from some of the Circuit
Court judges.
Perhaps the most provocative question
raised in the new petitions-and it is an
issue that seemed clearly designed to get
Justice Kennedy's attention-is this one:
"Whether the court of appeals' manifest
unwillingness
to
allow
Guantanamo
detainees to prevail in their habeas corpus
cases calls for the exercise of this Court's
supervisory power." The question is based
on the premise that the Court, in
BOllmediene, had said that habeas review for
Guantanamo
detainees
had
to
be
"meaningful" and that actual release had to
be an option open to District Court judges.
That question is raised in the Latif case,
involving a Yemeni national, Adnan Farhan
Abdul Latif. A District judge ruled in his
favor, but Judge Brown's opinion for the
Circuit Court majority reversed, and laid
down the legal principle that government
intelligence reports are entitled to a
presumption that they are accurate. That
opinion prompted an unusual, though
sharply worded, dissent from Circuit Judge
David S. Tate!' The same question is also
asked in the case of another Yemeni,
Hussain Salem Mohammed Almerfedi, who
won his case in District Comt, then the
Circuit Court ruled against him, more
broadly than the government had asked.

Without knowing at this point when the
eight new cases will be sent to the Justices
for initial consideration, and assuming that
at some point all will be ready, they can now
be grouped by the issues they seek to raise.
First, there is a list of issues and the cases
raising them, by case title and docket
number. Later in the post, the petitions are
listed with links to all of the filings so far
sent to the Comt in each.
1. Definition of government power to
detain at Guantanamo

Al-Bihani v. Obama (10-1383)-seeks a
basic definition of detention power, limited
by the laws of war
Uthman v. Obama (11-413)-challenges
detention for one who did not actually fight
against U.S. or allied forces and provided no
direct support to terrorists
Almerfedi v. Obama (11-683)-chalienges
detention authority if based on nonincriminating facts
Al-Madhwani v. Obama (11-7020)challenges detention based on "guilt by
association" with suspected terrorists, based
on visits to guesthouses and training
facilities
A l-Alwi v. Obama (11-7700)-chalienges
detention based on ties to the Taliban after
hostilities had ended

2. Circuit Court refusal to uphold any
release order
Almerfedi (11-683) and Latif(II-1 027)

3. Procedural rights of detainees in court
Uthman (11-413 )~violation of the habeas
Suspension Clause if habeas review is not
meaningful
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Almerfedi (11-683)-validity of reqUIrIng
detainee to rebut government evidence
found to be credible

11-421-Abdah v. Obama

Latif (11-1 027)-challenges presumption of
accuracy of U.S. intelligence reports, and
challenges Circuit Court power to find facts
on its own

ll-I027-Latifv. Obama

Kandari v. u.s. (11-1054)-right to restrict
government's use of hearsay evidence

11-683-Almerfedi v. Obama

11-1 054-Kandari v.

u.s.

11-7020-Al-Madhwani v. Obama-Chief
Justice recused
11-7700-Al-Arwi v. Obama

Al-Madhwani
(11-7020)-right
constitutional due process protection

to

A I-A lwi (11-7700)-inadequate time for
attorney to prepare a defense
4. Government power to transfer out of
Guantanamo over objection
Abdah v. Obama (11-421 )-right of attorney
to advance notice in order to challenge
planned transfer to a nation where the
detainee fears torture
Here are the eight new cases, listed by
docket number:
10-1383-Al-Bihani v. Obama

Beyond those eight cases filed for current
prisoners at Guantanamo, lawyers for two
former detainees there are seeking to revive
their claim that they have suffered harmful
consequences of having been treated as
enemies and held by the U.S. military. The
claims of Nazul Gul, an Afghan, and Adel
Hassan Hamad, a Sudanese national, both
claim innocence of any terrorist acts. The
petition is Gul and Hamad v. Obama (117827). The U.S. government response was
filed on Thursday but is not yet available.
Finally, there is another current detainee
case, but all of the papers in it are sealed. It
is El Falesteny v. Obama, pending on a
motion (llM59) to file a classified petition
under seal. Justice Kagan is recused.

11-413-Uthman v. Obama
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